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ABSTRACT  
This dissertation is a historical study of the socio-material and knowledge practices 
involved in the making of the modern Indian economy between approximately 1915 and 1965. It 
explores this subject through the lens of the khadi economy, the name I assign to the network of 
institutions established by Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi from the late 1910s to ameliorate rural 
unemployment and underemployment through the reintroduction of village industries in the 
Indian countryside. In contrast to most accounts of the khadi economy, which portray it as a 
traditionalizing zone rooted in a nostalgic vision of the past, I situate it at the heart of processes 
of modern economy formation in late colonial and early postcolonial India.  
The history of the khadi economy, I argue, offers critical insights into some of the key 
developments in twentieth-century Indian economic life, ranging from the changing spatial 
relationship of agriculture to industry; to the rise of formal organizations and scientific 
management; to the establishment of standardized weights and measures; to technological 
innovation. In recuperating the khadi economy as one instance in the making of the modern 
Indian economy, I provide an alternative perspective on economic modernization. The khadi 
institutions discussed here did not resist the rise of a modern economy but instead worked to 
establish a modern economy on their own terms that deployed some of the same tools (scientific 
management, standardized weights and measures, etc.) in different ways. In attempting to create 
a modern economy that was nevertheless different from the modern economy that ultimately 
prevailed in India, khadi institutions offer a unique lens on what exactly was at stake in the 
modern economy’s creation.  
 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Between 1957 and 1959, the Indian government published three pamphlets chronicling 
the past, present, and future of what it called the “silent economic revolution.”1 Elaborately 
illustrated and printed on handmade paper, these pamphlets told the story of a campaign 
established by Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi in the late 1910s to create a new economy for 
modern India. This campaign centered on rural India, home to over eighty percent of the Indian 
population, much of it unemployed or underemployed for large stretches of the year. Gandhi and 
a revolving cast of lawyers and scientists, writers and accountants, social theorists and 
bureaucrats attempted to reestablish the production of khadi, or handspun, handwoven cloth, in 
the Indian countryside as a way of combating the rural unemployment and underemployment 
crisis. Simultaneously, they worked to reconstitute the economy on what they regarded as a more 
egalitarian, cooperative, and self-limiting footing.  
 It is unclear whether Gandhi ever used the phrase “silent economic revolution” himself. 
Some of his fellow travelers did, however, including some of the khadi campaign’s leading 
luminaries. In their hands, the phrase came to signal a specific approach to economic change, one 
grounded in the belief that it is the outcome of a “long and laborious evolutionary process,” not a 
one-time event culminating in “thunder, storm, explosion, sound and fury.”2 The Indian 
nationalist leader J. B. Kripalani, for example, was fond of commenting, “It must be some kind 
                                                 
1 Vijayadev, Ambar Charkha: The Silent Revolutionary (Bombay: United Asia Publications, 1957); The Story of a 
Silent Economic Revolution (Bombay: Khadi and Village Industries Commission, 1958); Vijayadev, The Silent 
Revolution (Bombay: Khadi and Village Industries Commission, 1959). 
2 J. B. Kripalani, Politics of Charkha (Bombay: Vora & Co., Publishers, Ltd., 1946), 31-2. 
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of intellectual and visual jaundice that fails to see beauty in small things and is impressed by the 
big and the powerful alone.”3 A long-time colleague of Gandhi’s, he was perhaps the second- or 
third-most influential figure in the khadi campaign. In his hands, “silent economic revolution” 
took on an additional meaning—it was an admonishment to look beyond the obvious forces 
driving economic change to uncover those hidden from view.  
This dissertation is a historical study of the socio-material and knowledge practices 
involved in the making of the modern Indian economy between approximately 1915 and 1965. I 
approach this subject through the framework of the khadi economy, the name I assign to the 
network of institutions, individuals, ideas, and material objects established by Gandhi and his 
associates to accomplish a variety of ends, including ameliorating rural poverty and inequality; 
presenting an alternative to market capitalism; and making cooperation, and not competition, the 
central feature of Indian? economic life. I argue that the history of the khadi economy offers key 
insights into some of the critical developments in twentieth-century Indian economic life, 
ranging from the changing spatial relationship of agriculture to industry; to the rise of formal 
organizations and scientific management; to the establishment of standardized weights and 
measures; to the invention of technologies to create new forms of employment. 
 
The Modern Economy 
Two concepts provide conceptual coherence to this dissertation, the first of which is 
“modern economy.” “Modern economy” is a notoriously difficult term to define, in no small part 
because it is often treated as the inverse of the “traditional economy.” Rather than presupposing 
the nature of the modern economy, this becomes the focus of my inquiry. I examine the modern 
                                                 
3 Ibid, 23. 
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economy as it is constituted across multiple sites and scales of analysis—from a corporate 
boardroom in Bombay to the home workshop of an amateur technology enthusiast, from the 
pages of a mathematics textbook to poetry written in praise of the spinning wheel. All the while, 
I ask what the modern economy looks like and what it takes to produce one. In doing so, I follow 
the lead of the historical actors who are the subject of this study, asking when they thought their 
efforts would lead to the creation of a modern economy and why. 
This approach, derived partly from science and technology studies (STS) literature, 
allows me to move beyond the tired framework of “success” and “failure” that has structured so 
many histories of the modern economy. Signal works in the social construction of technology 
have demonstrated “the need for a more symmetric focus of analysis that looks at cases of both 
failure and success in understanding technical and social change.”4 In the context of my project 
this means resisting the urge to tell what Daniel Immerwahr has labeled “Modernization Comes 
to Town” stories. Stories written in this vain describe “how a world that was once rooted in local, 
heterogeneous, informal, flexible, pluralistic, and, above all, small-scale institutions was lost.” 
They implicitly “call for a reversal of that trend” while casting “the people and communities who 
have resisted modernization” as “tragic figures, doomed to failure.”5 In doing so, they divide the 
world into winners and losers, i.e. those who have modernized and those who have not. 
Though powerful in their starkness, Modernization Comes to Town stories are too 
simplistic to grapple with the possibility that modernization might produce more than two 
                                                 
4 This quotation comes from C. Shambu Prasad in his reinterpretation of “khadi science.” See “Exploring Gandhian 
Science: A Case Study of the Khadi Movement,” PhD diss. (Indian Institute of Technology, 2001), 116. A classic 
argument for the importance of viewing success and failure as two halves of the same whole is Trevor J. Pinch and 
Wiebe E. Bijker, “The Social Construction of Facts and Artifacts: Or How the Sociology of Science and the 
Sociology of Technology Might Benefit Each Other,” in The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New 
Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology, eds. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Pinch (Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press, 2012): 11-44. 
5 Thinking Small: The United States and the Lure of Community Development (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2015), 5-6. 
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outcomes. As I show in my dissertation, the khadi organizations that are the central protagonists 
of my story neither resisted the rise of the modern economy nor attempted to create its opposite. 
Instead, they established a modern economy of their own, using the same tools as other Indians. 
Approaching khadi organizations not as reactionary bodies trying to revive an old way of 
life but as enthusiastic participants in the creation of a new economic order helps us to view the 
modern economy anew as the outcome of a competitive process. This competition transpired not 
just on the level of ideas, as in the case of disagreements between Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru 
over the shape of independent India’s economy, but also on the level of everyday economic 
practice.6  
Critical accounts of economic modernization portray it as a fundamentally dehumanizing 
process that generates a clearly identifiable set of “losers.”7 In doing so, these accounts suggest 
that there are only two alternatives: to modernize or to invite marginalization. The story I tell in 
this dissertation departs from this narrative, however. In this respect, I follow in the tradition of 
historians like Tirthankar Roy and Douglas Haynes, who have refused to present the making of 
the modern economy as a straightforward case of winners and losers.8 But where Roy presents 
change within the artisanal sector as primarily modernizing in its direction—that is, as 
proceeding in a relatively straightforward fashion from the “traditional” to the “modern”—I tell a 
more complicated story in which economic change gave rise to not one but multiple moderns. In 
                                                 
6 Nehru and Gandhi exchanged contrasting views of the economy on many occasions. One example is their famous 
1945 correspondence, which can be found in “Gandhi-Nehru Dialogue,” in Hind Swaraj and Other Writings, ed. 
Anthony J. Parel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 143-9. 
7 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1998. 
8 Douglas Haynes, Small Town Capitalism in Western India: Artisans, Merchants, and the Making of the Informal 
Economy, 1870-1960 (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2012) and Tirthankar Roy, Artisans and 
Industrialization: Indian Weaving in the Twentieth Century (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
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this sense, my work tracks more closely with that of Haynes, who has argued that the artisanal 
economy in twentieth-century western India assumed multiple shapes, not just one.9 
 
Economic Imagination 
The second concept helping to organize this dissertation is “economic imagination,” i.e. 
the ways in which individuals and groups of individuals envision economic life and “conceive 
and present arguments about the future direction” of the economy. I have adapted this concept 
from Ernesto Bassi’s discussion of what he calls “geopolitical imagination.” Bassi argues that his 
definition “allows for every person to be a geopolitical analyst—it democratizes geopolitics and 
the geopolitical imagination—thus taking the exclusive rights to a geopolitical imagination away 
from ‘major actors and commentators’ to put geopolitics within the reach of subalterns and other 
minor actors.”10 My definition of economic imagination has similar implications, inviting us to 
approach accountants, schoolteachers, salespeople, and other ostensibly “minor” actors as 
individuals whose economic imaginations open up onto vast worlds.  
Economic imaginations are products of specific historical moments. As such, they tell us 
what the historical actors we study considered plausible and/or desirable at a given moment in 
time. This latter point is important because it allows us to move beyond the “success and failure” 
binary that structures so many analyses of modernization to a consideration of “the potential 
future outcomes that the historical actors we study believed could result from their present.”11 
Historical actors’ predictions about the future constitute their “horizon of expectations,” alerting 
                                                 
9 Haynes 2012, 10. 
10 Ernesto Bassi, An Aqueous Territory: Sailor Geographies and New Granada’s Transimperial Greater Caribbean 
World (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), 11. 
11 Ibid, 261. 
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us to what they considered possible at a given moment in time.12 In this sense, a study of 
imaginary futures is always a study of the present. People can envision only those futures they 
deem plausible, and their understanding of what is plausible changes in relation to changes in the 
world in which they live. In examining imaginary futures, then, we learn not only about the 
“other worlds” our research subjects wished to inhabit but also about the relationship between 
changes in the political, economic, social, and cultural landscape, and changes in “conceptions of 
the historically possible.”13 
I explore the economic imagination associated with the khadi economy through a series 
of questions: Why was this imagination compelling to the diverse group of people who 
participated in the khadi economy at various moments in time? How was it shaped by its 
landscape, and how did it help to shape it in turn? Was it internally coherent? Who or what did it 
include and exclude? And, finally, how does this economic imagination help us to interrogate 
what we take to be normative about the Indian economy? 
Unsurprisingly, the answers to these questions are incredibly varied. Although the 
modern economy envisioned by the subjects of my dissertation differed in important respects 
from the modern economy envisioned by other Indians, it also converged, particularly over the 
question of how a modern economy was to be made. As I show in the following chapters, the 
wide range of actors affiliated with khadi organizations recognized the power of standardization, 
bureaucratization, centralization, industrialization, etc. and attempted to incorporate these 
processes into their economy-building initiatives. They did so in ways that would have made 
                                                 
12 “Horizon of expectations” is a concept Reinhart Koselleck discusses in Futures Past: On the Semantics of 
Historical Time (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 255-77. 
13 Manu Goswami, “Imaginary Futures and Colonial Internationalisms,” American Historical Review 117, no. 5 
(Dec. 2012), 1463. 
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little sense to some of their contemporaries, however—for example, employing modern 
accounting and financial practices to avoid the production of a profit. 
Attention to the economic imagination embedded in khadi organizations reveals a wider 
range of orientations toward economic life than we have accounted for thus far. While popular 
portrayals of Gandhi sometimes view his economic outlook as hopelessly naive, the fact that it 
was shared to varying degrees by other participants in the khadi economy—scientists, 
mathematicians, teachers, accountants, lawyers, technologists, middle managers, etc.—suggests 
that we should take another look. We can do so by situating the history of the khadi economy 
more squarely within the context of post-World War I India and not primarily, as we are so 
accustomed to doing, the pages of Hind Swaraj and Gandhi’s other great writings on the evils of 
modern civilization. 
 
Historical Context 
The khadi economy began to take shape at a time of great political and economic turmoil 
in the Indian subcontinent. Gandhi returned to India from a two-decades-long sojourn in South 
Africa shortly after the outbreak of World War I, an event of enormous significance for India. 
The British colonial government recruited heavily in India, and by 1918, the size of the Indian 
army had grown to 1.2 million. India’s defense expenditures increased by approximately 300% 
as a result, and the colonial state’s attempts to increase its coffers created inflationary pressures 
in India at the very moment a four-decades-long world trade boom came to an end. This period 
marked a shift in India’s economic relationship with Britain. India had functioned as a classical 
colonial economy since the mid-nineteenth-century, becoming a net exporter of cheap raw 
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materials and a net importer of British manufactured goods. Now, India was beginning a slow 
shift toward an import-substitution model that would endure in one form or another until 1991.14   
The shift in India’s economic relationship with Britain had not resolved one of its greatest 
problems, though: the existence of a large surplus labor force in rural areas with little access to 
regular work. Historians have written extensively about the rural reconstruction programs 
established throughout India to make a dent in this problem. While a diverse group of people—
Indian nationalists, colonial officials, foreign capitalists and missionaries, and American 
philanthropists—had taken a keen interest in Indian villages from the late nineteenth century, 
their interest—and attempts to intervene—heated up in the interwar period. This is an important 
fact to keep in mind, since it shows that the khadi economy was far from the only intervention in 
the rural Indian economic landscape. In fact, khadi organizations shared much with organizations 
established by individuals such as the British bureaucrat Francis Brayne and the American 
missionary Spencer Hatch to provide work to rural dwellers.15 Nicole Sackley has noted that the 
global depression of the 1930s lent even more urgency to rural reconstruction as people around 
the world began to “question industrial capitalism and envision instead a return to the social and 
communal bonds of rural life, where even industry would be relocated to the countryside.”16 As a 
project designed to reestablish khadi production in village India, the khadi economy would seem 
to fit right in.  
This point notwithstanding, a wide range of Indians—many of them broadly sympathetic 
to Gandhi’s economic mission—questioned why he had decided to focus his vast resources on 
                                                 
14 My summary of the economic history of this period comes from B. R. Tomlinson, The Economy of Modern India, 
1860-1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 119 and 154-5. 
15 Subir Sinha, “Lineages of the Developmentalist State: Transnationality and Village India, 1900-1965,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 50, no. 1 (2008), 61-71. 
16 “The Village as Cold War Site: Experts, Development, and the History of Rural Reconstruction,” Journal of 
Global History 6, no. 3 (2011), 488. 
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the spinner and not the farmer or handloom weaver instead. Sam Higginbottom, the Presbyterian 
missionary whose experiments in scientific agriculture made him one of India’s most sought 
after agricultural experts, is one example of a Gandhi confidante who believed that economic 
change was best effected by improving the condition of the farmer. Both before and after he 
assumed a seat on the executive board of Gandhi’s All India Village Industries Association 
(AIVIA), Higginbottom urged Gandhi to abandon spinning for what he regarded as the far more 
important task of increasing agricultural productivity. Gandhi, Higginbottom suspected, was 
mired in a “traditionalist” mode of thinking.17  
The initial decision to focus khadi organizations’ resources on hand-spinning as opposed 
to, say, hand-weaving or agriculture seems to have been as much pragmatic as it was ideological, 
however. In conversations with his nephew Maganlal, who wanted to turn part of Sabarmati 
Ashram into a farm, Gandhi advised him to pursue only those agricultural activities that would 
generate a profit for the Ashram and devote the rest of his time to the charkha. “We should drop 
or curtail, one by one, those of our activities which we think others are likely to take up,” Gandhi 
wrote to Maganlal in June 1919, “and pay more attention to those in which others have less faith, 
or none, but which are all the same essential. Spinning is one such activity.”18 Spinning, as he 
elaborated on another occasion, was a dying occupation and therefore in need of more immediate 
attention than agriculture. Besides, large-scale agricultural reform could proceed only with the 
cooperation of a national government. Those who proposed tackling agricultural reform thus 
                                                 
17 Sam Higginbottom, Sam Higginbottom, Farmer: An Autobiography (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1949), 
179-80 and Gary R. Hess, Sam Higginbottom of Allahabad: Pioneer of Point Four to India (Charlottesville: The 
University Press of Virginia, 1967), 62-3. 
18 “Letter to Maganlal Gandhi,” June 1, 1919, CWMG Vol. 14, 340. 
 10 
 
“presupposed the existence of an independent Indian state,” and not the colonial one that wielded 
power.19   
When viewed from this perspective, Gandhi’s decision to pursue khadi production made 
a great deal of sense. A low-skilled activity that could be performed virtually anywhere with 
little training or capital investment, it promised a steady, if small, stream of supplementary 
income. Though some of Gandhi’s contemporaries ridiculed his plan to ease village India’s 
unemployment crisis through the reintroduction of handspinning to rural households, he 
remained firm in his convictions. “The sole claim urged in its favour,” he wrote in 1927, “is that 
it is the only immediately practicable supplementary occupation that can be offered to the vast 
mass of the population that is starving or half-fed in consequence of abject poverty and enforced 
idleness for nearly half the year.”20 Over time, Gandhi would amend this argument to make it 
more ambitious, proposing that Indians turn to handspinning as a full-time occupation instead. 
 
Historiography 
Khadi 
 This dissertation intervenes in three bodies of scholarship, the first of which is the 
literature on khadi and the khadi economy. The historiography on khadi is a rich and voluminous 
field that has contributed to our understanding of subjects as diverse as the rise of mass 
nationalism, scientific and technological development, small-scale industry, changing sartorial 
preferences, and of course, Gandhian economic thought.21 Until recently, however, it was 
                                                 
19 Prasad 2001, 90 and Thomson 1993, 111-2. 
20 Khadi Guide, 1927 (Ahmedabad: The All India Spinners’ Association, 1927), 1. 
21 For mass nationalism, see Rebecca Brown, “Spinning Without Touching the Wheel: Anticolonialism, Indian 
Nationalism, and the Deployment of Symbol,” Comparative Studies in South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 29.2 
(2009), 230-45; Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse (London: 
Zed Books, 1993; Lisa Trivedi, Clothing Gandhi’s Nation: Homespun and Modern India (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2007); and Rahul Ramagundam, Gandhi’s Khadi: A History of Contention and Conciliation. New 
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dominated by a focus on khadi’s symbolic and political dimensions to the near total exclusion of 
other concerns.22 A more recent body of revisionist scholarship has attempted to bridge the gap 
between khadi’s symbolic aspects, on the one hand, and its technical aspects, on the other, and, 
in doing so, to show that khadi’s “meaning and efficacy” is “not only political/cultural or 
technical but both at the same time.”23 
 I build upon this revisionist literature in my dissertation to present an alternative 
perspective on the khadi economy. While most accounts have portrayed it as a traditionalizing 
zone rooted in a nostalgic vision of the past, I reframe it as an instance in the making of the 
modern Indian economy.24 In doing so, I draw upon the work of scholars, such as Ross Bassett, 
C. Shambu Prasad, and Rahul Ramagundam, who have emphasized some of the explicitly 
modern dimensions of the khadi economy, including its contributions to science and technology, 
and to business models and practices.25  
                                                 
Delhi: Orient Blackswan, 2009). For scientific and technological development, see Ross Bassett, The Technological 
Indian (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016) and Prasad 2001. For small-scale industry, see Abigail 
McGowan, Crafting the Nation in Colonial India, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009); Deepak Mehta, “A 
Sociological Study of Gandhian Institutions: Work, Weavers, and the Khadi and Village Industries Commission.” 
PhD diss. (Delhi University, 1991); and Thomson 1993. For sartorial concerns, see C. A. Bayly, “The Origins of 
Swadeshi (Home Industry): Cloth and Indian Society, 1700-1930,” in The Social Life of Things: Commodities in 
Cultural Perspective, ed. Arjun Appadurai (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 285-321; Susan Bean, 
“Gandhi and Khadi: The Fabric of Indian Nationalism,” in Cloth in Human Experience, ed. Annette Weiner and 
Jane Schneider (Washington, DC:  Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989), 356-65; Rebecca M. Brown, Gandhi’s 
Spinning Wheel and the Making of India (London: Routledge, 2010); Dipesh Chakrabarty, “Khadi and the Political 
Man,” in Habitations of Modernity: Essays in the Wake of Subaltern Studies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2002); Bernard S. Cohn, “Cloth, Clothes and  Colonialism in the Nineteenth Century,” Colonialism and Its Forms of 
Knowledge (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); and Emma Tarlo, Clothing Matters: Dress and Identity in 
India (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1996). For Gandhian economic thought, see Ajit K. Dasgupta, A 
History of Indian Economic Thought (London:  Routledge, 1993); Bhabatosh Datta, Indian Economic Thought: 
Twentieth Century Perspectives, 1900-1950 (New Delhi: Tata McGraw-Hill Publishing Company Ltd., 1978); 
David Hardiman, Gandhi in His Time and Ours: The Global Legacy of His Ideas (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2004); Claude Markovits, The UnGandhian Gandhi: The Life and Afterlife of the Mahatma (London: Anthem 
Press, 2004). 
22 This emphasis on the symbolic can be found in Bean 1989, Cohn 1996, Mehta 1992, Tarlo 1996, among others. 
23 Prasad 2001, 15. Bassett and Ramagundam also epitomize this approach. 
24 Datta 1978 and Dasgupta 1993 are two examples. 
25 Only Ramagundam is specifically interested in the question of economy, though.  
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 Reframing the khadi economy as one instance of the making of the modern Indian 
economy helps us move beyond the tradition-modernity dualism that has structured so many 
studies of khadi. It also helps us move beyond another common tendency: to use the metrics of 
“success” and “failure” to evaluate the khadi economy. Many historians of khadi have anchored 
their analyses partly in the question of whether Gandhi and the khadi organizations with which 
he was associated succeeded in accomplishing their aims. They have more often than not 
answered this question in the negative, concluding, as in the case of Richard G. Fox, that: 
“Neither as an experiment in bread labor, nor as a major employer of India’s rural unemployed, 
nor as a check on mill owners’ greed, but only as a destination for government funds has khadi 
succeeded.”26 
 While there is nothing inherently wrong with a success-failure framework, it is 
nevertheless a limiting one, especially when applied to essentially experimental projects such as 
khadi. Shambu C. Prasad, issued a call for moving away from such a framework in his excellent 
study of khadi as an example of “science in civil society.” Work in science and technology 
studies, and the sociology of technology, he wrote, “have pointed out the need for a more 
symmetric focus of analysis that looks at cases of both failure and success in understanding 
technical and social change. The actual development process of a technical artefact in fact 
follows a multidirectional instead of a linear model of technical change.”27 In practical terms, 
                                                 
26 Gandhian Utopia: Experiments with Culture (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989), 181. Tarlo 1996 and Thomson 1993 
are two other examples of scholars who have embraced “success” and “failure” as parameters for evaluating the 
khadi project. While Tarlo, contra Susan Bean and others, argued that Gandhi failed to transmit a single 
comprehensible message through his khadi clothing, Thomson argued that Gandhi’s ashrams (Thomson 
characterizes them as laboratories for experiments in areas such as khadi) failed to live up to his expectations.  
27 Prasad 2001, 116. Ramagundam has also moved away from the success-failure framework, albeit in a less explicit 
fashion.  
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this means approaching success and failure as two components of the same whole and not, as is 
so often the case, as opposing positions in a binary.28 
 This dissertation makes two additional moves. First, it extends its history of the khadi 
economy beyond the conventional stopping point of August 15, 1947. Most studies of the khadi 
economy stop there, perhaps on the assumption that the khadi economy’s significance came to an 
end with the attainment of independence and later Gandhi’s death in January 1948.29 In selecting 
1947 as a stopping point, these studies reduce the history of the khadi economy to that of the 
nationalist movement, however, while reinforcing the longstanding break in South Asian 
economic history between analyses of the colonial and postcolonial periods. My study, by 
contrast, shows continuities and changes in the khadi economy around the moment of 
independence, showing how the economic imagination associated with khadi organizations 
continued to evolve. 
 Second, it refuses the tendency to portray Gandhi as a lone genius who established and 
operated the khadi economy on his own. While it is true that Gandhi was the primary architect 
behind the khadi economy’s creation, he did not exercise total control over it but helped institute 
an organizational culture that would distribute decision-making power to many other individuals. 
Situating Gandhi within the context of other projects to remake the rural economy and showing 
his reliance on others to enact his agenda is an important step in showing that the khadi economy 
enjoyed popular backing. If the khadi economy is simply a story about khadi, it is easy to dismiss 
its appeal. By bringing others into the picture—the abovementioned accountants, weaving 
masters, repair workers, etc.—we can link the history of the khadi economy to other histories, 
too. 
                                                 
28 This is similar in some ways to how historians have dissembled the tradition-modern binary. 
29 Mehta 1992 and Prasad 2001 are exceptions. 
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 Having said that, in tracing khadi’s mobilization across a variety of contexts, this 
dissertation also shines new light on Gandhi and the larger body of economic thought and 
practice that bears his name. Long considered an innovative political thinker, he is rarely 
recognized as an astute economic one. My research demonstrates not only that Gandhi was an 
important economic thinker, but also that his economic imaginings had real-world consequences. 
Nowhere was this more evident than with khadi, which represented his most successful attempt 
to transform the Indian material landscape. Gandhian economic thought has been resurrected 
repeatedly around the world by social movements committed to the creation of a more egalitarian 
economic order. I show how this influential but underexamined economic tradition operated in 
practice and, in doing so, intervene in debates about the historical significance of Gandhism and 
the lessons it holds for those working to establish a more just and environmentally sustainable 
economy. 
 
Textiles 
The second body of historiography in which this dissertation intervenes is the literature 
on the Indian textile industry. In 1835, the Governor-General of India Lord William Bentinck 
reported that “the bones of the cotton weavers are bleaching the plains of India.”30 This evocative 
image of handloom weavers felled by forces beyond their control would become one of the 
primary frameworks through which a diverse array of people—Indian nationalists, foreign 
missionaries, and even some British colonial officials—understood changes in the organization 
of the Indian economy in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The first generation of 
Indian nationalists, for example, made the handloom weaver a centerpiece of their critiques of 
                                                 
30 Governor General’s report of 1834-5. Karl Marx introduced Bentinck’s words to a global audience in Capital: A 
Critique of Political Economy, Vol. I, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin Books, 1990 [1867]), 558. 
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colonial rule. British colonialism had destroyed handloom weaving and other indigenous 
industries, they argued, while obstructing the development of modern, machine-based ones. 
Partly as a result, handloom weavers and other native artisans had been forced to seek 
employment in the agricultural sector, increasing already high demographic pressures on the 
land. Indians’ growing dependence on agriculture was dangerous, they continued, because it 
contributed to the further fragmentation of landholdings and exposed an ever-larger section of 
the population to the inherent vagaries of the agricultural calendar.31 Although these early 
nationalists explored the impact of increased agriculturalization on a wide range of Indians, 
including small-scale farmers and agricultural laborers, their decision to begin their account of 
economic change with the handloom weaver established a precedent for subsequent analyses of 
the economy. 
Many economic historians, too, have made the handloom weaver the central focus of 
their studies of economic change in nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century India. This is 
especially true of historians engaged in the so-called “deindustrialization debate,” which hinged 
on the question of whether changing trade patterns, colonial economic policies, and competition 
from foreign industrial goods had a mostly negative impact on Indian industry. While many 
historians writing in the 1970s and 1980s agreed with early Indian nationalists that British rule 
had essentially deindustrialized India, subsequent historians challenged this assertion by 
demonstrating that some artisans not only survived but also thrived under colonial conditions.32  
                                                 
31 Bipan Chandra, The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India: Economic Policies of the Indian 
Leadership, 1880-1905 (New Delhi: Har-Anand, 2010), 59-62. 
32 Amiya Kumar Bagchi, “Deindustrialization in India in the Nineteenth Century: Some Theoretical Implications,” 
Journal of Development Studies 22.1 (1978), 135-64 and Irfan Habib, “Colonization of the Indian Economy, 1757-
1900,” Social Scientist 8.3 (1975), 23-53. For a revisionist perspective, see Roy 1993; Tirthankar Roy, Traditional 
Industry in the Economy of Colonial India (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1999); and Haynes 2012. 
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Even as they arrived at different conclusions, however, both sides of the debate shared at least 
one key assumption in common: that the handloom weaver constituted the natural starting point 
for an analysis of the effects of colonial rule on native industry. A logical decision in many 
respects—handloom weaving was the largest employer of Indians after agriculture—it has 
nonetheless proved confining insofar as it has encouraged historians to read industrial change 
through the figure of the handloom weaver rather than the many artisans who produced goods 
other than cloth.33 This implicit weaver bias, as we might call it, has had a profound impact on 
how historians have theorized economic change and evaluated Indian and other responses to the 
damage wrought by colonial rule. 
Though productive of many vital insights, a weaver-centric approach to economic history 
has also come at a cost. In addition to deemphasizing the experiences of non-weaver artisans, it 
has also established the weaver as the de facto framework through which other small-scale 
industrial producers are assessed. Nowhere is this so evident as in the case of the khadi economy, 
whose work force was composed almost entirely of handspinners. These handspinners, most of 
whom approached spinning as a form of supplementary employment to be pursued only when 
they were not performing agricultural labor, produced yarn of varying quality to be sold to khadi 
organizations for a fixed sum. Economic historians have sometimes questioned Gandhi’s 
decision to make the hand-spinner, and not the handloom weaver, the centerpiece of his 
economic program, arguing that the rise of textile mills dedicated exclusively to spinning yarn 
had rendered handspinning obsolete.34 In doing so, they have compared the hand-spinner 
                                                 
33 A notable exception is Tirthankar Roy, Traditional Industry in the Economy of Colonial India (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999). Although most of his early work focused on the handloom weaver, his 1999 
monograph also addressed the experiences of other artisans, including manufacturers of brassware, leather, and gold 
thread (jari). 
34 Haynes 2012 has noted in passing that the khadi program held little appeal to handloom weavers who rarely 
competed with imported textiles or used foreign yarn (233-4). Abigail McGowan has noted that Gandhi devalued 
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unfavorably to the handloom weaver, whose superior technology and ability to react quickly to 
changing market signals, they suggest, made it possible for him to pursue weaving as a full-time 
occupation. Indeed, it is likely that some of these historians would agree with one of Gandhi’s 
harshest critics, who once accused him of attempting to perform “artificial respiration” on the 
spinning wheel.35  
By making the spinner and not the weaver a significant figure in my dissertation, I show 
a different side of the small-scale Indian textile industry, one grounded in the experiences of 
rural agriculturists who worked at cloth production in their spare time. This move decenters the 
artisan from histories of small-scale industry while simultaneously showing that the khadi 
economy—a space long presumed to exist at a distance from artisanal industry—began to look 
more like the handloom, powerloom, and even large-scale mill industries during the early and 
mid-twentieth centuries. This is broadly in line with the experience of the handloom industry, 
which, as Haynes and Roy have shown so elegantly, came to share many characteristics in 
common with the large-scale mills, including high degrees of centralization, specialization, and 
commercialization.36 
 Why, then, has the history of the khadi economy existed at a remove from that of other 
histories of cloth production? In large part, this is a function of the decision to emphasize 
difference over similarity as well as an inability to see past the ostensibly “preindustrial 
hardware” employed by khadi organizations.37 Narrating the history of the khadi economy 
alongside that of other textile-related economies reveals an important point, however. Haynes 
                                                 
“the role of master weavers capable of producing the finest cloth by insisting that anyone could learn spinning—and 
indeed, that it was so simple that everyone should learn it...” (197).   
35 S. Ramanathan with Pattabhi Sitharamayya and N. S. Varadachari, “The superstition of khadi: A discussion” 
(Erode: Kudi Arasu Publishing House, 1931), 3. 
36 Haynes 2012; Roy 1993; and Roy 1999. McGowan 2009 also makes this point (15-8). 
37 Bassett 2016 employs this phrase while arguing that Gandhi joined “preindustrial hardware” to “industrial values” 
(80-1). 
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has argued in the context of the western-Indian handloom and powerloom industries that the 
decisions made by weaver capitalists and laborers in the 1940s and 1950s played a key role in 
shaping the informal economy that emerged there.38 While khadi organizations did not 
participate in the creation of the informal economy, they helped to create a separate but linked 
economy using many of the same tools as the subjects of Haynes’ study. 
 
Economic Modernization 
 This brings me to my final point. One of the central arguments of the dissertation is that 
the socio-material and knowledge practices discussed in the individual chapters gave rise not to 
one but to multiple modern economies. Khadi institutions did not resist the rise of a modern 
economy or attempt to construct its opposite, but instead, they worked to establish a modern 
economy of their own that deployed some of the same tools (standardized weights and measures, 
formal institutions, scientific management, new technologies) in different ways. This insight 
helps shed light on what was specific about the modern economy that arose in India. While we 
rightly take standardization, bureaucratization, and other processes discussed in this dissertation 
to be defining features of modern economic life, my research suggests that they can take many 
different forms. In attempting to create a modern economy that was nevertheless different from 
the modern economy that ultimately prevailed, khadi institutions offer a unique lens onto what 
exactly was at stake in the modern economy’s creation. 
 Where then did the difference of the khadi economy lie? I suggest that it lay primarily in 
its economic imagination, which, for example, saw the potential for using accounting as a 
technique for avoiding the generation of profit and the creation of new weights and measures as 
                                                 
38 Haynes 2012, 303-10. 
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tools for making conceptual knowledge available to a greater range of people. This is not to say 
that the materiality of weights and measures, accounting charts, and spinning wheels did not 
matter, however. On the contrary, it was the material world that made it possible for the 
economic imagination embedded in the khadi economy to flourish. In this, it shared much in 
common with other economic actors, who also recognized the power of standards, scientific 
management, and formal organization. I thus cast the creation of the modern economy in 
explicitly political terms. We can embrace formal institutions, weights, and finance and still 
arrive at a different modern economy than the one we got.  
 
Chapter Outline 
 This dissertation is organized around four themes, each pertaining to a different aspect of 
the khadi economy. These themes—which range from the changing spatial relationship of 
agriculture to industry; to the rise of formal institutions and scientific management; to the 
establishment of standardized weights and measures; to technological development—are often 
taken to be constitutive elements of economic modernization. As such, they present the occasion 
to view the making of the modern Indian economy from multiple perspectives. 
Chapter 1 examines the material and intellectual foundations of the khadi economy. It 
argues that khadi did not emerge primarily out of an overarching critique of capitalist modernity 
or a recognition of the symbolic importance of cloth in Indian society but rather as a response to 
a specific problem in the Indian economy. This problem—the existence of a large surplus labor 
force in rural India with little to no access to work for large portions of the year—was a product 
of changes in India’s economic geography whereby agriculture and industry increasingly 
transpired in separate social spaces. Khadi institutions were not the only actors committed to 
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ameliorating rural unemployment and underemployment through the reestablishment of village 
industries programs, however. This chapter both situates the khadi economy within that larger 
milieu and shows how its approach to the surplus labor problem differed. Khadi institutions were 
guided by an agrarian imaginary that mostly excluded artisans, such as handloom weavers. In 
exploring the contours of that imaginary, I argue that decentering artisanry from studies of small-
scale industry offers a new lens onto India’s changing economic landscape. 
Chapter 2 examines the role of business—as a set of institutions, ideas, and practices—in 
the constitution and operation of the khadi economy. It argues that the historiography’s tendency 
to explore the relationship between business and khadi (as well as other Gandhian projects) 
through the lens of the capitalist classes has obscured the contributions of a substantially larger 
group of mid-level merchants, shopkeepers, and entrepreneurs to the everyday life of Gandhian 
enterprise. In placing business expertise at the center of a project designed to ameliorate rural 
inequality, khadi organizations carved out a prominent place for businesspeople in the moral and 
economic guidance of the nation. The chapter begins by considering the franchising system that 
connected distant khadi organizations to one another before exploring the careers of two khadi 
workers cum businesspeople who played a key role in formulating the administrative and sales 
guidelines that structured khadi organizations’ day-to-day activities. These guidelines, which 
covered subjects such as making prices, account keeping, and exchanging khadi hundis 
(specialized credit instruments), were at once attempts to ensure standardization across the khadi 
economy and components of a larger moral vision. In fact, we can understand many of these 
guidelines as efforts to harness business as a tool for responsibly embedding the market in social 
relations. This chapter thus introduces another vision of business to place beside the much-
maligned concept of trusteeship. 
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Chapter 3 examines the relationship between pedagogy, labor, and knowledge production 
in the khadi economy. It does so through an investigation of a range of projects designed to help 
the rural poor in overcoming their innumeracy. A lack of familiarity with mathematical concepts 
and methods (and, in some instances, an inability to count beyond a certain number), innumeracy 
negatively impacted villagers’ lives in ways that illiteracy and other more familiar problems did 
not. While standard accounts of Gandhian constructive work portray it as primarily disciplining 
in its thrust, I move away from a focus on pedagogy as a disciplining project to a consideration 
of how pedagogical encounters transpired in practice. In doing so, I argue that the main aim of 
khadi organizations’ pedagogical initiatives was not primarily, as some have suggested, to 
discipline the rural poor, but rather to create the conditions under which the rural poor could gain 
control over their own material and conceptual labor. This chapter shows that the economic actor 
valorized by khadi organizations was not simply a morally upright individual committed to bread 
labor but also an intellectually curious one who approached bread labor as a gateway to other 
forms of knowledge. 
Chapter 4 traces the rise and fall of the khadi economy through the framework of 
technological development. The narrative thread is an account of a competition to develop a 
better spinning wheel that attracted contestants from across India and the world. Initiated by 
Gandhi in 1919, it did not conclude until after his death in 1948. The winner, referred to as the 
ambar charkha, became the focus of efforts to transform khadi work from a part-time to a full-
time occupation and the village from an industrial backwater to the industrial engine of the 
Indian economy. These efforts made the ambar charkha appealing to an audience that extended 
beyond rank-and-file Gandhians. Members of the Indian planning establishment viewed the 
ambar charkha as a technology potentially capable of providing full-time employment at little 
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cost to the state. By moving away from well-trodden debates about whether Gandhi was pro- or 
anti-technology and toward a consideration of how his unique perspective on technology 
operated in practice, I show how changes in the charkha’s material qualities opened new 
possibilities while foreclosing others. Ultimately, I argue that khadi organizations’ greatest 
triumph—the unveiling of the ambar charkha—was simultaneously the occasion for their 
decline. 
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CHAPTER ONE:  
The Agro-Industrial Divide 
 
Imagine a nation working only five hours per day on an average, and this not by choice 
but by force of circumstances, and you have a realistic picture of India. If the reader 
would visualize the picture, he must dismiss from his mind the busy fuss of the city life 
or the grinding fatigue of the factory life or the slavery of the plantation. These are but 
drops in the ocean of Indian humanity. If he would visualize the picture of the Indian 
skeleton, he must think of the eighty per cent of the population which is working its own 
fields, and which has practically no occupation for at least four months in the year, and 
which therefore lives on the borderland of starvation.1 
 
Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi wrote these words in November 1921 shortly after one of 
his many trips to the Indian countryside. An urban creature more accustomed to London’s high 
streets than village India’s dirt roads, he had nevertheless taken a keen interest in rural life 
several years earlier, convinced that India’s future lay in its villages, not its cities. The rural 
landscape Gandhi encountered on his trips would have given him little reason to feel optimistic 
about the country’s future, however. As he noted on many occasions, the countryside was a bleak 
space afflicted by acute poverty, crippling debt, widespread landlessness, agrarian distress, and 
even starvation. To make matters worse, a very large percentage of the rural population had little 
to no work for large portions of the year, a condition Gandhi referred to as “enforced idleness.”2 
“Enforced idleness” in rural areas, he explained, was perhaps the most pressing issue facing the 
Indian economy: “Without some supplementary occupation to sustain him, the agriculturist 
cannot live.”3   
                                                 
1 M. K. Gandhi, “Cooperation,” Young India (3 Nov. 1921), CWMG Vol. 21, 391. 
2 Annual Report: 1926-27 (Ahmedabad: The All-India Spinners’ Association, 1927), 1. 
3 Gandhi, Cooperation,” 391. 
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This chapter examines the material and intellectual foundations of the khadi economy. It 
argues that khadi did not emerge primarily out of an overarching critique of capitalist modernity 
or a recognition of the symbolic importance of cloth in Indian society but rather as a response to 
a specific problem in the Indian economy. This problem—the existence of a large surplus labor 
force in rural India with little to no access to work for large portions of the year—was a product 
of changes in India’s economic geography whereby agriculture and industry increasingly 
transpired in separate social spaces. Reframing khadi as a response to the surplus labor problem 
helps us understand what was at stake in its revival. While scholars such as Partha Chatterjee 
have suggested that Gandhi’s arguments about the economic necessity of khadi were “practical” 
ones designed to convince those who did not share his “moral presuppositions,” I situate 
economic necessity at the very heart of the khadi project.4 At a time when the colonial state 
adopted a hands-off approach to agrarian crisis and land reform seemed a remote possibility, 
khadi represented both a plausible short-term fix to the surplus labor problem and the centerpiece 
of a larger vision to reshape the Indian economy. 
 
The Agro-Industrial Divide 
Spatial considerations have recently played an important role in studies of the Indian 
economy and Indian economic thought. Most notably, Manu Goswami has argued that India 
began to emerge as a territorially bounded national space and economy in the final third of the 
nineteenth century. She has further shown how “national economy” became the conceptual 
category through which Indian nationalists sought to make sense of the deterritorializing effects 
of British colonial rule and, in turn, to reterritorialize the Indian economy.5 When the new field 
                                                 
4 Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse (London: Zed Books, 1993), 118. 
5 Goswami 2004. 
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of Indian economics arose in the early twentieth century, it made the spatial unit of the village 
one of its primary objects of analysis. According to one of the field’s leading practitioners, 
Radhakamal Mukherjee, the village had been the worst casualty of colonial rule, which had 
redirected scarce economic resources from rural areas to urban spaces.6 The spatial categories 
Mukherjee employed—village-city, on the one hand, and rural-urban, on the other—have 
structured many subsequent analyses of the Indian economy.7 Indeed, in the popular and 
scholarly literature alike, Gandhi is indissolubly tied to the village and, by extension, to a vision 
of the economy in which the needs of the village take precedence over those of the city.8 
 Without disputing the fundamental significance of the spatial categories utilized by 
Mukherjee and later by historians as well, this section proposes paying closer attention to another 
set of categories: agriculture and industry. “Agriculture” and “industry” refer not so much to a 
particular spatial location as they do to a set of economic activities that are located in space. 
Though agriculture-industry sometimes maps onto the village-city and, especially, the rural-
urban dyads, the fit is imperfect at best. Prior to the second half of the nineteenth century, a large 
percentage of industrial activity had been located in agrarian areas, where it enjoyed a largely 
complementary relationship to agriculture. By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, 
industry and agriculture increasingly transpired at a remove from one another as a result of the 
phenomenon I have termed the agro-industrial divide. Before explaining how the divide 
functioned as a key moment in the history of Gandhian economics, it is useful to investigate the 
                                                 
6 Mukherjee has been credited with prefiguring some of Gandhi’s arguments. His best-known work is probably The 
Foundations of Indian Economics (London: Longmans Green, 1916). 
7 Rajnarayan Chandavarkar critiques what he terms the “implicit and natural dualism” that once structured studies of 
the colonial economy, particularly the assumption that the urban, industrial economy and rural, agrarian economy 
were separate from one another, in The Origins of Industrial Capitalism: Business Strategies and the Working 
Classes in Bombay, 1900-1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 1-2.  
8 For a survey of this literature, see Jan Breman, “The Village in Focus,” in eds. Jan Breman, Peter Kloos, and 
Ashwani Saith, The Village in Asia Revisited (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997), 15-75. 
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circumstances surrounding the divide’s production and to determine what a focus on agriculture 
and industry can show us that a focus on other spatial categories cannot.  
 The term “agrarian” is a good starting point insofar as it is often conflated with one of the 
terms I have already introduced: “agriculture” or “agricultural.” Following David Ludden, we 
can define “agriculture” as “the social organisation of physical powers to produce organic 
material for human use.” “Agriculture” thus encompasses a range of activities: “not only farming 
but also animal husbandry, pastoralism, fishing, and harvesting the forest.”9 “Agrarian” refers to 
an even broader set of concerns: “A region or social space is agrarian not because farming forms 
the material basis for other activities, but rather because a preponderance of social activity 
engages agriculture in some way or another during seasons of cultivation and circulation.”10  
The distinction between “agricultural” and “agrarian” is important, since it alerts us to the 
fact that, for much of human history, agrarian spaces have been home to both agricultural and 
industrial activities. In fact, the nature of the agricultural calendar is such that land-poor peasants 
and agricultural laborers, in particular, have frequently turned to industry to sustain themselves at 
certain times of year. After all, crops have a life cycle of their own that, after a certain point, 
cannot be speeded up by additional labor. While better-off peasants were sometimes able to 
maintain themselves during the agricultural offseason using stored up foodgrains or other 
working capital, most had to borrow from the local moneylender, thus entering into a cycle of 
debt and dependency from which few would ever emerge. Rural industry, which could be 
practiced close to home using minimal capital inputs, held out the promise of a third way.11 
Rarely remunerative enough to serve as a full-time occupation, it nevertheless generated a 
                                                 
9 David Ludden, An Agrarian History of South Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 18. 
10 Ludden 1999, 31. 
11 Shahid Amin provides a useful overview of the agrarian cycle in Sugarcane and Sugar in Gorakhpur: An Inquiry 
into Peasant Production for Capitalist Enterprise in Colonial India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984), 64-8. 
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modest income at lean times of year and/or presented the opportunity to self-provision outside of 
the market.12 This is not to say that part-time industrial work was a panacea for struggling 
agriculturists but rather that it was sometimes the only safety net available to them. 
 The nature of colonial record keeping policies makes it difficult to determine just how 
many agrarian households worked at some type of rural industry or what percentage of their total 
labor time they devoted to it. This is because colonial surveys and censuses tended to ignore 
supplementary occupations, reporting only primary occupations instead. For example, an 
agriculturist who derived part of his income from weaving or pressing oil appeared in the census 
as an agriculturist rather than an agriculturist who was also a weaver or an oil presser. In 
foregoing accuracy for statistical neatness, colonial record keepers muddied the historical record. 
Still, the ethnographic evidence compiled by a range of colonial and non-colonial sources 
suggests that rural industry was a common part-time pursuit for agriculturists for much of the 
nineteenth century.13 Historians generally concur, noting that in many parts of India, women of 
virtually every class performed handspinning and food processing work in their spare time. Food 
processing encompassed a range of industries, including grain husking, rice pounding, and flour 
grinding.14 Male agriculturists worked at a number of industrial activities as well, especially 
                                                 
12 For example, Chandavarkar 1994, 131-2 and Samita Sen, Women and Labour in Late Colonial India: The Bengal 
Jute Industry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 80. 
13 Francis Buchanan, The History, Antiquities, Topography, and Statistics of Eastern India: Comprising the Districts 
of Behar, Shahabad, Bhagalpoor, Goruckpoor, Dinajpoor, Purniya, Rungpoor, and Assam, in relation to their 
geology, mineralogy, botany, agriculture, commerce, manufactures, fine arts, population, religion, education, 
statistics, etc., R. Montgomery Martin, ed. (London: Wm. H. Allen, 1838) is one example. 
14 Tirthankar Roy, Rethinking Economic Change in India: Labour and Livelihood (London: Routledge, 2005), 160-
1; Prasannan Parthasarathi, The Transition to a Colonial Economy:  Weavers, Merchants and Kings in South India, 
1720-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 57-9; Michelle Maskiell, “Embroidering the Past:  
Phulkari Textiles and Gendered Work as ‘Tradition’ and ‘Heritage’ in Colonial and Contemporary Punjab,” The 
Journal of Asian Studies 58, no. 2 (May 1999), 369; Sen 1999, 33, 76-80; and Hari Ranjan Ghosal, Economic 
Transition in the Bengal Presidency (1793-1833) (Patna:  Patna University, 1950), 8-9. 
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cotton weaving, sugar manufacturing, and oil pressing. While some migrated short distances to 
pursue this work, most of them stayed relatively close to home.15 
This state of affairs began to change in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as 
the agro-industrial divide took hold around India. The product of a diverse array of changes 
sweeping the countryside and the capitalist world economy, the divide was attributable to three 
developments, in particular. The first of these was the decline of many forms of rural industry, 
starting in the second half of the nineteenth century. A combination of changing trade patterns, 
colonial economic policies, and competition from foreign industrial goods decimated many such 
industries.16 The establishment of textile mills, jute factories, and other large-scale industrial 
concerns in major Indian cities struck a fatal blow against others.17 Funded by mercantile capital, 
the large-scale industries that arose in Bombay, Ahmedabad, and Calcutta in the final third of the 
nineteenth century were the second development.18 Displaced artisans, along with landless and 
land-poor peasants, migrated to these cities and, later, smaller urban centers in search of factory 
work.19 Finally, certain sections of the artisanry adapted to the changed economic landscape by 
seeking out new technologies and markets, and creating ever more specialized production lines.20 
Artisanry was already a predominantly urban occupation but became even more so at this time as 
                                                 
15 Tirthankar Roy, Traditional Industry in the Economy of Colonial India (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 75 and 82-3; and Amin 1984. 
16 Amiya Kumar Bagchi, “Deindustrialization in India in the Nineteenth Century: Some Theoretical Implications,” 
Journal of Development Studies 22.1 (1978), 135-64 and Irfan Habib, “Colonization of the Indian Economy, 1757-
1900,” Social Scientist 8.3 (1975), 23-53. For a slightly different perspective, see Tirthankar Roy, Artisans and 
Industrialization: Indian Weaving in the Twentieth Century (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993); Roy 1999; and 
Douglas Haynes, Small Town Capitalism in Western India: Artisans, Merchants, and the Making of the Informal 
Economy, 1870-1960 (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
17 B. R. Tomlinson, The Economy of Modern India, 1860-1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
106-8. 
18 Tomlinson 1996, 109-12 and Chandavarkar 1994, 64-5. 
19 Ahmedabad and Calcutta initially utilized a local labor force but began importing labor from greater distances 
around the turn of the twentieth century. Sen 1999, 24-6; Tomlinson 1996, 114; and Chandavarkar 1994, 129 and 
146.  
20 Haynes 2012, 243-50; Roy 1999, 43; and Roy 1993 5. 
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some rural artisans abandoned their profession to join the agricultural labor market and others 
migrated to small towns to avoid a similar fate.21 These three changes—the decline of many 
forms of rural industry, the establishment of large-scale industry in urban centers, and the 
growing urbanization of artisanry—combined to alter industry’s spatial location. This is not to 
say that industry exited the countryside entirely but rather that, by the early twentieth century, a 
much smaller percentage of industry transpired in rural spaces than ever before. 
 On the level of the economy as a whole, then, rural industry was becoming something of 
a misnomer. Once a ubiquitous feature of agrarian environments, it was unequivocally on the 
decline—not yet extinct but growing scarcer day-by-day. The anthropologist Mary Douglas has 
referred to dirt as “matter out of place.”22 Similarly, rural industry had become “industry out of 
place,” that is, industry where it was not supposed to be. I will have cause in later chapters to 
discuss the discomfort with which the first generation of development economists treated the 
category of rural industry. Many of them wrote rural industry out of their models altogether, 
operating instead as though urban areas were industry’s natural location.23 Some of Gandhi’s 
contemporaries would adopt a similar attitude, approaching rural industry’s decline not as a 
problem to be solved but as a necessary, if painful, step on the road to economic development.24 
Economic historians have occasionally grappled with the problem of rural industry but have 
more often given it short shrift by subsuming it under the more general category of “industry.” 
This is especially true of those historians who have investigated how small-scale industrial 
                                                 
21 Haynes 2012, 56-7 and 74-5; Roy 1999, 45-6. 
22 Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (New York: Praeger, 1966). 
23 The paradigmatic example of this is W. Arthur Lewis, “Economic Development with Unlimited Supply of Labor,” 
The Manchester School 22, no. 2 (May 1954), 139-91. Sanyal 2014 provides an excellent analysis of this in 144-9. 
24 Jawaharlal Nehru is one example of this line of thought. 
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producers successfully adapted to economic change.25 In assigning more importance to the 
overall health of Indian industry and less importance to its health in particular locations, they run 
the risk of treating industrial change as an exclusively industrial problem and not as a 
simultaneously agrarian one. By contrast, the framework I employ here—that of the agro-
industrial divide—is designed to focus our attention on both the agricultural and industrial 
dimensions of agrarian change.  
  
The Peasant-Industrial Producer 
 The “where” question is our point of entry into Gandhian economics, which, I suggest, 
was first formulated in the early 1920s to grapple with the spatial dislocations precipitated by the 
agro-industrial divide. Not coincidentally, this was also the moment at which the khadi economy, 
the name I have assigned to the space in which a diverse array of organizations worked to 
reestablish khadi production in rural areas, began to acquire an institutional home outside of the 
ashram. A residential community intended as an experiment in utopian living, the ashram was 
the space in which Gandhi and some of his closest followers lived and worked. Gandhi 
established his first ashrams in South Africa, followed by another one in western India in 1917. 
Named Sabarmati Ashram for its location on the banks of the Sabarmati River, this latter ashram 
was the site where the khadi economy was born.26 Gandhi’s elevation to head of India’s leading 
nationalist organization, the Indian National Congress (INC), in 1920 provided him with the 
opportunity to establish khadi work on a broader institutional footing. At his urging, the INC 
                                                 
25 This is true of both sides of the so-called “deindustrialization” debate, which have generally tracked economic 
change through the figure of the urban artisan. Leading statements of the “deindustrialization thesis” are Bagchi 
1978 and Habib 1975. Leading revisionist statements are Roy 1993, Roy 1999, and Haynes 2012.  
26 Gandhi discusses the early days of the khadi economy in An Autobiography: Or the Story of My Experiments with 
Truth, Trans. Mahadev Desai (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1927), 450-7. 
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opened a khadi department in 1922, followed by a semi-independent body called the All India 
Khadi Board in 1924. Both the department and the board liaised with provincial- and district-
level INC offices to make khadi production a central focus of the INC agenda. These 
coordination efforts bore mixed fruit and so, in September 1925, the INC transferred 
responsibility for khadi work to an independent organization named the All India Spinners 
Association (AISA).27 Gandhi headed up this new organization, and some of the INC’s leading 
lights, including Jawaharlal Nehru and Rajendra Prasad, sat on its executive board.28 
 AISA dedicated its first decade to two tasks: increasing khadi production and 
consumption, on the one hand, and justifying its existence to both internal and external 
audiences, on the other. As a corollary to this second task, it compiled hundreds of pages of 
institutional records detailing the decisions made at monthly (sometimes weekly) meetings of the 
executive board, along with summaries of the operations of each of its provincial branches.29 It 
also published dozens of pamphlets and manuals for circulation to khadi institutions and the 
public. I have located and reviewed approximately thirty of them, which spanned a variety of 
genres, including annual reports, political-economic manifestos, and technical manuals.30 
Though diffuse in their concerns, these institutional records and publications regularly circle 
back to a single issue: the spatial reconfiguration of the Indian economy I have termed the agro-
industrial divide.  
                                                 
27 Trivedi discusses these institutions at length in Trivedi 2007, chapter 1.  
28 The remaining members were Shaukat Ali, Jamnalal Bajaj, Shankarlal Banker, Satishchandra Dasgupta, 
Gangadharrao Deshpande, Maganlal Gandhi, Lakshmidas Purushottam, C. Rajagopalachari, and Konda 
Venkatappaya. All India Spinners’ Association, Annual Report: 1926-27 (Ahmedabad: The All-India Spinners’ 
Association, 1927), 55. 
29 These records can be found in Akhil Bharat Charkha Sangh Papers/All India Spinners Association Papers 
(hereafter cited as AISA Papers), Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (hereafter cited as NMML). The majority of 
these records are written in Hindi. 
30 A comprehensive list of these publications is included at the end of the chapter. 
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 Consider the 235-page essay co-authored by S. V. Puntambekar, a professor of history 
and politics at Benares Hindu University in the United Provinces (UP), and N. S. Varadachari, a 
law graduate from South India who would go on to become editor of Gandhi’s weekly journal 
Young India. This essay, titled Hand-Spinning and Hand-Weaving, was the winner of a 1925 
competition for “the best essay on spinning” as determined by a committee comprised of M. K. 
Gandhi, Maganlal Gandhi, Shankarlal Banker, and Ambalal Sarabhai. Sponsored by the INC 
Joint Treasurer Revashankar Jagjivan Mehta, the competition attracted sixty-eight entries from 
across India and carried a Rs. 1,000 prize.31 AISA published the winning essay in 1926 with a 
foreword written by M. K. Gandhi. In it, Gandhi commended Puntambekar and Varadachari for 
convincingly demonstrating that handspinning constituted the best supplementary occupation for 
the millions of Indians who had no work for at least four months of the year.32  
We can understand Hand-Spinning and Hand-Weaving not merely as a statement of the 
authors’ opinion but also as an institutionally sanctioned, and in some ways co-authored, 
document. This is partly because of the nature of the competition itself. The search committee, 
composed of leading members of the AISA executive board, had previously announced a set of 
specifications the winning essay would have to meet. In selecting Puntambekar and 
Varadachari’s essay and in recommending its publication to AISA’s publishing wing, they lent it 
their institutional seal of approval. And, finally, Puntambekar and Varadachari drew extensively 
upon publications issued by AISA and its predecessor organizations when preparing their essay. 
Hand-Spinning and Hand-Weaving, in turn, was often cited in subsequent AISA publications, 
further solidifying its position in a rapidly expanding canon.33  
                                                 
31 Rs. 1,000 would have been a very large sum at a time when the average annual income was approximately Rs. 50. 
32 S.V. Puntambekar and N.S. Varadachari, Hand-Spinning and Hand-Weaving: An Essay (Ahmedabad: All India 
Spinners’ Association, 1926), 1-2.  
33 Putambekar and Varadachari 1926, bibliography. 
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 Now for the content of the essay itself. Though ostensibly a history of the changing 
fortunes of the Indian handspinning and handweaving industries, Puntambekar and 
Varadachari’s text is simultaneously an account of the emergence of the agro-industrial divide. 
The authors open their essay with a discussion of spinning and other village industries, which, 
they argue, were ubiquitous in the countryside prior to the arrival of the British. In their words, at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century, “the vast majority of homes, possibly not even one 
excluded, took to spinning as an occupation to fill idle hours and supplemented their agricultural 
and other incomes with earnings thereby.” “The spinners together with the carders, cotton 
retailers and the hand-ginners covered a seventh part of the population. The weavers were not 
less numerous if we take account of them along with their families.”34 
Puntambekar and Varadachari substantiated their assertions with data obtained from a 
wide variety of sources, including an economic survey of the eastern Indian provinces of Bengal 
and Bihar conducted by the Scottish physician and English East India Company (EIC) employee 
Francis Buchanan at the turn of the nineteenth century.35 Sprawling in its remit, Buchanan’s 
survey purported to provide a comprehensive overview of eastern India’s economic and social 
geography at the very moment the British had begun to consolidate their control over the 
subcontinent. Of all the information Buchanan had compiled, Puntambekar and Varadachari 
chose to emphasize one point in particular: that most spinners were women who plied the 
charkha, or spinning wheel, only in their spare time but who were nevertheless well 
compensated for their labors. These women, paraphrased Puntambekar and Varadachari, 
“brought no little addition to the home; for, their earnings usually varied from Rs. 2 to 4 a year 
per spindle, which would, measured in present money values, amount to Rs. 10 to 20.” Those 
                                                 
34 Ibid, 72-3. 
35 This survey was conducted between 1807 and 1814. 
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who worked at spinning full-time “made as much as 11 ½ to 12 annas a month or nearly Rs. 9 a 
year, which again rendered into present money values would represent Rs. 45 or thereabout.”36 
By way of comparison, the average annual household income in 1926 was about Rs. 50.37 To 
Buchanan’s findings, Puntambekar and Varadachari added those of the British historian Robert 
Orme, who was appointed official historiographer to the EIC in 1769. Writing in 1782, Orme 
estimated that half of all Indians derived a portion of their livelihood from cotton manufacture: 
“Spinning and weaving were the lightest tasks which a man could be set to and the numbers that 
did nothing else in the country were exceeding.” “While weaving as a pursuit was held in high 
esteem and was seen to be prosperous, spinning kept pace with it being universal and 
widespread.”38 
British “terrorism” destroyed this state of affairs, however, forcing the vast majority of 
rural dwellers to give up their industrial pursuits.39 Puntambekar and Varadachari grouped a 
number of different practices under the heading of “terrorism,” including the imposition of heavy 
import duties on Indian manufactures in Britain, the reconfiguration of the subcontinent as an 
open market for British industrial goods, and restrictions placed on the free movement of 
artisans.40 Some artisans, they continued, had even cut off their own thumbs in order to avoid 
becoming slaves to the British.41  
                                                 
36 Puntambekar and Varadachari 1926, 70-3. 
37 All India Spinners’ Association, Khadi Guide: 1927 (Ahmedabad: The All India Spinners’ Association, 1927), 7. 
38 Quoted in Puntambekar and Varadachari, 68-70. Orme was the author of the History of the Military Transactions 
of the British Nation in Indostan, first published in 1763 and 1778, as well as Historical Fragments of the Mogul 
Empire, the Morattoes and English Concerns in Indostan from 1659 (1782). 
39 Puntambekar and Varadachari 1926, 68.  
40 Ibid, 94-5. 
41 Ibid, 68. The story of artisans, usually weavers, cutting off their thumbs to avoid becoming subordinates of the 
EIC is a common one. Puntambekar and Varadchari are unusual in that they credit silk winders, and not weavers, 
with having taken this drastic step. 
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Puntambekar and Varadachari’s concern for the artisan would have been familiar to many 
of their contemporaries. After all, starting in the late nineteenth century, elite Indians and 
colonial officials alike tracked industrial change through the figure of the artisan.42 A specialized 
worker in possession of an exclusive, often hereditary, cultural tradition, the artisan functioned 
for the former as an emblem of the destructive impact of colonial rule on India and, for the latter, 
as a symbol of Indian backwardness.43 The artisan has become a key trope in the scholarly 
literature as well, especially for those historians concerned with the question of whether 
colonialism “deindustrialized” the Indian economy.44 But Puntambekar and Varadachari do not 
stick with the artisan for very long, instead quickly transitioning to a discussion of another, less 
familiar figure. 
 That figure is the peasant who was simultaneously an industrial producer, that is, the 
peasant who worked at rural industry in her spare time. Peasant-industrial producers were far 
more numerous than artisans, yet attracted considerably less attention from their 
contemporaries.45 They are also all but absent from conventional accounts of industrialization, 
which tend to regard the artisan as the small-scale producer par excellence.46 This is an 
unfortunate oversight since peasant-industrial producers were uniquely vulnerable to the divide’s 
effects, straddling as they did the twin worlds of agriculture and industry. While they had 
                                                 
42 Abigail McGowan, Crafting the Nation in Colonial India (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009) shows how the 
artisan became a central figure in struggles by elite Indians and British colonial officials “to establish authority over 
the lower classes as well as the state itself” in the late nineteenth century (4). 
43 Some colonial officials also viewed artisans as living embodiments of Indian tradition, to be preserved and 
perhaps even modernized. McGowan discusses this strain of thought in 2009, chapters 3 and 4. Arindam Dutta also 
discusses how artisans became a key trope in British efforts to render India more productive in The Bureaucracy of 
Beauty: Design in the Age of its Global Reproducibility (New York: Routledge, 2007). 
44 Bagchi 1978, Habib 1975, Roy 1993, Roy 1999, and Haynes 2012. 
45 It is hard to arrive at even an educated guess regarding the number of peasant-industrial producers in nineteenth- 
and early-twentieth century India. For a discussion of the changing composition of Indian industry as peasant-
industrial producers exited the workforce, see Roy 2005, 121-3. This discussion and the accompanying quantitative 
analysis strongly suggest that peasant-industrial producers once accounted for a very large percentage of the 
industrial workforce. 
46 Bagchi 1978, Habib 1975, Roy 1993, Roy 1999, and Haynes 2012. 
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previously hedged their bets by supplementing agricultural work with industrial pursuits, the 
divide pulled them in two different directions, forcing them to choose one or the other. Some fell 
back on work as agricultural laborers, while others journeyed to faraway urban areas in search of 
industrial employment. Still others worked sometimes at agriculture and sometimes at industry, 
but never in the same space as had been the case previously. 
Returning to Puntambekar and Varadachari, the central protagonist of the second half of 
their essay is the peasant-industrial producer confronted with two equally unappealing options: to 
enter the agricultural labor market or to migrate to the city in the hope of securing factory 
employment. Peasant-industrial producers did not previously have to decide between agriculture 
and industry, the authors suggest, but with “none of their old subsidiary occupations left to 
them,” they had little choice. To make matters worse, the 1901 census had recorded a large 
increase in the number of agricultural laborers, while the 1921 census revealed that the urban 
manufacturing sector had not “been able to absorb a tenth part of the population” displaced by 
rural industry’s decline. Instead, agriculture continued to support seventy-one percent of the 
Indian population, while “organized industry” supported only one percent. Partly as a result, a 
new generation of peasant-industrial producers increasingly traveled back and forth between the 
village and the city, sometimes working as factory or casual labor in urban areas, other times 
returning “home” to meet family or to help with the harvest.47 These occasional visits reinforced 
the essential interconnectedness of industry and agriculture while simultaneously emphasizing 
the growing spatial distance between the two. 
Of course, Puntambekar and Varadachari did not use the term “peasant-industrial 
producer” to refer to this new class of Indians. Instead, they (along with authors of other AISA-
                                                 
47 Puntambekar and Varadachari, 133-4. 
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sanctioned literature) employed a number of other terms, including “the unemployed and 
underemployed masses,” “idle hands,” “the poor villagers of India,” “the poor masses of India,” 
and, in at least one instance, “surplus people.”48 This latter phrase is especially important, since it 
allows us to connect the changing fortunes of the peasant-industrial producer to yet another 
important development in the history of late colonial India: the swelling of the ranks of the 
surplus labor force. 
In contrast to these thinkers, however, khadi institutions regarded the destruction of rural 
industry as an unequivocal evil.49 “Without cottage industries,” Gandhi once remarked, “the 
Indian farmer is poor. He cannot maintain himself through the fruit of the land alone. He is in 
need of some industry in order to make up this shortfall.”50 Or, on another occasion: “The 
destruction of the Indian farmer is assured in the absence of some type of home industry. He 
cannot fill his stomach through farming alone. He also needs some industry to support him.”51 
And finally: “Farming and spinning [once the most ubiquitous form of rural industry] are the 
Indian national body’s two lungs. It is essential to protect them from decay.”52 Gandhi employed 
cottage industry, home industry, and village industry as synonyms for the more general category 
of rural industry, the revitalization of which, he claimed, was the most pressing problem facing 
India.53   
                                                 
48 Respectively, All India Spinners’ Association, Khadi Guide: 1927 (Ahmedabad: The All India Spinners’ 
Association, 1927), 4-6; All India Spinners’ Association, Annual Report: 1927-28 (Ahmedabad: The All India 
Spinners’ Association, 1928), 25; Trustee Mandal, June 20-22, 1941, AISA Papers, NMML; and Puntambekar and 
Varadachari 1926, 3. 
49 Sanyal 2014, 118-9. See especially Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, The Development of Capitalism in Russia: The Process 
of the Formation of a Home Market for Large-Scale Industry (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 
1956). Originally published in 1918. See also Bhikhu Parekh, “Nehru and the National Philosophy of India,” 
Economic and Political Weekly (Jan. 5-12, 1991): 35-48. Both Lenin and Nehru acknowledged the large-scale 
violence entailed in the destruction of rural industry but regarded it as a necessary stage in the development process. 
50 Quoted in Ram Gopal Gupta, Khaddar (Lucknow: 1941), 15. Translated from Hindi. 
51 Quoted in Akhil Bharat Charkha Sangh, Marg Suchika, Part 1 (Wardha: Akhil Bharat Charkha Sangh, 1942) 17. 
Translated from Hindi. First published in a 1919 letter. 
52 Quoted in Gupta, Khaddar, 16. Translated from Hindi. 
53 Puntambekar and Varadachari, 126-7. 
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Consider Puntambekar and Varadachari’s response to one economist’s proposal that 
unemployed Madrasis (residents of Madras state) be sent to Burma to take up industrial work. 
They compared him to the “mad Emperor” Muhammad bin Tughlaq, who in 1327 ordered the 
residents of the capital city Delhi to leave their homes and join him several hundred miles away 
in another city. Tughlaq, they noted with no small measure of satisfaction, had been forced to 
rescind his order in the face of the abject failure of the new city to thrive.54 
In some regards, these Gandhian economists merely extended the critique of classical 
political economy that Indian nationalists had made a generation or two before. If those 
nationalists had argued that the Indian nation and not the British empire should serve as the 
natural site of capital accumulation, Gandhian economists were arguing that the Indian nation 
was still so expansive a space as to reproduce some of the dislocating effects associated with 
colonialism.55 But in another regard, they were taking this critique in an entirely different 
direction by identifying the agro-industrial divide, and not British colonialism, as the most 
pernicious influence on the Indian economy. The toolkit required to address the former would be 
very different from the one Indian nationalists had developed to challenge colonial rule. 
 
Restoring Rural Industry to Place 
Another way of getting at the constitutive relationship between the agro-industrial divide 
and Gandhian economics is to examine how the latter operated in practice. If the previous section 
provided an overview of the theoretical apparatus the first generation of khadi institutions 
                                                 
54 Puntambekar and Varadachari wrote that the economist’s suggestion “almost reminds one of the transfer of 
populations which one mad Emperor once proposed as between Delhi and Doulatabad” (156). While accounts 
written by contemporary historians such as Ibn Battuta and Ziauddin Barani reported that all of Delhi’s residents 
were compelled to leave (in Barani’s words, “Not a cat or dog was left”), recent histories have painted a more 
nuanced picture. Regardless, Tughlaq shifted the capital back to Delhi in 1335. 
55 Goswami 2004, 11-2. 
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constructed to guide their work, this section provides an overview of its material counterpart. It 
is by now well known that Gandhi and his colleagues attempted to turn India into a nation of 
spinners. That is, they encouraged all Indians, particularly those resident in rural areas, to ply the 
charkha daily and to have their clothes manufactured out of its yarn. Ramanathan spoke for many 
Indians when he dismissed the khadi economy in these terms: “The spinning wheel is dead, in 
fact it died some time before Mahatma Gandhi made the attempt ten years ago to give it artificial 
respiration. Its proper place is the museum and you can no more give it life than you can give life 
to the many dry bones that fill the museum.”56 Interpretations such as this one hinge on the 
flawed assumption that khadi was primarily an intervention in the industrial economy. The 
historiographical literature is rife with similar assertions, most of which firmly, if charitably, 
conclude that Gandhi’s efforts to sway Indian industrial producers to his idiosyncratic vision of 
development were less than successful.57 While certainly true, that is largely beside the point, for 
as I have indicated previously, khadi was above all an intervention in the agrarian economy. 
More specifically, it was an attempt to ameliorate some of the worst effects of the agro-industrial 
divide. 
Handspinning is usually portrayed as a low-skilled industrial occupation performed by 
the most menial members of rural society.58 By contrast, I understand it as an agro-industry, not 
in the popular sense of agriculture developed along industrial lines, but instead as an activity that 
combines elements of both industry and agriculture, thus blurring the already hazy boundaries 
between the two. Handspinning is one of many intermediate stages in a lengthy production 
                                                 
56 Ramanathan 1931, 3. “Mahatma” is an honorific that is literally translated as “great soul.” Many Indians, even 
those who considered themselves opponents of Gandhi, attached it to the beginning of Gandhi’s name. 
57 For example, Claude Markovits, Indian Business and Nationalist Politics, 1931-39: The Indigenous Capitalist 
Class and the Rise of the Congress Party (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 189; and Haynes 2012, 
233-4. 
58 Roy 2005, 160-1 and Roy 1999, 19. 
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process generally culminating in the manufacture of an article of clothing. Material inputs 
change form at each stage in the process as cotton fibers are transformed into thread and thread 
into cloth. The first stage is clearly agricultural, pertaining as it does to cotton cultivation, i.e. the 
sowing of cottonseeds, tending of cotton plants, and harvesting of cotton fibers. The next stages 
combine elements of both agriculture and industry, however. Cotton, the fiber removed from 
around the seeds of the cotton plant, must be cleansed of its impurities through an activity known 
as ginning. Sometimes performed by the harvesters themselves, other times by a specialized 
group of individuals stationed at a hand-powered or mechanized machine, ginning separates dirt, 
seeds, and other waste products from the fibers. Once ginned, cotton has also to be carded, its 
fibers disentangled from one another and arranged in parallel rows. Ginners employed by khadi 
organizations used, first, their fingers and, second, a sharp-toothed comb to perform this 
operation, shaping previously unruly fibers into neat bundles called slivers. Large-scale textile 
mills, by contrast, employed carding machines, some of them mechanized, others of them 
operated by hand. Carding could transpire in a variety of locations: the fields, the village hut, a 
seasonal processing unit, a permanent processing unit, or the wing of an urban factory. In each 
instance, laborers turned an agricultural good (cotton) into an agro-industrial good (cotton 
slivers). They then fed these slivers into a spinning wheel to produce thread. That thread, in turn, 
would be twisted, arranged into new bundles, strengthened through the application of a substance 
called sizing, and, finally, attached to the weaver’s loom. Washing, and sometimes dyeing, 
followed, usually marking the final stage in the cloth production process.59    
                                                 
59 This description of the cloth production process is drawn from a number of sources, including Prabhakar Diwan, 
Katne ki Kala (Raipur: Sunderlal Tripathi, 1935); Satyan, Otna, Tunna, v Dhunna (Sevagram: Hindustani Talimi 
Sangh, 1940); and Keshav Deodhar, Dhanush Takua (Sevagram: Khadi Vidyalay, 1944). 
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If conducted in relatively close proximity to the cotton fields, handspinning functioned 
more or less as an extension of the agricultural labor that produced raw cotton. In fact, it makes 
little sense to draw a sharp distinction between “agricultural” and “industrial” work in such a 
setting, except perhaps on the basis of their occasionally divergent temporalities.60 If conducted 
at a distance from the cotton fields, spinning no longer functioned as an extension of agricultural 
labor, however. Instead, it became a different order of activity and thus separate from many of 
the tasks that proceeded it in the production process.  
To restate the point slightly differently, spatial division in the form of the agro-industrial 
divide produced a distinction between agricultural and industrial work. We saw this previously in 
the case of the peasant-industrial producer forced to choose between agricultural and industrial 
pursuits. We see it again in the case of handspinning, which had been rendered virtually obsolete 
by the turn of the twentieth century because of the rise of machine-powered spinning mills.61 
Handspinning’s decline, when accompanied by the emergence of spinning mills in urban areas, 
had the effect of disaggregating spinning into agricultural and industrial components. As we will 
                                                 
60 Whereas intensive agricultural work could transpire at only certain times of year, industrial work could occur at 
virtually any time, although it tended to pick up steam in the agricultural offseason. 
61 Handspinning began to decline at slightly different times in different parts of India. Tomlinson estimates that 
handspun yarn supplied fifty percent of the domestic market by weight in the early 1880s, twenty-five percent in 
1900, eighteen percent prior to World War I, and less than ten percent from the late 1920s (Tomlinson 1996, 106-8).  
In the context of Bengal, Hari Ranjan Ghosal asserts that handspinners’ position declined from the 1820s (Ghosal, 
Economic Transition in the Bengal Presidency (1793-1833) (Patna:  Patna University, 1950), 44).  In the context of 
western India, Haynes asserts that handspinning supplied an important supplementary cash income to rural and 
urban dwellers until the mid-19th century (Haynes 2012, 45-7).  In an earlier publication, he concluded that most 
handloom weavers began to use yarn from European or Indian spinning mills in the early- to mid-19th century 
(Haynes 1991, 179).  In the context of the Central Provinces, Peter Harnetty argues that millspun yarn was pervasive 
by the final quarter of the nineteenth centuries (Harnetty, “‘Deindustrialization’ Revisited: The Handloom Weavers 
of the Central Provinces of India, c. 1800-1947,” Modern Asian Studies 25.3 (1991), 465-6).  Sumit Guha reports 
that the number of handspinners active in the Central Provinces had declined significantly by 1901 and was virtually 
zero by 1911 (Sumit Guha, “The Handloom Industry of Central India: 1825-1950,” in Tirthankar Roy, ed., Cloth 
and Commerce: Textiles in Colonial India (Walnut Creek: AltaMira, 1996), 227-9).  In the context of South India, 
Prasannan Parthasarathi has concluded that handspinning died out by the late nineteenth century (2001, 59).  Punjab 
may be a partial exception.  Michelle Maskiell argues that, although millspun yarn replaced handspun yarn for most 
“commercial urban textile production” in the nineteenth century, village women continued to practice handspinning 
into the twentieth century (Maskiell, “Embroidering the Past:  Phulkari Textiles and Gendered Work as ‘Tradition’ 
and ‘Heritage’ in Colonial and Contemporary Punjab,” The Journal of Asian Studies 58, no. 2 (May 1999), 380-1). 
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see shortly, khadi organizations’ efforts to reestablish handspinning in rural areas were oriented 
toward joining those components back together. 
Because handspinning could be performed at virtually any time of year, it possessed a 
fundamental flexibility that most types of agricultural work lacked. Khadi organizations drew 
upon this flexibility in a variety of ways, most notably by making part-time and not full-time 
employment the centerpiece of their program to reestablish industry in rural areas. Indeed, their 
genius lay partly in the recognition that, under certain circumstances, it might be more useful for 
people to pursue multiple forms of part-time employment than to work full-time at a single job. 
Many types of work have always been performed on a less than full-time basis, including 
seasonal, casual, and home work. This was certainly true in the early 1920s when the khadi 
economy began to take shape. Not only agriculturists but also factory workers rarely held down a 
single job, instead exchanging industrial for agricultural employment during the harvesting 
season or even working at multiple jobs in the same day.62 Partly because most employment was 
so insecure, many of the reform efforts launched during the late colonial period were oriented 
toward supplying Indians with reliable forms of full-time work.63 And yet the insecurity that was 
a hallmark of the time did not stem from anything inherent in the nature of part-time employment 
but rather from a variety of other forces, including the agro-industrial divide. 
Khadi institutions’ efforts to reestablish part-time employment in rural areas were firmly 
aimed at addressing one of the divide’s primary consequences: the partial evacuation of industry 
                                                 
62 For example, Chandavarkar 1994 reports that in 1934, one-third of the labor force employed in Bombay’s cotton 
mills was hired on a daily basis from among the ranks of the long-term unemployed (82). 
63 The badli system, introduced by Bombay millowners in 1935, had the effect of making industrial employment 
both more and less secure. It divided the workforce into two camps: permanent employees and badlis, who although 
not permanent employees, were nevertheless required to report to their mill every morning. Vacancies in the 
permanent workforce were to be filled from amongst the ranks of badlis and not the so-called casual laborers who 
had previously been hired on a daily basis. Badlis themselves enjoyed no security of tenure and could wait years 
before being offered a permanent position (Chandavarkar 1994, 156-7).  
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from the countryside. Consider the following statement, issued in 1927 and repeated in various 
forms over the course of the next two decades:  
It is necessary at the outset to remove one misapprehension which again and again crops 
up in the arguments used against the Charkha. Spinning is not put forward as the sole 
occupation for any class of people; it is not intended that it should compete with, or 
displace, any existing type of industry. There is therefore no meaning in comparing the 
earnings out of spinning [to] other whole-time occupations and declaring them to be too 
meager.64 
 
Presented as a riposte to critics who argued that handspinning was too unremunerative to serve 
as a full-time occupation, this statement made clear that it had never been intended to do any 
such thing. On the contrary, it was carefully designed to address what had been perhaps the 
divide’s most enduring consequence: the widespread loss of supplementary employment in rural 
areas. 
A low-skilled, labor intensive occupation that produced an essential consumer good using 
only minimal capital inputs, handspinning was uniquely suited to this task. Charkhas could be 
procured for as little as Rs. 2 in 1925 and were so simple to handle, Gandhi declared in his 
weekly journal, that they could be operated by the elderly, infirm, and “ignorant” alike.65 AISA 
launched a massive campaign to popularize the spinning wheel in late 1925. In support of this 
effort, its executive board met as often as twice a month to monitor the progress of khadi work 
and to consider requests from AISA’s provincial branches for funding and technical assistance. 
In 1925 and 1926, the board dedicated the bulk of its time to consolidating finances, appointing 
new employees, or karyakartas, and establishing district-level production and sales centers. By 
                                                 
64 AISA, Khadi Guide 1927, 1. Puntambekar and Varadachari 1926 make a similar claim (129). 
65 Prices, and presumably the quality of the charkha as well, varied by institution.  Institutions affiliated with the 
Bombay Provincial Khadi Board sold several charkhas, ranging in price from 4 to 8 rupees.  Another organization, 
the Saugor Khadi Bhandar in the Central Provinces, sold its charkhas for a little over 2 rupees.  See Khadi Guide, 
August 1925 (Sabarmati:  Khadi Information Bureau, 1925), 29 and 32.  By way of comparison, the Satyagraha 
Ashram manufactured and sold two varieties of handlooms in 1927, one for Rs. 20, the other for Rs. 40.  In Khadi 
Guide 1927 (Ahmedabad:  The All India Spinners’ Association, 1927), 88. For Gandhi’s comment, see Young India 
(1 Oct. 1926) in Khadi Guide, 1927, 5. 
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the end of 1925, AISA directly employed about six hundred karyakartas, many of them 
concentrated in a handful of states.66 At the beginning of 1927, Tamil Nadu alone was home to at 
least 120 AISA karyakartas and Bihar to eighty-six.67 In some states, such as Bengal and UP, 
semi-independent organizations employed the majority of khadi workers.68 In other states, 
especially Tamil Nadu, small-scale merchants operated a number of khadi shops.69 By mid-1927, 
AISA had opened almost four hundred production and sales centers, and started khadi work in 
approximately 1,500 villages.70 
Karyakartas were charged with performing a number of tasks, including instructing rural 
dwellers in carding, ginning, and weaving; supplying would-be handspinners with a charkha and 
a weekly allotment of raw cotton; collecting the yarn produced by handspinners and transporting 
it to a production center to be turned into khadi; compensating handspinners for their labor; and 
selling finished khadi to urban and rural consumers.71 I will discuss each of these initiatives at 
length in subsequent chapters, but for now it is enough to gesture toward their existence and their 
broad aim: repopulating the countryside with rural industry. 
Table 1.1 presents my best estimate of employment totals within the khadi economy 
between 1927 and 1945. Based on figures compiled by khadi organizations themselves, these 
estimates are admittedly imperfect. On balance, they are more likely to be underestimates than 
                                                 
66 Akhil Bharatvarshiya Charkha Sangh, Salana Report, 1925-26 (Ahmedabad: Akhil Bharatvarshiya Charkha 
Sangh, 1926), 1. 
67 AISA, Annual Report: 1926-27, 14-5. 
68 UP’s Shri Gandhi Ashram (SGA) is one such example. Bengal’s Khadi Pratisthan is another. For an overview of 
SGA’s activities, see Shri Gandhi Ashram-Charkha Sangh: Ashram-Vidhan (Meerut: Ramswarup Sharma, 1934), 2 
and J. B. Kripalani, “Shri Gandhi Ashram,” J. B. Kripalani private papers, NMML, 2-8. For an overview of Khadi 
Pratisthan’s activities, see Satis Chandra Das Gupta, Khadi Manual, Vol. I (Parts 1-3) (Calcutta: Khadi Pratisthan, 
1924). 
69 A Khadi Tour: Concerning Some Information about Khadi Gathered in the First Months of 1924 (Information 
Bureau, All India Khadi Department, 1924). 
70 AISA, Annual Report: 1926-7, 51 and Akhil Bharatvarshiya Charkha Sangh, Salana Report, 1925-26, 10. 
71 Akhil Bharatvarshiya Charkha Sangh: Salana Report, 1925-6 (Ahmedabad: All India Spinners Association, 1926) 
provides a comprehensive overview of the different components of this program. 
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overestimates. This is partly because many state-level khadi organizations, especially those with 
no formal affiliation to AISA, failed to submit information for publication some years. It is also 
because the below table includes only spinners and weavers in the total and not the smaller, 
although still substantial, group of carders, washers, dyers, and other miscellaneous individuals 
who helped to produce khadi. Khadi organizations reported employing almost as many workers 
as cotton textile mills between the mid-1930s and the mid-1940s: almost 350,000 at one point as 
compared to the textile mills’ 400,000.72 By way of comparison, the economic historian 
Rajnarayan Chandavarkar has estimated that the textile mills located in Bombay, the heart of 
India’s large-scale industrial sector, directly employed about 151,000 workers in 1922 and 
130,000 in 1945.73 Thus, far from being a marginal phenomenon as some historians have 
suggested, on the level of employment, at least, the khadi economy was well on par with one of 
the other major industrial developments of the day.  
 
Table 1.1 Employment, 1927-194574 
 
Year Number of spinners Number of weavers Total 
1927 83,339 5,193 88,532 
1928 97,700 4,944 102,644 
1930 179,453 13,733 193,186 
1939 265,253 17,545 282,798 
1940 254,968 16,801 271,769 
                                                 
72 Puntambekar and Varadachari 1926, 214 and Gulzarilal Nanda, “Some Aspects of Khadi,” Congress Jubilee 
Brochure, no. 3 (Allahabad: All India Congress Committee, 1935), 1.  
73 Chandavarkar, 78, 115, and 250. It is extremely difficult to compile accurate employment figures for the textile 
mills. Government surveys frequently undercounted industrial workers, who routinely moved between jobs or left 
factory employment entirely for extended periods. In addition, a large percentage of the industrial workforce was 
composed of casual laborers, who reported to the factory on a daily basis but were only occasionally offered 
employment. Finally, we must distinguish between the individuals directly employed by textile mills and the far 
greater number of individuals who derived some portion of their income from allied sectors of the economy. The 
latter group consisted of the street vendors who sold refreshments to mill hands, the construction workers who built 
vital infrastructure, the carters who transported raw materials, and the brokers, traders, and financiers who kept the 
mills afloat. 
74 All India Spinners’ Association, Annual Report: 1926-27 (Ahmedabad: The All-India Spinners’ Association, 
1927); All India Spinners’ Association, Annual Report: 1927-28 (Ahmedabad: The All India Spinners’ Association, 
1928); All India Spinners’ Association, Khadi Guide: 1931 (Ahmedabad: The All India Spinners’ Association, 
1931); and Akhil Bharat Charkha Sangh, Varshik Vivaran: 1941-42 (Wardha: Akhil Bharat Charkha Sangh, 1942). 
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1942 324,391 23,785 348,176 
1943 221,981 19,044 241,025 
1944 239,332 21,041 260,373 
1945 272,154 19,997 292,151 
  
 
The Spinner: A Microhistory 
 
Khadi organizations’ efforts to restore rural industry to place are best comprehended from 
the bottom up. While the agro-industrial divide reconfigured India’s entire economic geography, 
rendering millions of people surplus labor in the process, it had its greatest impact at the level of 
the individual household. Puntambekar and Varadachari once wrote of handspinning that its 
spread “acts even as a shower of rain distributed evenly and over a wide surface.”75 The agro-
industrial divide spread in a similar fashion, covering so much ground that its initial effects were 
nearly invisible except to the individuals stripped of vital sources of supplementary income and 
forced to reduce consumption or to migrate elsewhere in search of work. 
Khadi organizations’ initial progress, if any, would have been similarly invisible, at least 
on the level of the economy as a whole. To locate it, we must turn to the land-poor peasant or 
agricultural laborer presented with a spinning wheel and promised modest compensation for the 
yarn she produced. I am unaware of any first-person accounts of the khadi economy authored by 
spinners themselves. I am similarly unaware of any attempts on the part of khadi organizations to 
document the individual experiences of the spinners they served. While Gandhi and several of 
his colleagues wrote extensively about their experiences producing and consuming khadi, it is 
unclear how much these accounts can tell us about the hundreds of thousands (even millions) of 
nameless individuals who at one point or another spun yarn within the khadi economy.76 In the 
                                                 
75 1926, 195-6. 
76 Examples are Gandhi 1926; B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, I Too Have Spun: Being a Collection of Notes on Spinning 
(Bombay: Hind Kitabs Limited, 1946); and J. B. Kripalani, “Shri Gandhi Ashram,” 1975, J. B. Kripalani private 
papers, NMML, 2-20. 
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absence of such personalized information, we are forced to turn elsewhere for guidance, namely 
the institutional reports and aggregate statistical data I have referenced throughout this chapter. 
This does not mean that there is nothing for us to say about the people who experienced firsthand 
the consequences of the agro-industrial divide and who were the targets of khadi institutions’ 
initiatives to reestablish industry in rural areas. On the contrary, by patching together evidence 
from a variety of sources, we can write a microhistory of a typical spinner and, in doing so, 
provide some indication of what restoring rural industry to place might have looked like on the 
ground. The following microhistory was compiled from information contained in the institutional 
records and publications described in the previous section. Where appropriate, I have cited the 
names of individual sources. A full list of publications consulted is available in Appendix 1. 
While the specific circumstances facing spinners differed from district to district, and 
even from household to household, let us take a look at one spinner, a woman in her thirties 
living in a village in Muzaffarpur District in the eastern Indian state of Bihar.77 Located about 
seventy kilometers from the Ganges River in the northern portion of the state, Muzaffarpur 
District was a flat plains area crosscut by many rivers. Although plagued by frequent flooding, 
the district’s farmers simultaneously benefited from the soil’s high moisture content, as a result 
of which they were able to pursue agriculture year-round. Our typical spinner almost certainly 
belonged to an agricultural household, most likely one in possession of a small parcel of land. 
Her family may have owned this land outright or rented it from a more substantial farmer. Cash 
rents were common in her part of the state.78 Her family probably raised theirs by selling crops in 
the marketplace and/or by taking out a loan from the local moneylender. The principal crops in 
                                                 
77 Bihar was one of the highest producing khadi states in the country, along with Tamil Nadu and UP. 
78 Gyan Prakash, Bonded Histories: Genealogies of Labor Servitude in Colonial India (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 15-6. 
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her area were wheat, rice, pulses, and oil-seeds. She and other members of her household—at a 
minimum, a husband, children, parents-in-law, and perhaps other relatives from her husband’s 
side of the family—worked in the fields for many hours a day. She also had responsibility for 
numerous domestic tasks, including cooking, washing, and tending to small children.  
The appearance of a khadi worker in her village may or may not have had an immediate 
impact on her life. Let us say that the first one arrived in 1927 from AISA’s state headquarters in 
Muzaffarpur town. Clad in coarse white khadi and wearing a Gandhi cap on his head, he would 
have looked very different from her neighbors. M. K. Gandhi had passed through the district just 
a few months before as part of a tour to drum up support for the khadi program.79 Partly as a 
result, the khadi worker’s arrival would not have come as a complete surprise, although it was 
still sufficiently unusual as to attract considerable attention.  
The khadi worker had come to her village to persuade its residents to take up 
handspinning, promising to supply them with cotton and spinning wheels, and to pay them for 
their yarn. She herself knew nothing of spinning, which was no longer practiced in her village, 
but for one reason or another, she soon found herself in possession of a charkha.80 Perhaps her 
family had nationalist leanings. Perhaps a prominent member of her community was sympathetic 
to the khadi project. Perhaps she or her husband was swayed by the khadi worker’s promises of 
the additional income a charkha might accrue. But, regardless, the khadi worker entered her 
name in a register, gave her spinning lessons, and stopped by once a week to collect the yarn she 
had spun and to provide her with a new supply of cotton.81  
                                                 
79 Lakshmi Narayan, “Report of Khadi Work in Bihar, 1926-27” (Patna: Central Printing Press, 1927), 3-4. The 
Bihar portion of the tour lasted three weeks, concluding in the capital city, Patna, with the opening of a khadi 
exhibition.  
80 Handspinning was practiced in very few Indian villages by the 1920s. See footnote #73. 
81 The basic protocol khadi workers were expected to follow is described in Das Gupta 1924, 6-15. Also, Narayan 
1927, 11. 
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In other parts of the country, she might have grown this cotton herself or procured it from 
a neighbor. However, Muzaffarpur was not a cotton-growing region and so khadi workers 
purchased cotton from neighboring districts, such as Saran and Darbhanga, or from as far away 
as Cawnpore in the United Provinces.82 AISA’s executive board hired a “cotton expert” in 
November 1925 to oversee the procurement and transportation of cotton from cotton-surplus 
areas to cotton-deficit ones.83 The expert purchased cotton from central marketplaces at harvest 
time and stored them in warehouses for later use. Provincial branches facing a cotton deficit 
petitioned the executive board to allocate part of its stockpile to them. In December 1925, for 
example, the Bihar branch requested (and subsequently received) Rs. 50,000 worth of cotton 
from the board to distribute among its district branches.84 
The sprawling network that transported cotton from faraway agricultural fields to the 
handspinner’s doorstep partly resembled the supply chains established by textile mills. But even 
as khadi workers requested regular allocations of cotton, they attempted to bring cultivation 
closer to home by supplying spinners with cotton seeds or unginned cotton to be processed by 
hand. In later years, they would insist that handspinners grow cotton plants in the dirt patches 
alongside their homes or in pots in their courtyards. Our spinner might have cleared a small strip 
of land just outside her hut or even installed a row of cotton plants in her field. Too small in 
number to generate enough cotton for sale in the market, these plants were nevertheless capable 
of providing an adequate supply for home use.85  
                                                 
82 Narayan 1927, 12-3. 
83 Trustee Mandal, 10-15 November 1925, AISA Papers, NMML. 
84 Trustee Mandal, 25-27 December 1925, AISA Papers, NMML 
85 M. K. Gandhi, “Tin Zaroori Shartein,” Harijan (February 2, 1942), reproduced in Keshav Deodhar, Dhanush 
Takua (Sevagram:  Khadi Vidyalay, 1944), 2; Gandhiji, Rachnatmak Karyakaram:  Uska Rahasya aur Sthan, Trans. 
Kashinath Trivedi (Ahmedabad:  Navjiwan Prakashan Mandir, 1959 [1946]), 22; and Akhil Bharat Charkha Sangh, 
Kapas ki Samasya: Khadi ki Drishti se (Sevagram: Akhil Bharat Charkha Sangh, 1950), 4 and 15. 
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During the agricultural season, the spinner would almost certainly have saved her 
spinning work for the end of the day to avoid disrupting her household’s preexisting routine. 
Rising early in the morning, she probably prepared food for her family before heading out into 
the fields with her husband and children. In the evenings, she ginned and carded her weekly 
allotment of cotton. Ginning and carding were relatively simple jobs that khadi organizations 
urged spinners to assign to other members of their family. If our spinner followed their advice, 
she might have asked her children to clean the cotton and her mother-in-law to card it. 
Otherwise, she would have completed both tasks herself, beating the cotton with a stick to 
remove large waste particles, before picking out smaller waste particles with her fingers and 
separating the cotton fibers into parallel rows. Because she and other villagers possessed limited 
space in their homes, they preferred to perform these tasks outdoors.86  
Finally, our spinner set up her charkha outdoors or in a corner of her home and began to 
spin cotton into thread. In all likelihood, she would have worked clumsily at first but gained in 
skill over time.87 The yarn she produced would have been of a low or medium count, probably in 
the eight-to-fifteen range, as was the case in much of Bihar.88 Low- and medium- count yarn was 
best suited to the production of relatively coarse garments capable of withstanding regular use. 
By contrast, high counts were used to produce fine-quality garments that would have been little 
use to agriculturists except on all but the most festive of occasions.  
In the best-case scenario, the spinner would have earned a modest supplementary income 
for her labors. In 1927, AISA’s Bihar state unit paid spinners of ten-to-twelve count yarn (low 
                                                 
86 Akhil Bharat Charkha Sangh, Varshik Vivaran:  1941-42, 13-4. 
87 Khadi organizations frequently complained that handspinners produced poor-quality thread. See Akhil 
Bharatvarshiya Charkh Sangh, Salana Report, 1925-26 (Ahmedabad: Akhil Bharatvarshiya Charkha Sangh, 1926), 
15. 
88 Narayan 1927, 8. 
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counts) an average of a little over Rs. 1 per month. Those who spun yarn of twenty-to-twenty-
four counts (medium counts) received closer to Rs. 2 instead.89 Over the course of a year, then, 
she might have generated an additional Rs. 12-24 for her family, a sizeable increment at a time 
when the average annual income was only Rs. 50. Many agrarian households earned far less than 
Rs. 50, making a supplementary income of this size even more valuable.  
In the worst-case scenario, our spinner might have quickly abandoned the charkha. Many 
Indians did so in the 1920s as khadi institutions struggled to manage their finances and to recruit 
and train khadi workers. In early 1927, many of Bihar’s district khadi units curtailed production 
for want of liquid capital and transport networks capable of shifting yarn from village huts to 
small town sales departments.90  
It is quite possible that no one, including the khadi worker assigned to her, would have 
noticed the spinner’s absence. Certainly, her decision to stop spinning would not have impacted 
India’s gross national product or total yarn output in any appreciable way. But consider many 
such spinners, perhaps the 83,000 at work in 1927 or the 324,000 who would be at work in 1942. 
Still too few to make much of a dent in overall employment figures, they each nonetheless 
represented an instance in which the agro-industrial divide had been closed, even just a little bit. 
 
Conclusion 
I have argued in this chapter that, by the early twentieth century, rural industry had 
become economy out of place. An outcome of the progressive spatial separation of agriculture 
and industry, rural industry’s out-of-placeness aggravated the plight of rural dwellers already 
badly affected by the movement of global markets and accelerating population pressures on the 
                                                 
89 Ibid, 11-2. 
90 Ibid, 4-5. 
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land. Out-of-placeness assumed the status not only of a material reality but also of a normative 
assumption. This latter dimension probably accounts for some of the hostility with which many 
of Gandhi’s contemporaries greeted the khadi program, which seemed an affront to both 
conventional economics and to social commonsense. In contrast to the historiographical 
literature which views the khadi program as an intervention in the industrial economy, I have 
characterized it as an intervention in the agrarian economy instead. More specifically, khadi 
organizations’ handspinning initiative constituted an industrial intervention in the agrarian 
economy, albeit one that sought to effect—and benefit from—simultaneous agricultural 
improvement.  
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CHAPTER TWO: 
Accounting for Business 
  
Prafulla Chandra Ray was an unlikely candidate to assume a leading position within M. 
K. Gandhi’s khadi economy. Born in 1861 in Bengal’s Jessore District, he earned a doctorate in 
inorganic chemistry from the University of Edinburgh in 1888 and accepted an assistant 
professorship in the chemistry department of Calcutta’s Presidency College the following year.1 
While Ray seems to have been a capable teacher, he devoted most of his energy to research, 
especially research designed to bridge the gap between the scientific laboratory and the needs of 
Indian industry. After failed attempts to produce citric acid and to develop a chemical test for 
detecting the presence of adulterants in foodstuffs, he turned to what would be his primary focus 
for at least the next three decades: the manufacture and sale of pharmaceuticals.2 India imported 
almost all its pharmaceuticals from abroad when Ray started his research in the late nineteenth 
century. As a result, the business he established in 1897 or 1898 was India’s first 
pharmaceuticals company.3  
As news of his company’s success traveled throughout the subcontinent, Ray began to 
refashion himself as a public authority on business and what he regarded as its capacity to effect 
positive social change. In addition to delivering lectures on entrepreneurialism and time-
                                                 
1 Prafulla Chandra Ray, Autobiography of a Bengali Chemist (Calcutta: Orient Book Company, 1958 [1932]), 2 and 
58-62. 
2 Ibid, 68-9 and 74. 
3 Ibid, 84-5. 
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discipline, he chided Indians for lacking a “spirit of enterprise and business instinct.”4 Indeed, 
many passages from his 1932 autobiography read like a homage to “the initiative, the dash, the 
pluck, the resourcefulness…that go to the making of a businessman or an entrepreneur or a 
captain of industry.”5 Bengal’s high unemployment rate would plummet, he argued, if only the 
middle-classes took up business rather than succumbing to the “insane craze for university 
education.” “The average graduate is found to be a licensed ignoramus,” he added, with little to 
contribute to the crucial task of setting the Indian economy on a firmer footing.6 Ray also 
asserted that business values, among them industriousness, initiative, and organization, would 
stand Indians in good stead in all aspects of their lives. His own company, he suggested, was a 
small experiment in the power of business to ease unemployment and spread commercial culture 
to new areas of human life.7  
Given his status as an outspoken advocate of business, Ray’s decision to involve himself 
in khadi work came as a surprise to his investors and colleagues, many of whom viewed khadi as 
a distinctly un-businesslike proposition. Ray addressed their skepticism head-on in his 
autobiography, writing: “Being an industrialist on a humble scale, at first I scoffed at the very 
idea of this primitive, uncouth instrument competing with machinery. But mature deliberation 
soon convinced me of the efficacy of spinning in every rural household during the odd hours of 
unemployment. It is the only subsidiary occupation possible to the teeming millions of India, 
who live from hand to mouth and are often on the verge of starvation.”8 While Ray did not leave 
behind a written record of his khadi work, we know from other sources that he was intimately 
                                                 
4 Ibid, 169-72 and 362. In one of those lectures he encouraged his audience to read Benjamin Franklin’s 
autobiography and learn from it the value of time-discipline. He also drew an implicit comparison between himself 
and Franklin, suggesting that both of them had developed perfect schedules for managing their time (173-5).  
5 Ibid, 74. 
6 Ibid, 213-4. 
7 Ibid, 74. 
8 Ibid, 297. 
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involved with the operation of Khadi Pratisthan, an organization established by his one-time 
student and employee Satish Chandra Dasgupta in 1924. Khadi Pratisthan quickly became the 
largest khadi enterprise in Bengal and one of the largest in India, thanks in no small part to Ray’s 
contributions.9 
Ray was just one of many businesspeople who took up khadi work in the 1920s. While 
very few of them left behind a corpus of writing as extensive as his, these merchants, 
shopkeepers, and entrepreneurs constituted the backbone of the khadi economy, bringing their 
business expertise to bear on a project designed to ameliorate rural poverty. These mid-level 
businesspeople have mostly escaped the attention of the historiography, however, which has 
focused instead on the financial contributions of large-scale capitalists to khadi and other 
Gandhian projects.10 While wealthy merchant-industrialists like G. D. Birla provided some of the 
money that kept the khadi economy running, Ray and other businesspeople gave it shape by 
acting as agents of standardization. 
This chapter follows the efforts of AISA’s Executive Board to connect an unruly network 
of production centers, sales departments, showrooms, and independent businesses to one another 
through a certification process and the elaboration of uniform financial and accounting 
techniques. It begins by examining the franchising system that functioned as the primary 
mechanism through which outside individuals and organizations gained admission into the khadi 
economy. While franchisees were free to depart at any time, membership conveyed multiple 
advantages, including the right to market merchandise using AISA’s brand. In return, franchisees 
                                                 
9 Satis Chandra Das Gupta, Khadi Manual, Vol. I (Parts 1-3) (Calcutta: Khadi Pratisthan, 1924). 
10 Historians writing in this vein have concentrated primarily on Gandhi’s attempts to absorb the capitalist classes 
into the nationalist movement. Claude Markovits, Indian Business and Nationalist Politics, 1931-39: The 
Indigenous Capitalist Class and the Rise of the Congress Party (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) is 
one example of this trend. 
 56 
 
agreed to adhere to a set of guidelines regulating almost every aspect of their business. The 
second half of the chapter introduces the concept of standardizing labor—that is, the work of 
formulating and maintaining standards. By moving back and forth between the businesspeople 
who created standards and the accountants, salespeople, and minor clerks charged with applying 
them, it sheds light on a form of interpretive labor often hidden from view. I highlight three 
varieties of standardizing labor performed by khadi workers: making prices, account keeping, 
and exchanging specialized credit instruments. Attention to these activities shows the imbrication 
of moral concerns with standardization. Standardization is never merely a technical procedure, 
but always also a deeply ethical enterprise. 
 
The Khadi Franchise 
The principal feature of AISA’s business model was its franchising system. A partial 
inheritance from its predecessor organization, the AIKB, it was the primary mechanism through 
which AISA sought to exert control over a far-flung network of production centers, sales depots, 
and administrative headquarters. In 1926-7 alone, AISA estimated that it oversaw 177 production 
centers and 204 sales depots, with a presence in 2,831 villages.11 AISA’s Board of Trustees 
(BoT) was initially the central node in this network with the exclusive power to determine which 
organizations would receive franchises. By the late 1920s or early 1930s, the khadi economy had 
grown too large to be directed by AISA’s BoT alone, however. As a result, the BoT established a 
special department to oversee the certification process. Called the Certification Department 
(Praman Patra Vibhag), it reviewed applications for certification, issued certificates (praman 
                                                 
11 Annual Report, 1926-7 (Ahmedabad: The All-India Spinners Association, 1927). 
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patra), oversaw annual audits of certificate-holders, and investigated claims that certificate-
holders had failed to live up to the terms of the licensing agreement.12  
Prospective franchisees had to file an application listing the name and address of the 
franchise; the name of the owner, manager or trustee; the date when the franchise came into 
existence; and total capital invested in the business. Production centers also had to detail the 
villages and/or districts in which they did business; the names of their sub-franchises; their 
average production and expenses; and a list of the names of the spinners and weavers with whom 
they did business. They also had to provide a copy of their memorandum of association and 
articles of association to the Certification Department. 
Franchises bore the cost of certification and recertification. The Certification Department 
published a set of guidelines detailing the annual fees different types of franchises would be 
assessed for recertification. In 1934, for example, production centers were required to pay 
inspection fees of 4% of the value of all the khadi they produced up to Rs. 50,000 and 2% of the 
value of the khadi they produced in excess of Rs. 50,000. Sales centers, by contrast, were 
assessed a flat rate of Rs. 5 on sales below Rs. 5,000; Rs. 10 on sales between Rs. 5,000 and 
10,000; and Rs. 15 on sales of Rs. 10,000 and above. In return, they received the right to market 
merchandise using AISA’s brand as well as other benefits.13  
 In addition to agreeing to abide by the provisions of the AISA constitution, franchisees 
also had to agree to follow the rules devised specifically for them. There were 26 such rules, 
ranging from the size of labels attached to cloth to the disposal measures to be involved in the 
event khadi was contaminated with millspun yarn.14 
                                                 
12 Trustee Meeting, Oct. 15-16, 1934, AISA Papers, 1925-1948, NMML, 290-1. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Shri Gandhi Ashram-Charkha Sangh: Ashram-Vidhan (Meerut: 1934), 119-23. 
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An example of one prospective franchisee is one Kapurchandra Patni Jain of Jaipur in 
western India, who sent a letter to AIKB’s Board expressing his desire to convert his clothing 
shop into a khadi bhandar. While the Board tentatively approved his application, it responded 
with a list of conditions he would have to agree to before receiving his license. The first of those 
conditions—that Jain sell only khadi from his shop—must surely have given him pause. He 
already conducted a brisk business in gota-kinari, a style of embroidery native to his region, and 
had no wish to abandon it or to establish another store exclusively for the sale of khadi.15 The 
other conditions were similarly exacting. Jain would be required to invest up to Rs. 12,500 in the 
bhandar, for which he would receive 6% yearly interest from AISA. AISA, in turn, would invest 
up to Rs. 25,000 on the condition that Jain repay its capital, either in cash or khadi, after four 
years. Although Jain would become the sole owner of the bhandar at that time, several of AISA’s 
conditions would continue to apply. One of them was that Jain could not keep more than 6.25% 
of the net income from his goods if he sold them outside Jaipur and only 3.125% if he sold them 
within Jaipur. Another was that AIKB would be permitted to audit his accounts at any time. Any 
disputes between the two parties, the license agreement stated, would be referred to binding 
arbitration.16 While it is unclear whether Jain consented to this agreement, many other private 
business owners did.17  
                                                 
15 Gota-kinari is a type of metal embroidery that originated in Rajasthan. It is made by melting gold, silver, copper, 
and other metals into thread, and sewing them into cloth in elaborate patterns. 
16 Board Meeting, April 22, 1925, All India Khadi Board Papers (1924-5) (hereafter cited as AIKB Papers), Nehru 
Memorial Museum and Library (hereafter NMML), 60-2. 
17 The minutes from the Aug. 24, 1925 meeting of the Board specify that Jain had until Sept. 15, 1925 to consent to 
the agreement (90). An example of a private business owner who consented to AIKB’s agreement is Rambinod 
Sinha of Bihar, whose application for a license and loan was approved by the AIKB Board on February 27, 1925. 
Another is Shuddh Khadi Bhandar of Kanpur, whose application for a license and loan was approved on May 20, 
1925. See AIKB Papers, NMML, 52 and 79-81. 
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Fig 2.1 Advertisement for a list of businesses certified by AISA.18 
 
 
Rules and Administration 
Perhaps no one better exemplifies the rule-bound nature of the franchising system than 
Satish Chandra Das Gupta, a Bengali chemist and inventor who was an original member of 
AISA’s Executive Council and the founder of Bengal’s leading khadi enterprise, Khadi 
Pratisthan. Born in June 1880 in Kurigram in eastern Bengal, Das Gupta completed a master’s 
degree in chemistry from Calcutta’s Presidency College under the partial supervision of Prafulla 
Chandra Ray. An Edinburgh-trained chemist, Ray had established India’s first pharmaceuticals 
company, Bengal Chemical and Pharmaceutical Works, in the Calcutta suburb of Sodepur at the 
                                                 
18 Khadi Guide: 1931 (Ahmedabad: The All India Spinners’ Association, 1931), inside cover. 
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turn of the twentieth century.19 Das Gupta worked as a superintendent in Ray’s chemical factory 
for at least several years after graduation, developing special expertise in the production of 
caffeine. He is also credited with inventing a low-cost fire extinguisher, which Ray sold to 
another firm at a large profit.20 Das Gupta left the factory to join the Indian nationalist movement 
in the late 1910s, and in 1921, he opened Khadi Pratisthan in Sodepur. Located within a short 
walk of Ray’s factory, Khadi Pratisthan quickly became Bengal’s flagship khadi enterprise, 
opening twelve production centers and twenty-five sales centers within its first five years of 
existence.21 Das Gupta joined AISA’s ten-member Executive Council (also called its Board of 
Trustees) in September 1925 at Gandhi’s invitation, and when he resigned eleven years later, he 
did so as one of its longest-serving and most influential members.22  
 Das Gupta was entrusted with many responsibilities in his capacity as an AISA trustee. In 
addition to considering requests for loans and approving annual budgets, he also played a leading 
role in formulating the policies that governed the day-to-day operation of khadi enterprises, 
monitoring adherence to those policies, and devising the two-year curriculum of study for 
individuals training to join AISA’s managerial staff. Das Gupta had already developed an 
extensive set of policies for Khadi Pratisthan managers, which he published in two volumes in 
1924. The first of these volumes, titled simply Khadi Manual, spanned nearly a hundred pages, 
                                                 
19 Ray seems to have started manufacturing pharmaceuticals in Sodepur on a limited basis in the early 1890s. He 
converted his Bengal Chemical Works into a limited liability company in about 1903, renaming it Bengal Chemical 
and Pharmaceuticals Works, Ltd. At the time Ray started his business, India imported almost all of its 
pharmaceutical preparations from abroad. Ray stressed the nationalist dimensions of his business in his interactions 
with the public, potential investors, and the pharmacists he hoped to persuade to buy his goods. See Ray, 1958. 
20 Illa Vij, “Satish Chandra Dasgupta,” The Tribune (May 13, 2000), 
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2000/20000513/windows/fact.htm, accessed May 1, 2017. 
21 All India Spinners’ Association, Khadi Guide: 1927 (Ahmedabad: The All India Spinners’ Association, 1927), 
38-40 
22 Board of Trustees meeting, August 27-28, 1936, All India Spinners Association Papers, 1925-1948 (henceforth 
cited as AISA Papers, 1925-1948), Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML).  
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many of them covered with diagrams and sample forms.23 The sales information on the title page 
suggests that it may have been available for purchase by the public, but more likely, other khadi 
enterprises constituted its primary audience.24  
 Das Gupta’s status as a leading AISA administrator and founder-head of one of the 
country’s largest khadi enterprises makes Khadi Manual an important source of information 
about the values AISA hoped to inculcate in its managers. In addition to providing painstaking 
instructions on how to manage virtually every aspect of the khadi production and distribution 
process, the volume also advanced an argument about the essential components of good 
management. The manager’s primary responsibility, Das Gupta argued, was to ensure that his 
employees worked in harmony for the good of the organization. Just as unruly foot soldiers 
threatened the success of a military operation, undisciplined workers threatened the wellbeing of 
a business operation. The managers of khadi enterprises should look to their counterparts in 
business (especially the limited liability company) and the military for models of effective 
leadership. As things stood now, he warned, Khadi Pratisthan resembled a dysfunctional military 
unit in which the privates were accorded an unacceptable degree of freedom and thus primed to 
“revolt at the flimsiest excuse.”25 
 Khadi enterprises struggled to impose discipline on their workers for several reasons, Das 
Gupta explained. Many employees failed to appreciate the importance of administrative labor, 
which they dismissed as a distraction from more pressing, not to mention more exciting, tasks. 
Nowhere was this more evident than in the field of account keeping: 
It is extremely difficult to make the workers believe in the necessity of keeping proper 
accounts. ‘We are not thieves—we are self-sacrificing men working for a cause—what is 
the good of asking us to waste our valuable time on the dry and non-productive work of 
                                                 
23 Satis Chandra Das Gupta, Khadi Manual, Vol. I (Calcutta: Khadi Pratisthan, 1924). 
24 Vol. I retailed for Rs. 2 and Vol. II for Rs. 1. There is no print run information. 
25 Das Gupta 1924, 2-3. 
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keeping accounts?—If this much trust cannot be placed on us &c. &c.’ This is the 
customary reply that is met with when question of keeping accounts is raised. With this 
mental attitude selfless men have done immense harm to the cause and have been 
instrumental to losses and wastes, which if calculated and put together, will stagger the 
selfless patriots! The object of keeping accounts is not properly understood. It is not a 
question of honesty or dishonesty but it is a question of existence or extinction of the 
institution. 
 
“Accounts,” Das Gupta continued, “is not a dead and dry thing kept for the satisfaction of the 
auditor but it is a living thing, a helpful thing, a trusty handmaid to the manager or organizer.”26  
 
Making Price 
Khadi organizations’ standardizing activities began with the formulae they used to make 
prices. While in the neoclassical model, price is the point at which supply and demand meet, in 
other models, it is the outcome of social and political considerations. Recent work in economic 
anthropology and the sociology of finance has examined how prices are made.27 For example, 
the anthropologist Jane Guyer has demonstrated that although prices generally appear to us as 
“singular amount[s],” they are in fact “composites” of a diverse array of factors, including input 
costs, ideologies, social relations, projections about the future, and the exercise of power. Prices’ 
composite nature does not make them “inaccurate” or “unreliable.”28 It does, however, make 
them historical creations and therefore ripe for historical analysis. 
Khadi organizations considered three different numbers (each of them composed of many 
other numbers) when determining the price of khadi. The first number, cost price (lagat kimat), 
referred to expenditures incurred on the actual manufacture of khadi, especially the cost of 
                                                 
26 Ibid, 3-4. 
27 Jane Guyer, “Composites, Fictions and Risk: Toward an Ethnography of Price,” in Market and Society: The Great 
Transformation Today, eds. Chris Hann and Keith Hart (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 203-20; 
Donald MacKenzie, Material Markets: How Economic Agents are Constructed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), 85-6 and 93-4; and Janet Roitman, Fiscal Disobedience: An Anthropology of Economic Regulation in Central 
Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 83-5. 
28 Guyer, 203-5. 
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essential inputs such as yarn and dye, and the wages paid to spinners, weavers, launderers, and 
other primary producers. The second, institutional charges (vyavastha kharch or sanstha kharch), 
referred to expenses over and above the cost of production, including karyakartas’ salaries, rent 
payments on buildings leased by khadi organizations, and transportation charges. The third, sales 
price (bikri kimat), referred to the price at which a particular type and quantity of khadi would be 
sold; it was arrived at by adding institutional charges to cost price. But this is not all. Since many 
production centers did not sell their manufactures onsite, instead shipping them to dedicated 
sales centers for distribution to the public, two different sets of institutional charges were often 
applied to the same piece of khadi—one by the production center and one by the sales center. 
Thus, the sales price quoted by production centers was almost always lower than the sales price 
quoted by sales centers; the former had only one set of institutional charges attached to it while 
the latter always had two.29 
AISA and allied khadi organizations perceived the second number—institutional 
charges—as the most fungible of the three and so made it the centerpiece of their efforts to make 
prices that would generate neither profit nor loss. Although aware that they could also 
manipulate the first number by purchasing inputs at more or less opportune times or by altering 
the quantity of wages paid to primary producers, they viewed the second number—with some 
justification—as more directly subject to their control. This is because khadi institutions 
possessed only enough capital to purchase relatively small amounts of cotton and other inputs, 
and, then too, only shortly before existing stocks ran out. They could not, in other words, 
purchase inputs in bulk when market prices were low, nor could they afford to store bulk 
                                                 
29 Virtually every discussion of price in the documents produced by khadi organizations references these three 
numbers. For a detailed explanation of the content and relationship of the numbers, see Vitthal Ambadas 
Santoshwar, Bunai Ganit (Adhikrit Pathya Pustak) (Bombay: Khadi aur Gramodyog Commission, 1959), 99-108. 
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purchases for long periods of time. Moreover, they had pledged to pay primary producers a fixed 
wage for a fixed quantity of work. While they could increase those wages, as they did 
periodically, they could not decrease them without calling into question their stated commitment 
to elevating the lot of the common laborer.   
Institutional charges, by contrast, though not inherently more elastic than other 
expenditures, did not arise directly out of the production process. Instead, they functioned 
primarily as administrative expenses that could be reduced by limiting electricity use or 
trimming karyakartas’ benefits—or, in more dire situations, by firing karyakartas or shuttering 
sales centers. Thus, as early as August 1924, AISA’s predecessor organization, the All India 
Khadi Board (AIKB), urged private khadi dealers to impose institutional charges of no more than 
6.25% of khadi’s cost price.30 That is to say, if a given piece of khadi cost one rupee to 
manufacture, dealers could demand an additional one anna (6.25%, or 1/16th, of a rupee) in 
institutional charges. The sales price of that piece of khadi would thus come to one rupee and one 
anna. AISA’s board of trustees issued a similar command just two years later, this time decreeing 
that both production and sales centers should limit their institutional charges to an average of 
6.25%. In other words, a production center could impose institutional charges of 6.25% the cost 
price of khadi it provided to sales centers. These sales centers could then add an additional 
6.25% of their own for total institutional charges of 12.5%. The AIKB and AISA rules applied 
only to khadi made of cotton. Khadi made of wool or silk required more attention from 
karyakartas and so could be assessed a higher institutional charge.31 
                                                 
30 Meeting, August 1, 1924, All India Khadi Board Papers (hereafter cited as AIKB Papers), NMML. 
31 Trustee Mandal, June 26-28, 1926, Akhil Bharat Charkha Sangh/All India Spinners Association Papers (hereafter 
cited as AISA Papers), NMML.   
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Neither the AIKB nor the AISA decree explains how these organizations settled upon 
6.25% as the most appropriate institutional charge. However, transcripts of AISA board of 
trustees meetings indicate that 6.25% remained the normative rate until at least 1940.32 In fact, 
AISA and affiliated institutions, such as the United Provinces’ Shri Gandhi Ashram (SGA), 
repeatedly reminded karyakartas to adhere to the 6.25% rule. Departing from it, they suggested, 
risked making “unfair” prices, a transgression for which an organization’s affiliation with AISA 
could be terminated.33 Even after 1940 when, as I will explain shortly, AISA permitted its 
branches to collect slightly higher institutional charges in recognition of their growing expenses, 
it insisted that the sales price should never rise so high as to create a profit. And in their dealings 
with the general public and the colonial state, khadi officials reiterated their commitment to what 
we might term profit avoidance. For example, in its annual report for the 1941-42 fiscal year, 
AISA informed well-wishers that it followed “the laws of moral economics” when fixing prices, 
by which it meant that it sold its goods at the lowest possible price, thus foregoing any hope of 
personal gain.34 And in perhaps the most curious commentary on the profit-avoidance rule, 
SGA’s founder and long-serving head J. B. Kripalani asserted first, that Marx and Engels’ labor 
theory of value had no merit whatsoever and second, that even if it did, “village industry [khadi 
included] satisfied the best requirements of the theory” insofar as it denied the employer—in this 
case AISA—“surplus value.”35 To be a khadi organization, then, was in part to make prices that 
encouraged profit avoidance, a task in which the proper calibration of institutional charges 
played a leading role. 
                                                 
32 Varshik Vivaran: 1940 (Wardha: Akhil Bharat Charkha Sangh, 1941). 
33 Trustee Mandal, May 20-25, 1929, AISA Papers, NMML. 
34 Akhil Bharat Charkha Sangh, Varshik Vivaran: 1941-42 (Wardha: Akhil Bharat Charkha Sangh, 1942), 12-3.  My 
emphasis. 
35 J. B. Kripalani, Politics of Charkha (Bombay: Vora & Co., Publishers, Ltd., 1946), 29. 
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But how did AISA and other khadi institutions guarantee that their branches and 
affiliates, much less private dealers, made price in the prescribed fashion? For starters, they 
produced exhaustive tables detailing the price at which different types of khadi should be sold. 
Subject to revision at least once a year, these tables listed permissible sales prices or, 
alternatively, the quantum of institutional charges that could be applied to khadi manufactured at 
a given cost price.36 AISA distributed price tables to its production and sales centers for the use 
of karyakartas stationed there. SGA also sent its tables to customers who purchased khadi at the 
wholesale rate.37 And crucially, AISA maintained a strict policy that it would award a certificate 
of affiliation (praman patra) to only those organizations that adhered to its pricing guidelines. 
Under other circumstances, non-AISA institutions might have made little effort to procure such a 
certificate. But because AISA claimed for itself the exclusive right to determine if cloth termed 
“khadi” by its producers or sellers was actually khadi, and because only those institutions in 
possession of a certificate of affiliation could, as per its rules, claim to trade in “genuine” khadi, 
khadi dealers desirous of AISA’s stamp of approval had little choice but to apply for a 
certificate.38 The INC supported AISA’s claim until at least mid 1949, thus ensuring that for all 
intents and purposes, “khadi” meant not only handspun, handwoven cloth but handspun, 
handwoven cloth certified as such by AISA.39 While we know for certain that many businesses 
claimed to sell “genuine” khadi even after being denied—or more likely, not bothering to apply 
for—a certificate, it is likely that many others saw the value of securing AISA’s official 
recognition. 
                                                 
36 For an example of the second type of price table, see Trustee Mandal, January 20-21, 1952, AISA Papers, 
NMML. 
37 Prabandhak Samiti, Register 1, January 13-14, 1934, Shri Gandhi Ashram Papers (hereafter cited as SGA Papers), 
Shri Gandhi Ashram (SGA), Lucknow. 
38 See AISA’s revisions to its praman patra rules in 1935 and 1945 in Trustee Mandal, November 7-10, 1940 and 
Trustee Mandal, March 24-25, 1945, AISA Papers, NMML.  
39 Trustee Mandal, April 17-18, 1949, AISA Papers, NMML.  
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But AISA was not so naïve as to assume that khadi dealers would apply for a certificate 
of affiliation simply out of deference to its authority. Instead it offered a variety of financial 
incentives to certified institutions to adhere to its pricing and other policies. For instance, for at 
least the first five years of its existence, it provided an annual “bounty” to certified institutions 
on their khadi sales.40 Here, it once again followed AIKB’s lead, which announced in August 
1924 that khadi dealers would receive a bounty equivalent to two percent of their annual khadi 
sales but only on those sales to which institutional charges of no more than 6.25% had been 
attached.41 Moreover, AISA and SGA sold their khadi at wholesale prices to only those dealers 
and institutions that had been certified by AISA. Wholesale prices were more generous than 
those on offer at AISA’s retail stores and thus attractive to those who purchased khadi in bulk to 
sell elsewhere.42 And on certain occasions, SGA (and perhaps AISA as well) offered a 
“commission” on khadi purchased at wholesale rates; that is, it reimbursed customers a certain 
percentage of the funds they had expended on khadi. Customers did not have to make large 
purchases in order to receive a commission. In 1934, for example, SGA called for its branches to 
offer commissions of three percent on khadi purchases up to Rs. 25; four percent for purchases 
of Rs. 25 to Rs. 50; five percent for purchases of Rs. 50 to Rs. 100; and six percent for purchases 
over Rs. 100.43 Interestingly, these and other schemes provided financial incentives to 
organizations that configured their prices in a way AISA hoped would prevent the generation of 
profit. 
Still, for all its rules, AISA recognized that branches and affiliates would occasionally 
need to modify prices in response to changing local circumstances. As a result, it decreed as 
                                                 
40 Trustee Mandal, May 20-25, 1929, AISA Papers, NMML. 
41 Meeting, August 1, 1924, AIKB Papers, NMML. 
42 Prabandhak Samiti, Register 2, November 26, 1938, SGA Papers, SGA, Lucknow. 
43 Shri Gandhi Ashram-Charkha Sangh:  Ashram-Vidhan (Meerut: 1934), 59. 
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early as June 1927 that provincial branches could alter the price of khadi but only with the prior 
approval of AISA’s central office.44 There are few examples of provincial branches seeking and 
receiving such permission. The earliest example I could find dates from March 1946, when the 
Bihar branch was given permission to raise its prices to reflect the growing cost of cotton and the 
increased wages paid to weavers. However, AISA’s board of trustees warned their counterparts 
in Bihar that the latter had permission to raise prices only so much as to cover new expenses, not 
to generate a profit.45 More often, AISA and, following decentralization in the late 1940s, 
independent institutions took it upon themselves to change the percentage of permissible 
institutional charges for all of their branches and affiliates simultaneously. AISA seems to have 
increased the permissible institutional charges margin for the first time only in 1940, setting the 
upper limit for retail sales at twenty percent. The twenty percent ceiling referred to institutional 
charges applied by both production and sales centers and so represented an increase of 7.5 
percentage points from the previous 12.5% (6.25% + 6.25%).46 Although AISA provided no 
explanation of its reasons for raising institutional charges in 1940, other institutions did so at 
slightly later dates to accommodate rising or falling expenses. For example, Bihar Khadi Samiti 
(BKS) permitted production centers to increase their institutional charges in July 1948 and sales 
centers to do the same just one month later.47 By contrast, SGA, though it increased institutional 
charges in July 1953, subsequently lowered them in January 1956 and again in April 1957 as a 
result of efficiencies gained from increased production.48 One does not have to examine these 
                                                 
44 Trustee Mandal, June 29, 1927 to July 8, 1927, AISA Papers, NMML. AISA reiterated this command in 1942 in 
Marg Suchika, Part 1 (Wardha: Akhil Bharat Charkha Sangh, 1942), 25. 
45 Budget samiti meeting, March 2, 1946, AISA Papers, NMML 
46 Varshik Vivaran: 1940 (Wardha: Akhil Bharat Charkha Sangh, 1941), 14. 
47 Meeting, July 17-18, 1948, Bihar Khadi Samiti Papers (hereafter cited as BKS Papers), Bihar Khadi Gramodyog 
Sangh (BKGS), Muzaffarpur and Meeting, August 17, 1948, BKS Papers, BKGS, Muzaffarpur. 
48 Prabandhak Samiti, Register 3, July 4, 1953, SGA Papers, SGA, Lucknow; Prabandhak samiti meeting, Register 
3, January 18, 1956, SGA Papers, SGA, Lucknow; and Prabandhak samiti, Register 3, April 23, 1957, SGA Papers, 
SGA, Lucknow. 
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changes in close detail to grasp the main point of this analysis: the prices charged by khadi 
institutions for their goods were not the mere outcomes of relatively straightforward changes in 
supply and demand. Instead, they were the products of careful calibration on the part of khadi 
institutions. 
Khadi organizations complicated their task even further by attempting to make prices that 
would also serve ends other than profit avoidance. Namely, they employed price as an instrument 
for encouraging khadi consumption among certain target groups. While the historical literature is 
rife with examples of campaigns to persuade the urban middle classes to purchase khadi, it 
largely ignores the far more numerous, if less glamorous, campaigns to increase khadi 
consumption among karyakartas, spinners, and weavers.49 This may be because the former 
campaigns so often took the shape of public speeches, newspaper advertisements, and 
exhibitions, while the latter transpired mainly out of public view. Though they passed a series of 
increasingly stringent resolutions stating that karyakartas would have to clothe themselves 
exclusively in khadi or risk termination, khadi institutions more frequently relied on what 
economists term price signals to spur khadi consumption. They did so by providing khadi to 
karyakartas and their dependents at a discounted rate—sometimes the wholesale price, other 
times at cost price plus limited institutional charges.50 Unfortunately, we have little information 
regarding the quantity of khadi consumed by karyakartas and their dependents or the extent to 
which consumption might have increased after the imposition of new price signals. However, we 
have ample evidence that khadi institutions considered price signals a useful tool, one that they 
                                                 
49 For discussions of the former, see Emma Tarlo, Clothing Matters: Dress and Identity in India (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1996) and Lisa Trivedi, Clothing Gandhi’s Nation: Homespun and Modern India 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007).   
50 Shri Gandhi Ashram-Charkha Sangh:  Ashram Vidhan (Meerut: 1934), 60; Prabandhak samiti meeting, Register 
1, January 13-14, 1934, SGA Papers, SGA, Lucknow; and Meeting, December 15, 1947, BKS Papers, BKGS, 
Muzaffarpur. 
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applied to small-scale khadi producers as well. Indeed, khadi institutions may have been even 
more generous with spinners and weavers than they were with their own karyakartas. AISA 
made khadi available to primary producers at cost price from 1934, a policy BKS continued even 
after its separation from AISA in 1947.51 But however useful they found it, khadi organizations 
could not maintain a differentiated pricing structure (one price for spinners and weavers, a 
second price for karyakartas, and a third price for everybody else) without first taking into 
account the other aims they hoped to accomplish with their prices. It would not be easy to make 
price in such a way as to eliminate both profit and loss while simultaneously charging different 
rates to different types of consumers. 
  
Accounting for Profit 
Khadi institutions did not always succeed at not making a profit. On the contrary, they 
failed so regularly that AISA grew concerned and began to devise strategies for disposing of 
profit as soon as it came to the accountant’s attention. For, if diverted quickly enough, profit 
could not accumulate, and non-accumulation, as I will argue here, was one of the khadi 
economy’s central objectives. The chief mechanism AISA put in place to manage profit was the 
Kamgar Seva Kosh, or Workers Benefit Reserve Fund, a store of money to be used exclusively 
for the welfare of spinners, weavers, and other primary producers. Established in 1935 by 
AISA’s board of trustees, the Kosh was actually multiple funds—one controlled by AISA’s 
central office and one by each of its provincial branches. These funds were stored in bank 
accounts kept separate from khadi institutions’ other assets and could be operated upon only by 
officeholders or their designated representatives. AISA rules dictated that individual khadi 
                                                 
51 Trustee Mandal, April 4, 1934, AISA Papers, NMML and Meeting, December 15, 1947, BKS Papers, BKGS, 
Muzaffarpur. 
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organizations review their accounts at least once a year (sometimes twice a year) to identify any 
profit they had accrued. Ten percent of that profit was to be transferred to AISA’s central office 
and the remaining ninety percent to the nearest provincial branch.52 The central office and 
provincial branch would then deposit these funds into the Kosh, where they would be changed 
from profit into something else.  
AISA did not attempt to name this “something else,” but it did publish broad guidelines 
detailing the uses to which Kosh funds could be put. In 1937, it defined an acceptable use as any 
attempt to increase “the efficiencies of spinners and other artisans by supplying them more 
efficient spinning wheels and other necessary implements and accessories, also by preparing 
instruction for imparting scientific training to them in the necessary process of their work, and to 
take such steps as may be found necessary in this behalf.”53 In 1940, it provided additional 
clarification, specifying that Kosh funds could be devoted to any of the following tasks: the 
instruction of spinners and other primary producers in techniques to improve the quality of their 
output; the supply of more efficient spinning wheels and other technologies to khadi producers; 
the establishment of schools to provide instruction in khadi production; the establishment of 
schools to provide a basic education to the children of khadi producers; the establishment of 
schools to provide basic literacy training to khadi producers; the distribution of free medicines to 
khadi producers and other rural dwellers; the spread of knowledge about sanitation and public 
health; the establishment of general stores to sell food grains and other necessities at low prices; 
and the reduction or elimination of khadi producers’ debts. An unspecified percentage of the 
                                                 
52 Trustee Mandal, March 23-24, 1937, AISA Papers, NMML.  
53 Trustee Mandal, March 23-24, 1937, AISA Papers, NMML. 
 72 
 
Kosh could also be used to benefit consumers, presumably in the form of lower khadi prices.54 In 
1942, AISA granted certified organizations permission to open their own Kosh instead of 
transferring profits to the central office and provincial branches.55 And although it wielded no 
authority over provincial governments and princely states, it nevertheless encouraged them to 
deposit the profits they amassed through khadi work in a dedicated fund to be used solely for the 
benefit of workers.56 
It is tempting to dismiss the Kosh as a mere accounting trick, a financial sleight of hand 
designed not so much to eliminate profit as to disguise it under a new name. And indeed some 
critics of the khadi economy claimed that khadi institutions amassed substantial profits, which 
they concealed from the public and used for unsavory purposes.57 However, we should not jump 
to conclusions without first attempting to understand what AISA and other khadi institutions 
believed themselves to be doing when they erected a firewall in the shape of the Kosh between 
the profits they had accidentally generated and ordinary operating funds. We should also keep in 
mind that accounting is never so straightforward or rule-bound as popular opinion would 
sometimes have it. Instead, acts of classification are “always in principle decisions.” Accountants 
are trained to apply a finite set of rules to specific cases, but even the most tightly crafted rule 
can admit of multiple interpretations.58 For instance, as we will see shortly, khadi officials could 
answer the seemingly simple question “Over what period of time should profit be measured?” 
(or, alternatively, “How much time can pass before profit becomes accumulated capital?”) in 
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different ways based on their changing perceptions of the economic landscape. Indeed, AISA’s 
continued insistence that profit must be avoided at all costs and disposed of properly should it 
arise is strong evidence of the weighty task it had assigned the Kosh. 
AISA sometimes had occasion to doubt its branches’ commitment to the profit avoidance 
and profit management rules. One such episode transpired in April 1947, when SGA’s head 
office asked permission to use its “accidental” profits to repay a portion of the considerable debt 
it had amassed with AISA. AISA granted permission even while airing its suspicion that SGA 
had intentionally generated a profit: “It is in complete violation of AISA’s policy to make profit 
for the purpose of increasing capital or repaying a loan. Khadi work, whether undertaken by 
AISA or one of its affiliates, should put no system in place through which the temptation for 
profit might arise.”59 It made a similar declaration just eight months later when BKS office 
bearers proposed awarding some of their profit to karyakartas in the form of a bonus instead of 
depositing it in the Kosh.  AISA refused, adding: “AISA considers it a sin for profit to arise and 
established the Kamgar Seva Kosh to check the inclination to make a profit. In this instance, it 
does not consider it appropriate to give a bonus simply because there is a profit.  In doing so, sin 
assumes the appearance of virtue.”60 
But how were khadi institutions to know when they had made a profit? AISA offered no 
clear answer in this regard. Instead, it ordered its provincial branches to have their accounts 
audited twice a year and supplied them with templates to be used when keeping accounts or 
preparing budgets.61 In addition, it required certified organizations to submit their accounts to an 
AISA-approved auditor at least once a year for review.62 These rules probably encouraged khadi 
                                                 
59 Trustee Mandal, April 18-21, 1947, AISA Papers, NMML.  
60 Budget samiti meeting, December 9-12, 1947, AISA Papers, NMML. Translated from Hindi. 
61 Trustee Mandal, June 29, 1927 to July 8, 1927, AISA Papers, NMML. 
62 Trustee Mandal, May 20-25, 1929, AISA Papers, NMML. 
 74 
 
organizations to maintain their accounts in a fashion likely to meet with the auditor’s approval. 
But they did not guarantee that all khadi institutions would calculate profit in the same fashion. 
In fact, it would have been virtually impossible to guarantee such a thing since even the most 
fundamental accounting questions can be answered in a variety of ways. AISA acknowledged as 
much when it entertained provincial branches’ requests to reclassify accounting items; a figure 
initially classified as a “net deficit” could, if viewed in a different light, end up under the “capital 
account” subheading instead.63   
AISA made a more dramatic admission of profit’s essential fungibility in the waning 
months of 1945 when it made a seemingly modest change to the Kamgar Seva Kosh rules. 
Although prior to this date, khadi insitutions had deposited their annual profits directly into the 
Kosh, the new rules permitted them to store those profits with an AISA head office for up to two 
years. Most institutions embraced the new policy for a very simple reason: if they suffered a loss 
or incurred a debt during that two-year period, they could make it up using some or all of the 
profit they had entrusted to the head office. By contrast, those institutions that continued to abide 
by the old rules could not reclaim the profit they had transferred to the Kosh even if they suffered 
a crippling loss.64 Think of the Kosh, then, as a lockbox. Profit, once placed inside, could never 
be withdrawn by its depositor. Instead, its contents belonged exclusively to khadi producers—
and in rarer instances, khadi consumers—on whose behalf the Kosh’s trustees operated. The new 
rules established a second lockbox, more permeable than the first. Depositors had a key to this 
second lockbox, which, with the trustees’ permission, they could use to withdraw part of its 
contents. But after two years elapsed, the contents of the second lockbox were transferred to the 
first, thus severing the original depositor’s claim over them.  
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The new policy was at root a pragmatic one insofar as it guaranteed struggling khadi 
institutions a new measure of financial security. But it was also indicative of a slight shift in the 
way AISA approached profit. Whereas previously it had treated profit as something best 
measured and disposed of at the end of every fiscal year, from late 1945 onwards, it began to 
measure profit using a slightly longer time frame. This new time frame made profit appear more 
not less ambiguous since it implied that what was profit in the short term (i.e., at the end of the 
fiscal year) might not be profit two years later. And furthermore, it suggested that profit, though 
still dangerous, even sinful, did not have to be discarded immediately but could be sequestered 
and thus contained for up to two years. Perhaps profit had a longer half-life than khadi 
institutions had initially realized. 
 
The Sales Sciences 
 Vitthaldas Jerajani, a Gujarati merchant who opened a khadi store in 1919, is widely 
credited with introducing “the sales sciences” to the khadi economy. Born in Jamnagar state in 
Gujarat in September 1882, he spent a large portion of his childhood in Zanzibar before returning 
to Bombay in the 1890s to take up a menial position in his uncle’s cloth shop. Jerajani learned 
bookkeeping from his uncle’s accountant before moving to another store where, after four years 
of hard work, he achieved the status of lead accountant himself. He quit that job shortly after the 
outbreak of the swadeshi movement in 1905, taking a position at a store founded by the Indian 
nationalist leader Bal Gangadhar Tilak to promote the sale of cloth manufactured in India.65 
Gandhi visited the store with his close friend Revashankar Jagjivan Jhaveri in early 1915 and 
struck up a conversation with Jerajani. The cloth sold in Tilak’s store was not truly swadeshi, or 
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indigenous to India, Gandhi informed Jerajani, even though it had been manufactured in the 
subcontinent by handloom weavers and Indian-owned textile mills. This was because the 
handloom weavers had used millspun thread and the Indian-owned textile mills had stripped 
native artisans of their employment.66  
 After much back-and-forth with Gandhi, Jerajani agreed to assume responsiblity for the 
first khadi sales depot opened in Bombay. Monthly sales were only Rs. 800-1,000, a number 
Gandhi considered far too low. Jerajani did not like this work at first since he was used to 
effecting annual sales of crores of rupees. Nevertheless, he managed to increase monthly sales to 
Rs. 8,000 in his first month on the job through the use of advertising techniques he had learned 
from his father. He hawked khadi, carrying bolts of it on his shoulders or in a cart. He also 
printed advertisements in newspaper, posted colorful signboards, and issued radio 
announcements. Eventually, he started a Gujarati- and English-language newsletter of his own 
specializing in the publication of khadi-related news. Nationalist associations reprinted his 
articles in full or part. At one point, the newsletter enjoyed an annual circulation of 60,000 
copies.67 
 Jerajani’s story is emblematic of that of many mid-level merchants who decided to make 
a career for themselves within the khadi economy. While some of them converted preexisting 
businesses to shops devoted exclusively to the sale of khadi, others opened new khadi stores or 
took over the management of stores established by AISA and its affiliates. As with Dasgupta, 
who tried to set the administration of khadi organizations on a business footing, Jerajani and 
others attempted to apply the skills they had learned selling other commodities to marketing 
khadi.  
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Capital Formation 
Khadi organizations had developed relatively successful strategies to prevent the 
generation of profit and to dispose of any profit that arose in a fashion that precluded 
accumulation. However, their very success created another problem: they rarely had enough 
capital to reproduce themselves, much less grow their work. AISA aggravated this problem by 
continually changing its stance on what constituted an acceptable method of capital formation. 
Its rules initially stated that provincial branches and affiliates could take out loans from pre-
approved banks (the central offices and state branches kept a list of those it had certified), state 
governments, and constructive organizations like Gandhi Seva Sangh. They could also accept 
donations (chanda) from private citizens, even “private capital.”68 But AISA remained skeptical 
of loans and periodically forbade khadi institutions from accepting them. It routinely relaxed this 
prohibition, as in September 1937 when it solicited a loan to increase production.69 Nonetheless, 
it reversed its reversal in 1940, confessing that it had had a difficult time repaying loans and 
could no longer tolerate the uncertainty of not knowing in advance whether a loan would be 
extended. In addition, it did not wish to continue mortgaging goods to secure loans or procuring 
insurance for mortgaged goods. As a result, it repaid all its bank loans and those it had incurred 
with state governments, probably by reducing production or selling off some of its assets. Now it 
faced the same situation it had confronted prior to 1937—how to raise capital. M. K. Gandhi 
temporarily resolved the problem by obtaining Rs. 4 lakhs worth of donations in Bombay 
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between September and December of 1940.70 But khadi organizations could not subsist on 
donations alone. 
  As a result, they had to develop techniques for raising capital that would not interfere 
with their prior commitment to non-accumulation. One technique took the form of a khadi hundi, 
a hybrid currency-promissory note that could be redeemed only for khadi. Institutional sources 
trace the origins of the khadi hundi to an INC exhibition held in Calcutta in 1929. Exhibition 
organizers asked Gandhi to hawk khadi at the exhibition in an effort to boost khadi sales. He 
declined, citing lack of time, but agreed to sign receipts for individuals who made advance 
payments for khadi. That is, would-be customers paid their money in advance, received signed 
receipts from Gandhi in return, and later used those receipts to purchase khadi. So eager were 
some attendees to obtain Gandhi’s signature that, in the words of one source, “The response was 
instantaneous and stocks worth large amounts of money were sold.”71 Vitthaldas Jerajani, an 
AISA trustee and the man charged with putting khadi sales work on a “scientific” footing, 
recalled this episode in 1932 when he assumed charge of AISA’s Bombay sales depot. In a 
memoir published twenty-five years later, he remembers printing “tickets” ranging in value from 
Rs. 1 to Rs. 100 that customers could purchase with cash and exchange for khadi at a later date. 
Though he does not explain why customers found these tickets attractive, he reports selling Rs. 
30,000 of them within the first week of their availability.72 Other khadi institutions quickly 
followed suit, including SGA in 1934.73 Until 1953 and the formation of a government body to 
oversee the khadi economy, individual institutions issued tickets (renamed khadi hundis between 
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1932 and 1934) more or less at their own initiative. They did not sell hundis year round, 
however, but on special occasions, such as the eve of a political rally or Gandhi Jayanti 
(sometimes called Charkha Jayanti), a commemoration of Gandhi’s life held on and around his 
birthday each October.74 
The khadi hundi served multiple purposes, helping to stimulate public interest in khadi, 
clear accumulated khadi stocks, and, most importantly for our purposes, raise large sums of 
capital in relatively short periods of time. In this last sense, khadi hundis partially resembled 
their namesake, the hundi, a financial instrument first used in South Asia as early as the tenth 
century C. E. to perform a wide range of trading and banking functions.75 Historians have 
struggled to define hundi, Marina Martin argues, partly because they have been too eager to draw 
comparisons with “European credit instruments and banking facilities” and partly because there 
have been many different types of hundis.76 Very few hundis have survived to the present day, 
making it difficult to comment on their physical appearance. However, we have reason to believe 
that in their simplest form, hundis were little more than slips of paper onto which a few key 
pieces of information had been inscribed. Rajat Kanta Ray has investigated the changing uses of 
the hundi in the subcontinent beginning with its deployment in the tenth century as a vehicle for 
remitting taxes and soldiers’ wages. By the sixteenth century, the hundi had gained an additional 
function as an instrument for making private remittances. Merchants and bankers used hundis to 
finance inland trade under the Mughal Empire and, from the seventeenth century, Indian Ocean 
trade. Traders employed hundis to transfer funds across vast distances or to raise credit for their 
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business ventures.77 When the English East India Company arrived in India at the beginning of 
the seventeenth century, it used hundis largely for trading purposes, but from the eighteenth 
century, it also used them to remit military and other funds.78 The colonial state struck a 
(possibly unintentional) blow at the hundi system in the mid nineteenth century when it 
introduced a uniform silver rupee intended to replace the subcontinent’s many local currencies. 
Although only partly successful, this action nonetheless deprived many Indian bankers of the 
fees they had previously accrued by issuing hundis that changed gold sovereigns and other 
foreign currencies into local ones.79 Still, the hundi endured as an instrument of “mainstream” 
trade far into the twentieth century.80 
Khadi hundis performed only some of the same functions as the hundis discussed above, 
but it is nevertheless worth keeping in mind that khadi institutions—and later the post-colonial 
state—saw fit to repurpose a centuries-old financial instrument as a vehicle for reproducing the 
khadi economy in the present. The capital generated by the sale of khadi hundis could be used to 
stimulate faltering khadi production, and since consumers could not exchange their hundis for 
khadi before a predetermined period of time (usually at least a month) had passed, sales centers 
had time to restock their shelves before customers descended upon them. Khadi hundis bore 
more than a passing resemblance to the bank loans they were partially intended to replace. But in 
contrast to bank loans, khadi hundis carried no interest charges and were financed directly by the 
Indian people. Moreover, they resisted accumulation since the capital they generated was used 
up almost immediately in the manufacture of new khadi. This is because customers purchased 
khadi hundis with the understanding that they were simultaneously purchasing khadi of 
                                                 
77 Ray, 459-62. 
78 Ibid, 469-70. 
79 Ibid, 495-6. 
80 Martin, 918. 
 81 
 
equivalent value to be delivered at some point in the future. While khadi institutions might 
conceivably have used a portion of this incoming capital to produce new capital in the short 
term, available evidence suggests that they did not. Indeed, AISA’s resistance to what one of its 
leading intellects termed “accumulation” or “acquisitiveness” (parigrahi) only grew over time. 
Such resistance took the form of blanket opposition to storing funds in banks, both out of fear 
that banks would divert those funds to ends at odds with the khadi economy and out of 
conviction that khadi institutions should raise only so much capital as they could immediately 
use.81 And, on a purely practical level, individual khadi institutions seem to have occasionally 
made a mess of the hundi system, issuing hundis on credit instead of in exchange for cash to the 
perpetual bewilderment and dismay of khadi officials. SGA attempted to head off karyakartas’ 
enthusiasm for exchanging hundis for largely worthless I.O.U.’s, but to little avail.82 Khadi 
hundis generated enough capital to justify their sale but squandered plenty in return. 
I have been unable to locate any khadi hundis printed prior to the early 1950s. Khadi 
officials stationed in Bihar, Delhi, Gujarat, Maharashtra, and UP have informed me that they 
were likely destroyed decades ago.83 However, we have reason to believe that even in the 
absence of a centralized agency to oversee their manufacture and circulation, khadi hundis, at 
least in their material form, may have shared several features in common. This is because AISA 
issued instructions in mid 1939 detailing the procedures to be followed when preparing hundis or 
keeping records of their transaction. The instructions, all of them proposed by Jerajani, are as 
follows: (1) Khadi institutions should contract with “a reliable press” to print their hundis along 
with a counterfoil for recording the name and address of the purchaser, the value of the hundi, 
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and the date of the transaction; (2) Hundis should be serially numbered and a “responsible 
worker” appointed to enter them into a register; (3) Hundis should be “printed on hand-made 
paper in two or three colours block, and the form and colours be changed from time to time”; (4) 
Hundis should bear the signature of the secretary or agent of the branch that printed them; (5) 
“The specimens of different sorts of [h]undis and the signatures of the persons authorized to sign 
the same should be previously supplied to the depots where the coupons are to be cashed”; (6) 
Workers charged with selling particular hundis should sign their names in a register 
acknowledging receipt; and (7) “As soon as a hundi is cashed it should be stamped as ‘cashed’ or 
‘paid’” and sent to branch headquarters “where the details should be recorded and signed by the 
responsible officers and then destroyed forthwith in their presence.”84 
Khadi hundis continued to be printed through at least the late 1960s, but their meaning 
and function seem to have begun changing from the mid-1950s. While prior to this time khadi 
organizations prioritized the use of hundis to ensure that capital was consumed in approximately 
the same space as it was produced, they subsequently prioritized nation-building objectives.85  
  
The Yarn Currency 
In late 1944, AISA made an announcement that would forever change its relationship to 
consumers: starting in July 1945, customers would no longer be permitted to purchase khadi 
using only cash. Instead, they would also have to provide a fixed amount of what khadi 
organizations called “yarn currency,” or in some instances, “yarn provision” (sut ki shart). Yarn 
currency was exactly what it sounds like: a medium of exchange that took the form of yarn.  
However, unlike other media of exchange, such as paper notes or metal coins, yarn is the direct 
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outcome of a productive process. Apart from employees at government printing presses, 
manufacturers of local currencies, and counterfeiters, Indians did not make material money. On 
the contrary, they exchanged the goods they produced—usually agrarian products or 
handicrafts—for money and/or sold their labor power for money in factories and other 
workplaces. In this sense, yarn currency more directly indexed productive labor than did the 
rupees or annas consumers had previously used to purchase khadi. Moreover, as khadi officials 
noted on multiple occasions, the introduction of the yarn currency and the corresponding rule 
change mandating that customers pay for a certain percentage of their khadi with handspun yarn 
increased the likelihood that those who wore khadi also participated in its production.86 And, 
finally, yarn, unlike other currencies, would, if used properly, enjoy only a relatively short 
lifespan. For it was not intended to serve as a permanent store of value but a temporary one that 
would, after changing hands once or twice, be woven into cloth. That is, it would be entirely 
used up by the production process. 
AISA’s aims were relatively modest when it first announced the establishment of the 
yarn currency. Worried that it would alienate consumers by demanding too much of them too 
quickly, AISA initially determined that consumers would have to pay only a little over 3% of 
khadi’s sales price in yarn; that is, they could pay for the remaining 96 to 97% in cash. 
Moreover, would-be customers did not even have to spin the yarn they exchanged for khadi 
themselves. Instead, they could provide yarn spun by a family member, a friend, or another 
resident of the locality.87 But, to AISA’s dismay, some customers interpreted the final option as a 
license to purchase handspun yarn from others, which they then used to procure khadi. As a 
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result, it changed the final option to “yarn spun by a servant” to whom one paid a guaranteed 
monthly wage.88 The reason for this change is not entirely clear but would seem to have 
something to do with AISA’s desire to remove the yarn currency from the realm of everyday 
transactions. Since one did not pay a servant specifically for handspun yarn but instead a lump 
sum for all his/her monthly labors, one was not technically buying yarn from the servant, or at 
least not in the same way that one purchased yarn from a store or a professional spinner.  
AISA recognized that the yarn currency would not achieve its desired effect in its current 
form and so determined that from January 1946 customers would have to provide at least 1 lati 
(640 feet) of handspun yarn for every Rs. 1 of khadi they purchased. It doubled this requirement 
to 2 latis, or 1,280 feet, of handspun yarn in July 1946.89 Both consumers and karyakartas found 
it difficult to convert between units of length, on the one hand, and rupees, on the other, and so 
AISA officials began to reframe yarn currency such that it was no longer equivalent to a rupee 
amount but to a percentage of the yarn required to produce a given piece of khadi. Thus, from 
July 1946, customers had to pay for their khadi with a quantity of yarn equal to at least half of 
the yarn used to weave the khadi they wished to buy; they could pay for the remainder with 
cash.90 There is some evidence to suggest that AISA departed from its timeframe. For instance, 
transcripts of a board of trustees meeting held in April 1948 indicate that one of the trustees 
proposed a resolution calling for customers to provide ¼ of the total yarn used to manufacture a 
given piece of khadi from July 1947, ½ from January 1948, and all from July 1948. The majority 
of trustees present rejected the proposal, concluding that it would be “improper” to pass it at that 
point. However, AISA continued to reiterate the importance of the yarn currency, adding that 
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sales depots should refuse to sell khadi to would-be consumers who had purchased the yarn they 
exchanged for khadi.91 And when certified institutions wrote requesting permission to waive the 
yarn currency requirement, AISA refused. Indeed, AISA registered its disapproval when SGA 
dropped the requirement in November 1947, informing SGA that it no longer enjoyed a “moral 
relationship” with AISA and calling upon it to return AISA’s capital immediately.92 
The yarn currency was a limited experiment in that AISA began to wind down its 
commercial business from late 1948 to devote all its attention to vastra swavalamban (self-
sufficiency in cloth). As a result, it announced its intention to stop selling khadi to the public, 
thus obviating the need for yarn currency. After all, if AISA no longer sold khadi, it could hardly 
demand that customers pay for that khadi with yarn.93 Nevertheless, its increased embrace of 
vastra swavalamban was in many ways simply an extension of the yarn currency. This is because 
participants in the vastra swavalamban program did not purchase khadi using cash. Instead, they 
spun yarn, which they exchanged at AISA and other centers for khadi. Or, to be more precise, 
AISA arranged for spinners’ yarn to be woven into khadi free of charge or at a heavily 
subsidized price. This new system virtually guaranteed that spinners would increase their khadi 
consumption. Whereas previously they had received cash in exchange for yarn, they would 
henceforth receive only khadi. While spinners could in theory sell that khadi on the market for 
cash, in practice there would have been few interested buyers. Instead, spinners confronted 
another problem:  a paucity of weavers willing to turn handspun yarn into khadi. AISA attempted 
to swell the ranks of weavers by offering them higher wages—as of 1942 a minimum wage of 
eight annas for eight hours of work—establishing weaving schools, training its own karyakartas 
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to weave, and in some instances, even paying weavers to resettle in areas where their services 
were most needed. Yet there never seemed to be enough weavers, and on several occasions, 
khadi institutions even had to introduce “khadi rationing.”94 When khadi rationing was in effect, 
khadi institutions fulfilled longstanding customers’ orders first and new customers’ orders 
second, meaning that the latter rarely received all the khadi they had requested. This discouraged 
new participants from joining the khadi project but, more importantly, threatened to undo much 
of the financial labor khadi institutions had invested in producing non-accumulation. This is 
because in the absence of weavers prepared to manufacture khadi, the handspun yarn submitted 
by spinners began to accumulate in production centers and warehouses. 
Spinners made the situation even worse by insisting that khadi institutions provide them 
with khadi made exclusively of the yarn they had submitted for weaving. That is, they did not 
want khadi made of yarn spun by other spinners, but khadi made of yarn they had spun with their 
own hands. Khadi institutions initially acceded to this demand but quickly discovered that in 
doing so, they had made their own work more difficult. Karyakartas found it difficult to keep 
track of the small bundles of yarn submitted by different spinners, even more so when those 
bundles passed into the possession of weavers. Moreover, it took far too much time and money 
to transport a single spinner’s yarn to the nearest weaving shed, wait for the weaver to turn it into 
khadi, and then hand over that khadi to the spinner. Better to mix different bundles of yarn 
together, send those bundles to the nearest unoccupied weaver, and distribute the finished khadi 
to wherever it was needed. Thus, in 1945, AISA announced that participants in the vastra 
swavalamban program would receive khadi equal in value to the yarn they deposited at a 
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production center but not necessarily khadi made of the yarn they themselves had spun. This 
decision had the effect of making yarn more like other currencies in that henceforth yarn would 
cease to index the labor of a particular individual and would instead become a generic store of 
value. In other words, bundles of yarn of the same quantity and quality were now 
interchangeable whereas previously they had maintained an irrevocable bond with their producer 
even after being transformed into cloth.95 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the role of business—as a set of institutions, ideas, and 
practices—in the constitution and operation of the khadi economy. It argues that the 
historiography’s tendency to explore the relationship between business and khadi (as well as 
other Gandhian projects) through the lens of the capitalist classes has obscured the contributions 
of a substantially larger group of mid-level merchants, shopkeepers, and entrepreneurs to the 
everyday life of Gandhian enterprise. In placing business expertise at the center of a project 
designed to ameliorate rural inequality, khadi organizations carved out a prominent place for 
businesspeople in the moral and economic guidance of the nation. The chapter began by 
considering the franchising system that connected distant khadi organizations to one another 
before exploring the careers of two khadi workers cum businesspeople who played a key role in 
formulating the administrative and sales guidelines that structured khadi organizations’ day-to-
day activities. These guidelines, which covered subjects such as making prices, account keeping, 
and exchanging khadi hundis, were at once attempts to ensure standardization across the khadi 
economy and components of a larger moral vision. In fact, we can understand many of these 
                                                 
95 Akhil Bharat Charkha Sangh, Karya Vivaran: 1 July 1945 se June 1946 tak (Sevagram: Akhil Bharat Charkha 
Sangh, 1946), 7-8. 
 88 
 
guidelines as efforts to harness business as a tool for responsibly embedding the market in social 
relations. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
Writing the Economy 
Khadi institutions did not produce only khadi. They also produced books—and lots of 
them. Between 1920 and 1970, the All India Spinners Association (AISA) and several of its 
affiliates published more than 250 books in Hindi and English alone. These books took many 
different forms: some were annual reports, institutional histories, ideological treatises, and 
syllabi, while others were statements of mathematical principles, rate charts, technical manuals, 
and discussions of weights and measurements. The authors of these texts came from highly 
varied backgrounds. Some, like Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and Rajendra Prasad, enjoyed 
national, even international, reputations, while others had achieved recognition only within the 
khadi industry, and then too, only within a state or locality. These authors wrote for a wide range 
of audiences, sometimes spinners, weavers, and employees of khadi organizations, other times 
for schoolchildren, teachers, politicians, and municipal governments. Nevertheless, they 
repeatedly articulated a conviction that their literary efforts were not singular but instead part of 
a larger literary project. They could do so partly because some khadi organizations had 
established sahitya, or literature, departments as early as 1922 to oversee the commissioning, 
editing, publication, and distribution of what soon came to be known as khadi sahitya, or 
literature about the khadi economy.   
Why did a group of organizations charged with promoting the production and 
consumption of handspun, handwoven cloth require sahitya departments? What was khadi 
sahitya, and how can we distinguish it from other bodies of writing produced at the time? To 
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answer these questions, we must take a step back to consider the broader literary and political 
landscape in which khadi sahitya was located. The turn of the twentieth century marked a crucial 
moment in Indian writing about the economy as a growing number of economists and nationalist 
intellectuals turned their attention to crafting a specifically “Indian” political economy. By this, 
they meant a body of theory capable of grasping India’s concrete economic circumstances, a 
move that necessarily entailed the rejection of many of the assumptions upon which colonial 
economic policies had been based.1 As part of their efforts, these economists and intellectuals 
recommended a series of policies to revitalize the Indian economy, chief among them the 
protection of Indian industry, the reduction of taxes on agriculture, and tariff reform.2 As the 
twentieth century advanced and the perceived successes of Soviet-style planning became clearer, 
Indian political economists devised ever more detailed proposals for state intervention in the 
economy. Though aware that very few of these proposals would garner the support of the 
colonial government, they nonetheless saw themselves as engaged in the critical task of 
formulating an economic agenda for an independent India.   
Recent scholarship has sought to disentangle the rival visions of economic development 
current in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s. In doing so, it has demonstrated that the shape the post-
colonial Indian economy would assume remained uncertain until at least a decade following 
independence.3 While the majority of this scholarship has focused on visions of the economy that 
championed rapid industrialization in conjunction with some form of central planning, a few 
                                                 
1 Bipan Chandra, The Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India:  Economic Policies of Indian National 
Leadership, 1880-1905 (New Delhi:  People’s Publishing House, 1966).   
2 For a survey of these recommendations, see Chandra (1966); Joseph J. Spengler, Indian Economic Thought:  A 
Preface to Its History (Durham:  Duke University Press, 1971); and Bhabatosh Datta, Indian Economic Thought:  
Twentieth Century Perspectives, 1900-1950 (New Delhi:  Tata McGraw-Hill Publishing Company Ltd., 1978). 
3 Vivek Chibber, Locked in Place:  State-Building and Late Industrialization in India (Princeton:  Princeton 
University Press, 2003) and Benjamin Zachariah, Developing India:  An Intellectual and Social History (New Delhi:  
Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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works have attempted to draw our attention to what they term “alternative” or “parallel” strands 
of economic thought.4 One such strand, itself a “gradual and retrospective creation,” sometimes 
goes by the name of Gandhian economics.5  Seized upon as a resource by critics of 1950s- and 
1960s-era development models, Gandhian economics became, from the late 1960s, a virtual 
synonym for “sustainable” and “participatory” economic development.6 And yet as Benjamin 
Zachariah has argued in his discussion of late colonial era discourses on development, Gandhian 
economics was never “popular” but rather “elitist in origin and didactic in intent and tone.”7 In 
this respect, it shared much in common with other discourses—capitalist, nationalist, socialist, 
and communist—current at the time, none of which accorded more than the most fleeting space 
to economic knowledge produced by the masses. On the contrary, these and other discourses 
conceived of economic thought as a good best produced at the highest levels of society.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, historians have largely followed mid-twentieth-century historical 
actors in approaching the development of economic thought as primarily the preserve of elites. 
For instance, most accounts of modern Indian economic thought are organized around a series of 
“great thinkers,” such as Dadabhai Naoroji, Mahadev Govind Ranade, Romesh Chander Dutt, 
Radhakamal Mukherjee, and occasionally, even M. K. Gandhi.8 Moreover, studies of planning, 
that great engine of Indian economic policy in the immediate post-colonial period, have tended 
to center their narratives on P. C. Mahalanobis, Jawaharlal Nehru, and other elevated figures.9 
                                                 
4 For an emphasis on industrialization and central planning, see B. R. Tomlinson, The Economy of Modern India, 
1860-1970 (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2005 [1998]) and Datta (1978).  For alternative visions of 
economic development see Ajit K. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Economic Thought (London:  Routledge, 1993). 
5 Zachariah, 157. 
6 The quintessential statement on the subject is E. F. Schumacher, Small is Beautiful:  Economics as if People 
Mattered (New York:  Harper & Row, 1973). 
7 Zachariah, 156. 
8 Spengler (1971), Datta (1978), and Dasgupta (1993). 
9 Chibber (2003); Zachariah (2005); and Ramachandra Guha, India After Gandhi:  The History of the World’s 
Largest Democracy (New York:  HarperCollins Publishers, 2007), 209-32. 
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Even the rare attempt to examine vernacular-language economic writing has focused almost 
exclusively on the contributions of university-educated intellectuals.10 This approach to the 
production of economic knowledge mirrors an earlier generation’s approach to the production of 
political knowledge.11 Revisionist efforts to highlight the generativeness of subaltern politics 
achieved only mixed results, casting subalterns not as knowledge producers but as bearers of 
deep cultural understandings.12 Similarly, though a large body of literature portrays peasants, 
artisans, and laborers as the architects of sprawling moral-economic universes, it rarely 
investigates their involvement in the development of political-economic thought.13 A recent 
study of liberalism in late-colonial Bengal begins to remedy this deficiency insofar as it seeks to 
explain how some peasants came to articulate liberal arguments about the property-constituting 
capacities of labor.14 However, its ultimate objective is to clarify the relationship between liberal 
political thought and political economy, not, as is my aim here, to examine the contributions of 
“ordinary” Indians to the production of macroeconomic knowledge.   
This chapter investigates several of the areas in which non-elite Indians contributed to the 
generation of economic knowledge. It does so through an examination of khadi sahitya, which 
functioned as one of the principal media through which khadi institutions and khadi workers 
endeavored to explain the khadi economy to others. More specifically, it considers what khadi 
                                                 
10 Francesca Orsini, The Hindi Public Sphere, 1920-1940:  Language and Literature in the Age of Nationalism (New 
Delhi:  Oxford University Press, 2002), 326-31. 
11 For instance, Anil Seal, The Emergence of Indian Nationalism:  Competition and Collaboration in the Later 
Nineteenth Century (London:  Cambridge University Press, 1968) and John Gallagher, Gordon Johnson, and Anil 
Seal, eds., Locality, Province, and Nation:  Essays on Indian Politics 1870 to 1940 (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1973). 
12 Ranajit Guha, Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency (New Delhi:  Oxford University Press, 1983) and 
Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, eds., Selected Subaltern Studies (New York:  Oxford University 
Press, 1988). 
13 Nita Kumar, The Artisans of Banaras:  Popular Culture and Identity, 1880-1986 (Princeton:  Princeton University 
Press, 1988); Gyanendra Pandey, The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India (Delhi:  Oxford 
University Press, 1990); Prasannan Parthasarathi, The Transition to a Colonial Economy:  Weavers, Merchants and 
Kings (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2001) 
14 Andrew Sartori, Liberalism in Empire:  An Alternative History (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 2014). 
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sahitya can tell us about the knowledge production activities of three distinct groups: spinners 
and weavers; employees of khadi organizations; and producers of khadi sahitya. The remainder 
of this chapter is divided into four sections, the first of which argues that khadi sahitya can be 
distinguished from other “popular” forms of writing about the economy by the conditions of its 
production and circulation. That is, in contrast to other modes of popular economic writing, 
khadi sahitya arose in response to the specific challenges confronting actual economic producers. 
Moreover, non-elites assumed a disproportionate amount of responsibility for creating and 
distributing it. The second section investigates a subfield of khadi sahitya termed khadi 
mathematics, which modified prevailing mathematical conventions to make them more “useful” 
to the khadi economy. An examination of the khadi mathematics literature reveals that unlike 
many of their contemporaries, who sought to impose new metrological standards upon the Indian 
population, khadi officials approached “ordinary” Indians as knowledge producers capable of 
formulating metrological standards for themselves. The third section explores another subfield of 
khadi sahitya, this one concerned with currency. It considers the contributions of employees of 
khadi organizations to the decimalization of Indian coinage, emphasizing their efforts to embed 
the decimal system in local knowledge conventions. The final section examines the textbooks 
authored by producers of khadi sahitya. It demonstrates that such authors encouraged readers to 
produce knowledge about macroeconomic matters for themselves through close engagements 
with productive technologies. Thus, I argue that khadi sahitya provides us with a critical window 
into the contributions of “ordinary” Indians to the production of modern economic thought.  
 
Popular Economics Literature 
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Khadi sahitya emerged at a time when Indians had begun to write about the economy in 
growing numbers. Although Indian critics of colonial rule had written extensively on political-
economic matters since at least the mid nineteenth century, the early decades of the twentieth 
century witnessed an explosion of writing on the economy. This writing took a variety of forms, 
appearing as general articles, editorials, and letters to the editor in daily newspapers, and as peer-
reviewed texts in specialist periodicals. Moreover, political bodies such as the All India Congress 
Committee (AICC) and the Congress Socialist Party (CSP) regularly issued books and pamphlets 
pertaining to economic issues as well as summaries of meetings and copies of resolutions.15 
Usually prepared in English and then translated into other Indian languages, these writings 
reached an influential but relatively circumscribed audience. Simultaneously, however, Hindi-
language printing presses and publishing companies began to turn their attention to economic 
concerns, particularly questions relating to agriculture and the peasantry. Publishing houses 
released original political-economic texts in Hindi from as early as 1907, while Hindi-language 
journals such as Madhuri and Saraswati began to feature the writings of political economists 
only a few years later.16 Such publications reached a relatively wider audience than their 
English-language counterparts but nonetheless circulated chiefly among the upper and middle 
classes. Troubled by this state of affairs, a loosely connected group of professional economists 
scattered throughout North India set themselves the task of producing what they termed a 
popular Hindi-language economics literature. 
These professional economists defined “popular” in several ways. First, they argued that 
a popular economics literature was one that took all Indians as its audience. That is, it would 
                                                 
15 Zachariah, 48-53. 
16 Francesca Orsini, The Hindi Public Sphere, 1920-1940:  Language and Literature in the Age of Nationalism (New 
Delhi:  Oxford University Press, 2002), 326-9. 
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address itself to farmers, laborers, and artisans in addition to the educated classes who had been 
the focus of prior writing on the economy. Hindi-language economists addressed their work to 
the Indian people not out of a democratizing impulse, however, or a commitment to 
egalitarianism. Instead, they repeatedly articulated a conviction that countries could not hope to 
improve their economic circumstances, much less achieve economic independence, until all their 
people possessed at least a basic understanding of the economy. Such an understanding, they 
claimed, could come only through the study of economics.17 Second, these economists defined a 
popular economics literature as one written in Hindi, which they termed India’s mother tongue 
and/or national language. But even in doing so they expressed no great pride in Hindi, which 
they described as woefully lacking in the technical vocabulary required for the scientific study of 
economics. Instead, they justified their privileging of Hindi on the grounds that the Indian people 
would learn best in a language with which they were (ostensibly) familiar.18 And finally, 
proponents of a popular Hindi-language economics literature claimed that such a literature 
should be written in a simple, concise language. Vernacular economists variously characterized 
this language as one capable of being understood by anyone and akin to that spoken in the 
                                                 
17 Many economists writing in Hindi made this claim, including Ganeshdatt Pathak, Arthashastra Praveshika, arthat 
Arthashastra ke Mul Siddhant (Allahabad:  Indian Press, 1919); Radhakrishna Jha, Bharat ki Sampattik Avastha 
(Calcutta:  Hindi Pustak Agency, 1920); Bhagwandas Kela, Bharatiya Arthashastra (Lucknow:  Ganga Pustakmala 
Karyalay, 1925); Dayashankar Dube and Bhagwandas Kela, Hindi mein Arthashastra aur Rajniti Sahitya 
(Vrindavan:  Bharatiya Granthmala, 1935); and Dayashankar Dube and Shankar Sahay Saxena, Gramya 
Arthashastra (Yuktprant ke Highschool aur Intermediate Board ki Highschool Pariksha ke Gramya Arthashastra ke 
Pathyakram ke Anusar Likhit (Allahabad:  National Press, 1940). 
18 For discussions of Hindi’s perceived inadequacies, see Dayashankar Dube and Bhagwandas Kela, Hindi mein 
Arthashastra aur Rajniti Sahitya (Vrindavan:  Bharatiya Granthmala, 1935); Dayashankar Dube, Gadadharprasad 
Ambasth, and Bhagwandas Kela, Arthashastra Shabdavali, 4th ed. (Allahabad, Bharatiya Granthamala, 1949); and 
Raghuvir, Bhagwatsharan Adholiya, and Pannalal Baldua, Arthashastra Shabd-Kosh (Wardha:  Govindram 
Seksariya Arth-Sahitya Prakashan Mandal, 1949).  For characterizations of Hindi as India’s mother tongue and/or 
national language as well as discussions of the importance of publishing in Hindi, see Amarnath Bali and Mohanlal, 
Bharatiya Arthashastra (Lahore:  Virjanand Press, 1923/24) and Krishnakumar Sharma, Arthashastra ke Mul 
Siddhant aur Unka Bharat mein Prayog (Kanpur:  Kishore Publishing, 1939), 1. 
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village.19 One even pointedly warned that the language of popular economics texts should depart 
as far as possible from the administrative texts produced by the Mughal state and the English 
East India Company.20 This rough consensus on what distinguished a popular work from a non-
popular one constituted one of the primary frameworks within which much subsequent Hindi-
language writing on the economy transpired. 
The framework articulated by proponents of a popular economics literature commanded 
attention partly because many of its advocates maintained close ties with leading universities, 
publishing houses, and printing presses. Take one of the best-known Hindi-language economists, 
Dayashankar Dube, as an example. Born in approximately 1900, Dube completed his B.A. from 
Jabalpur in central India in 1917, then an M.A. in economics from Allahabad’s Evening 
Christian College in 1919. Upon completing his M.A., Dube served as a research scholar in 
Allahabad University’s economics department for one year and an economics instructor at 
Evening Christian College for two years before moving to Lucknow University in 1922. At 
Lucknow University, he taught classes in economics, mathematics, and administration, while 
also publishing widely in Madhuri, Saraswati, and other Hindi-language journals and testifying 
before the 1925 Indian Economic Enquiry Committee.21 In addition, in 1923 he helped to found 
the Bharatiya Arthashastra Parishad (BAP), or Indian Economics Council, a voluntary 
association dedicated to the production of Hindi-language literature on the economy. Other 
founding members included the eminent economist and sociologist Radhakamal Mukherjee and 
the editor and publisher Dhularelal Bhargava.22 Though BAP lacked the finances to maintain a 
                                                 
19 Hanuman Prasad Goyal, Vyapar aur Karigari (Banaras:  Bhagwan Pustakalay, 1938/39), 2 and Shivlal Sharma, 
Gramya Sangathan (Agra:  Gramin Granthmala Karyalay, 1935), 1. 
20 Radhakrishna Jha, Bharat ki Sampatik Avastha (Calcutta:  Hindi Pustak Agency, 1920), 3. 
21 Dayashankar Dube’s Videshi Vinimay (Lucknow:  Ganga Pustakmala, 1926), 8-9. 
22 Bhagwandas Kela, Bharatiya Arthashastra, Vol. 1 (Lucknow:  Ganga Pustakmala, 1925), 13 and back inside 
covers. 
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publishing unit of its own, it provided editorial assistance to Hindi-language economists while 
also helping to identify suitable publishers for their work.23 Publishing companies marketed 
some of the materials produced by BAP-affiliated authors as textbooks to government schools, 
national schools, and municipal libraries.24 Other BAP materials, though not explicitly marketed 
as textbooks, seem to have been at least partially intended for use in schools and colleges.25 Dube 
himself published a handful of books on the BAP imprint, among them an annotated 
bibliography of several hundred Hindi-language economics texts and a glossary of several 
thousand Hindi-language economics terms.26 His connections to many of the leading figures and 
institutions in the Hindi publishing world helped him to promote his vision of a popular Hindi-
language economics literature in a wide variety of forums. Partly as a result, he and some of his 
colleagues exerted an outsized influence in dictating what a popular economics literature would 
look like.  
Khadi sahitya shared some of the same founding assumptions as the popular Hindi-
language economics literature described above insofar as it also addressed itself to the masses 
and employed relatively straightforward language. However, it arose in a radically different 
institutional context and, partly as a result, betrays a different set of concerns. In contrast to the 
writings of Dube and his colleagues, which took shape in university economics departments and 
the occasional secondary school, khadi sahitya emerged out of the khadi project and its intimate 
connections to the laboring activities of peasants and artisans. Although most early works of 
                                                 
23 Dularelal Bhargava’s own publishing line Ganga Pustakmala published at least two BAP texts.  BAP played a role 
in the preparation and publication of at least eighteen Hindi-language economics books between 1925 and 1949. 
24 For example, Bharatiya Granthamala marketed Dayashankar Dube, Bhagwandas Kela, and Gadadharprasad 
Ambasth’s Arthashastra Shabdavali (1932); Dayashankar Dube and Bhagwandas Kela’s Hindi mein Arthashastra 
aur Rajniti Sahitya (1935); and Janaglal Gupta and Bhagwandas Kela’s Kautilya ke Aarthik Vichar (1935 or earlier) 
to schools and libraries.  See Dube and Kela (1935), back inside cover. 
25 For example, Dayashankar Dube’s Videshi Vinimay (Lucknow:  Ganga Pustakmala, 1926). 
26 Dayashankar Dube, Bhagwandas Kela, and Gadadharprasad Ambasth’s Arthashastra Shabdavali (1932); 
Dayashankar Dube and Bhagwandas Kela’s Hindi mein Arthashastra aur Rajniti Sahitya (1935); 
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khadi sahitya took the form of annual reports and bulletins highlighting the progress of khadi 
work in the provinces, khadi institutions also published a series of “practical” texts for their 
karyakartas, or salaried employees, and others interested in carrying out khadi work in their 
homes. Such texts offered guidance on the operation of the spinning wheel and other productive 
technologies as well as suggestions for khadi officials intent upon improving their business 
acumen.27 As AISA and other khadi institutions diversified their activities in the 1930s and 
1940s, they expanded their range of publications to include political-economic treatises, 
institutional histories, periodicals, manifestos on science and mathematics, syllabi, and 
textbooks. Khadi sahityakars, or producers of khadi sahitya, justified this diversification with 
reference to the perceived needs of the khadi project. For example, they argued that 
mathematical treatises would teach spinners to perform basic calculations while textbooks would 
prepare karyakartas to manufacture and repair machinery. Even political-economic texts would 
perform a practical function by outlining a positive economic agenda for an independent India. 
Thus, more than the popular economics literature championed by Dube and others, khadi sahitya 
emerged as a response to the challenges confronting economic producers.    
Moreover, most of the individuals who authored works of khadi sahitya had themselves 
spent years working as small-scale producers. This is because most khadi sahityakars were first 
and foremost karyakartas, or full-time, salaried employees of AISA and other khadi 
organizations. The clear majority of karyakartas hailed from India’s small towns and villages, 
where they had previously worked as agriculturalists or minor clerks. Although most enjoyed at 
least some schooling, few if any had enrolled in college; many others had dropped out after 
                                                 
27 For instruction on the use of productive technologies, see Maganlal Khushalchand Gandhi, Charkha Shastra 
(Ahmedabad:  Maganlal Khushalchand Gandhi, 1922).  Originally written in Gujarati, it was translated into Hindi by 
an unnamed student taking lessons from Gandhi at Satyagraha Ashram.  For business suggestions, see All India 
Khadi Information Bureau, Khadi Bulletins, 1923 (Sabarmati:  Khadi Information Bureau, 1923). 
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completing primary school or midway through secondary school. Furthermore, after entering 
AISA’s service, they participated in an extensive training program designed to familiarize them 
with the minutiae of the cloth production process before receiving a permanent assignment at a 
sales depot or production center. And even after taking up their permanent assignment, 
karyakartas devoted at least two hours a day to spinning or weaving and several more to 
overseeing and advising small-scale khadi producers.28 While khadi sahityakars were 
undoubtedly among the best educated of karyakartas, their life experience diverged sharply from 
that of Dube and his colleagues. Indeed, we can approach karyakartas—and, by extension, 
sahityakars—as particularly compelling examples of non-elite Indians writing—and producing 
knowledge—about the economy.   
Khadi sahitya differed from the so-called popular economics literature in another crucial 
respect, however: the conditions of its circulation. Although both bodies of literature claimed to 
address similar audiences—the formally illiterate peasants, artisans, and laborers who made up 
the bulk of the Indian population—they employed different methods for doing so. Whereas Dube 
and his colleagues proposed that their texts be taught in colleges and secondary schools, 
presumably to trickle down from there to the masses, khadi sahityakars could rely on a dense 
network of khadi institutions to transport their work to even those individuals who would never 
set foot inside a school. In other words, khadi sahityakars recognized that karyakartas and, to a 
lesser extent, schoolteachers would assume a disproportionate amount of responsibility for 
transmitting the content of khadi sahitya to its intended audience. This is because even those 
spinners who could not read a given text might expect to have parts of it read out loud to them 
                                                 
28 All India Spinners Association Papers, 1925-1948, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Private Papers 
collection, microfilm, R. 2880 #1 and Shri Gandhi Ashram, Karyavahi Pustika:  Prabandhak Samiti, Register #2 
(1938-1946). 
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or, more likely, communicated to them through their interactions with khadi workers. These 
workers might not have viewed their interactions with spinners and weavers as explicitly 
pedagogical in thrust. Nevertheless, such interactions transpired fairly regularly—karyakartas 
were expected to meet with certified spinners and weavers resident in their area at least once a 
week—and in such a way that myriad forms of knowledge could be transmitted relatively easily 
through verbal instructions and material processes.29 As a result, the circulation networks 
available to khadi sahityakars ensured that the latter’s texts stood a far better chance of reaching 
a “popular” audience than those produced by Dube and other proponents of a popular economics 
literature. 
 
Khadi mathematics 
The late 1930s and the early 1940s marked an especially important turning point in the 
history of khadi sahitya as a new generation of authors began to publish on a wide range of new 
subjects. One of those subjects was what khadi sahityakars came to call khadi ganit, or khadi 
mathematics. Though sahityakars never offered an explicit definition of khadi mathematics, they 
used the term to refer to discussions of the mathematical formulae used to calculate the strength, 
uniformity, and fineness of yarn; the techniques for converting between different units of 
measurement; the means of instructing mathematically “illiterate” Indians in basic counting, 
addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division; and the production of tables estimating the 
quality and quantity of labor individuals, families, and villages would need to expend in order to 
meet their basic clothing and nutritional needs. As this section will seek to demonstrate, the 
architects of khadi mathematics had two primary aims: first, to acquaint a general audience with 
                                                 
29 All India Spinners Association Papers, 1925-1948, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, Private Papers 
collection, microfilm, R. 2880 #1. 
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the material and conceptual labor required to perform basic mathematical calculations and, 
second, to modify existing mathematical conventions to make them more useful to the khadi 
economy. Moreover, they also worked to standardize khadi mathematics so that it would assume 
a uniform shape across the entire khadi economy. Peasants and artisans made important 
contributions to the field of khadi mathematics, nowhere so much as where metrological systems 
were concerned. Although much of the historical literature emphasizes the close ties between 
metrological systems and political authority, attention to khadi sahitya points us in a different 
direction. Indeed, far from attempting to impose new weights and measures upon the Indian 
people in a top-down fashion, khadi sahityakars approached “ordinary” Indians as knowledge 
producers capable of formulating metrological standards for themselves.  
It is difficult to overstate the economic significance of metrological systems, since they 
play a crucial role in determining how much of a given product can be exchanged and at what 
price. Partly as a result, political authorities have typically exercised tight control over weights 
and measures, approaching them as almost unassailable markers of sovereignty.30 And yet as the 
pioneering scholar of historical metrology Witold Kula has argued, measures are never 
exclusively economic. Instead, they also possess a “social content” that imbues them with value 
and meaning.31 Perhaps for this reason, some communities have resisted attempts to introduce 
new metrological systems, particularly those they regarded as unjust or unintelligible. For 
instance, Sudipta Sen’s account of the East India Company’s attempts to “settle” Indian 
marketplaces foregrounds the politico-cultural conflicts produced by the imposition of new 
metrological and pecuniary standards.32 Similarly, Kula’s study of the introduction of the metric 
                                                 
30 Witold Kula, Measures and Men, Trans. R. Szreter (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1986), 18-23. 
31 Ibid, 3-4. 
32 Sudipta Sen, Empire of Free Trade:  The East India Company and the Making of the Colonial Marketplace 
(Philadelphia:  University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998). 
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system in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century France demonstrates the tremendous amount of 
work required to displace already existing non-metric systems.33 Still, for all their attention to 
conflict and resistance, the story Kula and others tell about metrological change is remarkably 
straightforward: abstract measures slowly but surely replaced contextual measures derived from 
“concrete phenomena in daily life.”34 In the South Asian context, this story takes a special form 
since the colonial state is often credited with imposing some degree of uniformity upon an 
almost impossibly varied metrological landscape.35 However, even as late as the mid-1950s, a 
wide range of local, regional, and imperial systems of measurement prevailed in different parts 
of the subcontinent, meaning that proponents of metrological reform had to replace not a single 
system but multiple systems.36 Khadi officials and karyakartas aspired to do just that.   
 “Standardization” is not a term closely associated with the khadi economy, which in the 
popular imagination at least more often signifies its antithesis. However, khadi officials and 
karyakartas placed a high value on standardization, which they took to be a minimum condition 
for the smooth running of the khadi economy. Indeed, works of khadi sahitya are littered with 
efforts to familiarize readers with accounting, banking, and manufacturing protocols, and to train 
them in the proper names for different parts of the charkha.37 But khadi sahityakars paid special 
attention to metrological standards, perhaps motivated by the recognition that weights and 
measures impinged closely upon virtually every aspect of spinners and weavers’ lives. After all, 
                                                 
33 Kula, 244-53. 
34 Ibid, 3-4. 
35 Sen (1998) and Goswami, Producing India:  From Colonial Economy to National Space (Chicago:  The 
University of Chicago Press, 2004), 85-6. 
36 Anil Kumar Acharya, History of Decimalisation Movement in India (Calcutta:  Indian Decimal Society, 1958), 1-
4. 
37 For instance, Satish Chandra Das Gupta, Khadi Manual, Vol. 1 (Calcutta:  Khadi Pratisthan, 1924); Shri Gandhi 
Ashram-Charkha Sangh:  Ashram-Vidhan (Meerut:  Ramswarup Sharma, 1934); Akhil Bharat Charkha Sangh, 
Magan Charkha (Ahmedabad:  Akhil Bharat Charkha Sangh, 1940); and Shri Gandhi Ashram, Hisab Pranali tatha 
Vyavastha Sambandhi Hidyatein (Meerut:  Shri Gandhi Ashram, 1940). 
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without at least a rudimentary understanding of the metrological system employed by the khadi 
economy, spinners could not determine how much yarn they had spun, the quality of yarn they 
had spun, or the quantity of wages to which they were entitled. Moreover, they would find it near 
impossible to exchange their yarn for khadi and other goods if they could not convert between 
different units of measurement. As a result, metrological standardization—of “systems of 
counting, instruments of counting, [and] methods of using these instruments”—became a 
primary emphasis of the khadi project.38   
For an understanding of how metrological standardization operated in the context of the 
khadi economy, it is best to turn to the khadi mathematics literature, particularly the writings of 
the longtime karyakarta and AISA trustee Krishnadas Gandhi. Gandhi authored four texts on 
khadi mathematics, including the earliest surviving Hindi-language example.39 The first 
underwent four print runs between 1940 and 1957 for a total of 15,000 copies. The second was 
published first in 1945 and then again in 1954. We do not have figures for the first print run, but 
the second consisted of 3,000 copies. The third volume also underwent two print runs—one in 
1949, the other in 1957—for a total of 8,000 copies. We know very little about the fourth volume 
save that it was published once in 1955 and may have enjoyed prior or subsequent print runs.40 
While focused on different subjects, each volume offered guidance on the forms of calculation 
with which karyakartas and khadi producers should be familiar. For example, the first volume 
provided instruction in how to convert between different units of measurement, as well as how to 
calculate the time required to spin a given quantity of yarn. The second instructed readers in how 
                                                 
38 Kula, 94. 
39 Krishnadas Gandhi, Katai Ganit, Bhag 1: Gaz aur Tar, ya Sut ki Lambai ke Nap (Kashi:  Akhil Bharat Sarv Seva 
Sangh Prakashan, 1957 [1940]). 
40 Krishnadas Gandhi, Katai Ganit, Bhag 1; Katai Ganit, Bhag 2: Sut ka Ank (Maganwadi, Akhil Bharat Seva 
Sangh, 1954 [1945]); Katai Ganit, Bhag 3:  Sut ka Vyas (Kashi:  Akhil Bharat Sarv Seva Sangh Prakashan, 1957 
[1949]); and Katai Ganit, Bhag 4 (Sarv Seva Sangh, 1955). 
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to calculate yarn count, an index of yarn’s relative fineness. While interesting in and of itself, the 
mathematical information contained in these texts is significant primarily for what it tells us 
about the circumstances under which knowledge of weights and measures was produced. For, as 
khadi sahityakars repeatedly emphasized, karyakartas introduced new measures not of their own 
initiative, but at the instance of small-scale producers. 
Let us start with an example drawn from Gandhi’s second book on khadi mathematics. In 
this book Gandhi reveals that khadi institutions have sometimes found it necessary to invent new 
units of measurement, that is units unacknowledged as such by prevailing social conventions. 
Just as many readers may have learned to recognize the meter and yard as standard measures of 
length, many Indian contemporaries of Gandhi would have learned to recognize the gaz and 
gundi. And yet as Gandhi tells us, khadi workers decided to introduce a new measure of length, 
the pati, in 1942 for a very specific reason: the smallest standardized units of measurement 
available to them were too large to accommodate the needs of the spinners with whom these 
karyakartas worked. Even by the early 1940s, many spinners could afford to procure only 
enough cotton to produce very small quantities of yarn. Other spinners worked the charkha only 
occasionally, thus producing small quantities of yarn as well. At least in the eyes of some khadi 
officials, many such spinners struggled to perform the mathematical labor required to determine 
what percentage of an already existing unit of measurement of yarn they had produced.41 These 
officials also worried that some spinners could not even count, thus making it impossible for 
them to calculate the count of yarn they had spun and, by extension, the quantity of wages they 
were owed.42 While some officials expressed the opinion that spinners would just have to do the 
best they could, others proposed introducing a new, smaller unit of measurement that would 
                                                 
41 Krishnadas Gandhi, Katai Ganit, Bhag 2, 22; 71-3. 
42 Ibid, 35; 6; 11. 
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obviate the need for spinners to perform all but the simplest calculations. The latter faction won 
out, and the pati was born.43 
Khadi sahitya recounts many other similar decisions, each of them illustrative in one way 
or another of khadi institutions’ determination to make mathematics more accessible to peasants, 
laborers, and artisans. To take just one additional example, khadi workers and spinners 
frequently had to convert between ratals and tolas, two units for measuring weight. The ratal 
was the larger unit and thus better for measuring the substantial quantities of yarn produced by 
Indian textile mills. The tola, by contrast, was far smaller and thus better suited to handspinners. 
While existing mathematical conventions called for tolas to be converted into ratals at a ratio of 
38 8/9th tolas to 1 ratal, AISA determined that this ratio was too complicated and prone to 
generating unwieldy numbers. Instead, it proposed that for the purposes of the khadi economy, 
the ratio be altered to 40 tolas to 1 ratal.44 Most khadi institutions embraced this change, 
presumably because the rationale offered for it made sense to them. After all, the new ratio 
promised greater simplicity and ease of use even if it also implied (at least initially) lesser 
precision.   
Although hardly revolutionary in and of themselves, what these decisions suggest is a 
commitment to reshaping standardized mathematics to meet the needs of small-scale producers 
rather than forcing small-scale producers to accommodate themselves to standardized 
mathematics. In the mid twentieth century when much of the khadi mathematics literature was 
produced, the colonial and later the post-colonial state, along with Indian and British 
                                                 
43 Krishnadas Gandhi provides an additional explanation for the invention of the pati in 1942.  1942 was the year 
when M. K. Gandhi called for the introduction of the yarn currency, a system of exchange in which yarn could be 
used to “purchase” basic necessities.  M. K. Gandhi called for khadi officials to devise a way for spinners to 
exchange even very small quantities of yarn for essential items, such as salt or sewing needles.  See Krishnadas 
Gandhi, Katai Ganit, Bhag 2, 71. 
44 Ibid, 2-3. 
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industrialists, various Chambers of Commerce, and other influential economic actors, 
increasingly marshalled quantitative data to make arguments about the normative organization of 
the economy. Khadi institutions did the same, preparing elaborate reports on projected khadi 
production and sales figures, along with tables depicting the number of spinners and weavers 
employed by the khadi industry at a given point in time.45 In one sense, this style of quantitative 
argumentation was far from new. After all, Dadabhai Naoroji’s late-nineteenth-century 
denunciations of colonial rule rested in no small part on the many figures he had assembled to 
rebut British claims about India’s “material progress” and to promulgate his own drain of wealth 
theory.46 But in another sense, the production and circulation of quantitative data had increased 
so dramatically by the mid twentieth century as to become something qualitatively different. 
Indeed, to many Indians anticipating the end of colonial rule, mathematics and science held out 
the promise of a better future, one in which universal logic and rationality trumped the vagaries 
of imperialism. However, while most Indians looked to university-trained scientists and 
technocrats to generate mathematical knowledge, very few considered the possibility that 
peasants and artisans might also serve as knowledge producers.47  
Karyakartas and sahityakars were able to imagine this possibility primarily because they 
maintained a very particular relationship to mathematics. This relationship distinguished them 
from Naoroji and other economic nationalists, who challenged the adequacy of figures proposed 
                                                 
45 Such reports and tables are a constant feature of annuals, including Akhil Bharatvarshiya Charkha Sangh, Salana 
Report, 1925-26 (Ahmedabad:  Akhil Bharatvarshiya Charkha Sangh, 1926); Akhil Bharat Charkha Sangh, Varshik 
Vivaran:  1940 (Wardha:  Akhil Bharat Charkha Sangh, 1941); and Akhil Bharat Charkha Sangh, Vishesh 
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1951). 
46 For one example, see Dadabhai Naoroji, Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, reprint (Government of India 
Publications, 1962 [1901]). 
47 Gyan Prakash, Another Reason:  Science and the Imagination of Modern India (Princeton:  Princeton University 
Press, 1999).  Prakash also notes that some Indians attempted to recuperate what they termed the ancient field of 
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by the colonial state on the grounds that they were the products of inaccurate data or 
insufficiently precise mathematical formulae while paying little heed to the general intelligibility 
of said figures or the complexity of the mathematical labor required to produce them. By 
contrast, khadi sahityakars and the institutions with which they were associated worried less 
about the “truth” or accuracy of figures and far more about their accessibility. By accessibility, I 
mean the degree to which even individuals with no formal mathematical training could 
understand a figure’s meaning and, more importantly, the concrete steps through which it had 
been generated. Or perhaps it would be more appropriate to say that khadi sahityakars regarded a 
figure as accurate only to the extent that it was also accessible, that is, the extent to which even a 
non-specialist could comprehend, make judgments about, and even replicate the mathematical 
work required to “produce” it.   
Spinners and weavers did so in a variety of ways, usually by “failing” to complete their 
work in the fashion prescribed by AISA. For instance, in the early 1940s, some Bihari spinners 
“informed” local karyakartas that they could not count, presumably by repeatedly preparing yarn 
bundles of the “wrong” size and quantity. In response, khadi officials employed by the Bihar 
branch debated how to resolve this problem, concluding that a critical mass of spinners would 
have to be taught counting at some point in the near future.48 But Bihari spinners were not alone 
in their innumeracy and so karyakartas and sahityakars stationed in different parts of the country 
set themselves the task of developing a more uniform solution.49 They did so by attempting to 
determine up to what number the average villager could count, concluding that many could not 
comfortably work with numbers larger than twenty.50 As a result, one leading official declared, 
                                                 
48 “Akhil Bharat Charkha Sangh Bihar Shakha, Madhubani (Darbhanga):  Suchna-January, 1942,” Rajendra Prasad 
Private Papers, National Archives of India, F.3-A/42, 4. 
49 Krishnadas Gandhi makes much the same point in Katai Ganit, Bhag 2, 35. 
50 K. G. Mashruwala, “The So-Called Decimal Coinage,” Harijan 10.14 (12 May 1946), 126 and Lele (1961), 8. 
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khadi mathematicians took pains to ensure that conversion ratios used to establish the length of 
yarn permitted spinners to work with numbers no larger than twenty or powers of twenty.51 Here 
again, then, khadi mathematics’ elaboration proceeded not through the application of logic and 
abstract reasoning to an already existing body of thought but through continuous negotiation 
between karyakartas and small-scale producers.   
Khadi sahityakars contributed to this dynamic by encouraging spinners and weavers to 
exercise control over their own mathematical labor. That is, they urged small-scale producers to 
learn to solve mathematical problems for themselves and sought to assist them in doing so by 
making their own publications as accessible as possible. For instance, some sahityakars 
emphasized that the same mathematical problem could be approached in multiple ways. 
Krishnadas Gandhi made this point in his 1940 volume in the context of a discussion about 
conversion between different units of measurement. In it, he advised instructors at khadi 
institutions and primary schools that their students should gain familiarity with all the potential 
methods of arriving at the answer to a problem and provided a lengthy explanation of each 
method.52 Another sahityakar did much the same in his 1938 book on spinning, asserting that 
spinners could calculate the count and strength of yarn using three different methods.53 Gandhi 
and many other producers of khadi sahitya attempted to facilitate readers’ understanding of these 
methods by presenting them with a series of practice questions. These questions called for 
readers to convert between two units of measurement or to calculate the speed at which they 
could spin a given quantity of yarn on a particular type of charkha. More importantly, they also 
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showed readers the various steps through which they might arrive at an answer to the questions.54 
In doing so, they made explicit the content of the work required to perform even the most basic 
mathematical tasks. Moreover, they demonstrated to readers that the latter enjoyed at least a 
modicum of freedom when determining their approach to a mathematical problem. If readers 
were unfamiliar with the unitary rule, they could employ basic division instead. If they preferred 
not to weigh their yarn on a scale, they could employ alternative forms of measurement.55 The 
important thing, as Gandhi argued in the introduction to his text, was to avoid the use of big 
numbers when small numbers would suffice and to reject complicated mathematical equations in 
favor of simpler ones.56 
Similarly, khadi sahityakars urged small-scale producers to resist the attempts of 
merchants and large-scale producers to concentrate weights and measures in their own hands. 
While, on the one hand, sahityakars worried that cunning middlemen would employ defective 
weights in an effort to take advantage of naive artisans, on the other hand, they recognized that 
small-scale producers required weights, scales, and other measuring implements in order to 
generate mathematical knowledge for themselves. But even in the mid twentieth century, 
measuring implements were so expensive and uncommon as to be out of reach for most 
participants in the khadi economy. As a result, one khadi sahityakar made the seemingly 
preposterous recommendation that Indians manufacture their own scales out of lemon rinds. Or 
as this individual put it:   
[W]e Indians have a habit of eating lemons.  Therefore, we can make a set of scales 
(taraju) by cutting a lemon into two equal parts, removing the juice, peeling the lemon, 
                                                 
54 Krishnadas Gandhi, Katai Ganit, Bhag 1, 13-9 and 112-7. Also see Dattoba Dastane, Bunai:  Saranjam, Kriyaen 
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and cleaning it.  With the aid of this set of scales, we can calculate yarn count using the 
weight of the coins in circulation at the time.57   
 
We have no evidence to suggest that spinners and weavers heeded the call to manufacture lemon 
rind scales, but fortunately the call’s significance lies elsewhere. In encouraging small-scale 
producers to craft their own measuring implements, the khadi sahityakar affirmed the importance 
of control of one’s own mathematical labor. But here control implies not only a basic familiarity 
with mathematics but also access to the instruments used to engage that mathematics. 
Though spinners and weavers did not formally co-author the metrological texts examined 
here, their influence on them is indisputable. This is because, consciously or not, small-scale 
producers extended the purview of khadi mathematics through their everyday practices. When 
spinners and weavers lacked appropriate units of measurement, khadi officials created them. 
When spinners and weavers had trouble employing existing conversion ratios, karyakartas 
modified them. But we should not understand khadi officials and karyakartas as the sole or even 
primary agents of this process, for khadi producers initiated change in the first place by making 
visible the limitations of prevailing mathematical conventions. This point is important because a 
large strand of the historiography examines how peasants, artisans, and other low-status Indians 
received and redeployed understandings of the economy produced elsewhere. This 
historiography has been generally quite keen to portray the Indian masses as agentive subjects 
capable of comprehending and working to alter their economic situation. However, it has rarely 
examined how the Indian masses contributed to the production of conceptual understandings of 
the economy and, by extension, to the production of the economy itself. Attention to khadi 
sahitya helps us to explore this largely neglected dimension of economic life while reminding us 
                                                 
57 Lele (1961), 12.  This suggestion is attributed to C. Rajagopalachari, whose contributions to khadi mathematics I 
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of the role of another group of non-elites in standardizing and popularizing these understandings. 
The next section turns to that group, khadi karyakartas, and their contributions to the production 
of economic knowledge. 
 
Decimalization 
The khadi economy faced one of its greatest challenges in April 1957 when the Indian 
government began to implement the decimalization of India’s currency system. Decimalization 
refers to the process by which a currency pegged to non-decimal denominations is modified so as 
to conform to the decimal system instead. Despite its historical contributions to the development 
of the decimal system, India came relatively late to decimalization, which by the mid 1950s 
played a key role in structuring international trade and other macro-level economic relations. 
Although khadi sahityakars writing in the mid 1940s had successfully resisted the imposition of 
decimalization, sahityakars writing in the mid 1950s and early 1960s confronted a changed 
landscape, one in which leading representatives of the Indian state considered the decimal system 
all but indispensable to Indian economic development. But karyakartas had spent the previous 
two decades struggling to make non-decimal systems intelligible to spinners and weavers; the 
introduction of the decimal system threatened to render much of their labor useless. This section 
examines karyakartas’ response to decimalization, in particular their attempts to embed the 
decimal system in local society. In doing so, it foregrounds the everyday work required to make 
a macro-level convention such as the decimal system function. Thus, here the decimal system is 
not so much an internationally recognized numerical system as an outgrowth of karyakartas’ 
conceptual and material labor. 
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Advocates of the decimalization of Indian currency had been lobbying since at least the 
second half of the nineteenth century to overhaul the Indian system of coinage. Their efforts 
picked up steam from 1930, when a group of economists, statisticians, and scientists—including 
the future mastermind of the Second Five Year Plan, Mahalanobis—constituted the Indian 
Decimal Society (IDS), an organization dedicated to the standardization and decimalization of 
Indian weights and measures. The Society proposed a draft decimal coinage bill in 1944, which 
the government introduced in the Central Legislative Assembly in slightly modified form in 
February 1946.58 Although up to that point, the basic unit of Indian currency, the rupee, could be 
subdivided as follows—1 rupee = 16 annas = 64 pice = 192 pies—the bill called for the ratio to 
be changed to 1 rupee = 100 paise. The rupee is pegged to the decimal system in the latter 
scenario but not in the former because the decimal system uses ten or a power of ten, such as 
100, as its base. The bill’s supporters championed decimalization on the following grounds: that 
it would encourage the expansion of trade and commerce while simultaneously reducing the 
mental labor required to perform mathematical calculations.59 And yet, much to their dismay, the 
legislation never came up for a vote. An IDS joint secretary subsequently blamed M. K. Gandhi 
for the bill’s failure, arguing that the latter had “issu[ed] practically a fatwa” against it!60  
The historical record offers little support for the joint secretary’s contention that Gandhi 
singlehandedly derailed the decimal coinage bill. However, it is true that Gandhi articulated 
strong objections to it. Writing in the pages of Harijan, his weekly journal, he called for the 
government to defer such a consequential decision until the legislature had passed entirely into 
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Indian hands. Moreover, he speculated that the poor would suffer at the hands of rapacious 
merchants in the transitional period when non-decimal coinage remained in circulation.61 Gandhi 
referred interested readers to the writings of K. G. Mashruwala, a close colleague since at least 
the time of the 1930 Salt March. Mashruwala had made an extensive study of the decimal 
system, the immediate implementation of which he too opposed. Mashruwala’s argument rested 
on two claims relevant to the current discussion: first, that the decimal system was not nearly as 
simple as its supporters claimed and, second, that the decimal system’s simplicity, to the extent it 
existed, applied mainly to written rather than oral calculations. In support of his first claim, he 
asserted that it is much easier to divide a unit into halves than into fifths or tenths.62 Here, he is in 
agreement with Kula, who has argued that a high capacity for “dichotomous division,” i.e. the 
division of a unit into two parts, has historically been the chief feature of enduring metrological 
systems. For instance, metrological systems that employed twelve, sixteen, or twenty as their 
base number were far more common in early modern Europe than those that employed ten for 
the simple reason that the former could be subdivided by two more times without resorting to 
fractions than the latter.63 Or, in Mashruwala’s words: “A child of seven would be able to divide 
a piece of string into 2, 4, 8 or even 16 equal parts with greater ease and without a measuring rod 
than an educated adult could divide it into 1/10th or 1/5th.” And in support of his second claim, he 
suggested that an uneducated and largely innumerate adult would have a difficult time handling 
the large numbers—“35 cents, 48 cents, 72 cents etc.”—favored by the decimal system. By 
contrast, an educated professional working with pen and paper would have little trouble 
grappling with such figures.64 And yet despite these and other arguments that the decimal 
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system’s abstractions could never provide the same ease of use as khadi mathematics, 
decimalization became a reality from April 1957. What did karyakartas, some of them 
indefatigable proponents of a simplified mathematics, do then? 
For starters, they embraced decimalization, perhaps none more so than Dwarkanath Lele, 
a high-ranking khadi official and self-proclaimed inventor of khadi mathematics, who published 
a text on the decimal system in 1961. In that text, Lele called for khadi institutions to set an 
example for the rest of the country by immediately—and completely—decimalizing. Indeed, he 
claimed to have made an intensive study of the subject, as a result of which he could state with 
confidence that Indian arithmetics had long been grounded in the decimal system, at least on a 
conceptual level.65 Lele’s argument was not implausible: much scholarship credits Indian 
mathematicians with developing a decimal-based numbering system as early as the start of the 
Common Era—albeit one that had largely fallen out of use by the twentieth century.66 More 
unexpected was his assertion that khadi institutions had already played a key role in 
reintroducing the decimal system to the country. They did so, Lele argues, at the instigation of 
M. K. Gandhi, who though he knew nothing about mathematics, intuited that 1,000 would make 
an ideal base number. At his insistence, the required would-be members to submit 2,000 (that is, 
1,000 x 2) gaz of yarn along with their membership applications in 1924.67 In addition, AISA, 
established at Gandhi’s insistence in 1925, briefly required its members to submit a donation of 
1,000 gaz of yarn each month.68 From this, Lele concludes that Gandhi had already made 1,000, 
and through it the decimal system, a basic unit for measuring length, weight, and even currency 
                                                 
65 Lele 1961, 2-3. 
66 In Lele’s view, the chaturthman paddhati, a mathematical system whose base unit could be divided into four 
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67 The gaz, as mentioned above, was a unit of measurement approximately equal in size to the yard.  In 1924, it 
would have been the standard unit for measuring the length of yarn. 
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in the khadi economy. Although Lele concedes that few individuals, including Gandhi, initially 
recognized the importance of this decision, he cites Kalidas’s invocation that “the meaning of 
what [great] men say becomes apparent only later.” Moreover, he terms Gandhi’s intuition a 
“paigam,” or message, comparable to that which Gandhi received in 1909 when traveling on a 
ship from England to South Africa. The result of that earlier paigam, of course, was Hind 
Swaraj, often regarded as Gandhi’s magnum opus.69 
We can read Lele’s argument about the khadi economy and its early embrace of 
decimalization in multiple ways—for instance, as an assertion of khadi’s modernity, originality, 
and/or rationality. But more important here is what Lele’s claim tells us about the strategies 
karyakartas employed to make the decimal system intelligible to the spinners and weavers with 
whom they worked. For karyakartas did not merely describe the decimal system’s formal 
properties to their constituents but instead attempted to embed that system in older systems of 
knowledge.  Doing so required two parallel moves:  first, a demonstration that on a purely 
material level, spinners could use the decimal system in the same way they had previously used 
non-decimal systems and, second, the development of conceptual resources to assist spinners in 
remembering the decimal system’s basic properties.   
Lele provides examples of both strategies, the first of which he attributes partly to the 
INC leader C. Rajagopalachari. In the mid to late 1920s when Rajagopalachari allegedly 
articulated this strategy, he was engaged in constructive work in Madras Presidency; he would 
subsequently become the chief minister of Madras state and the founder of the Swatantra Party.  
Rajagopalachari suggested that spinners would encounter fewer difficulties determining 
appropriate compensation for their labor if taught to recognize that the coins they carried in their 
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pockets had a standardized weight corresponding to certain fractions of the tola.70 For example, a 
one-rupee coin weighed approximately the same as one tola, an eight-anna coin weighed 
approximately the same as half a tola, and a four-anna coin weighed approximately the same as a 
quarter of a tola. As a result, instead of investing in weights of their own or even learning how to 
use those weights, spinners could memorize a handful of statements (for example, the weight of 
a one-rupee coin is equal to one tola) and apply them using instruments ostensibly ready-to-hand. 
Lele approved of this tactic and, in the wake of the adoption of the decimal system, 
recommended that spinners be acquainted with the weights of the new coins manufactured by the 
Bombay mint. As a spur to this effort, he published a conversion table listing the respective 
weights of one-paisa, two-paisa, five-paisa, ten-paisa, twenty-five-paisa, fifty-paisa, and one-
rupee coins.71 While in Rajagopalachari’s hands, conversion tables served as measuring aids, 
insofar as they made it possible for spinners to determine how many tolas of yarn they had 
produced even in the absence of weights, in Lele’s hands conversion tables also served as 
reminders that the new decimal coinage could be used in the same way as the old non-decimal 
coinage. That is, spinners would not need to learn an entirely new numeracy system if only 
karyakartas did the work of showing them that, for everyday purposes at least, the new coins 
functioned in much the same way as the old ones. 
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71 Lele 1961, 10-2. 
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Fig. 3.1 A set of scales with coins used as weights.72 
 
Furthermore, Lele and other karyakartas strove to introduce spinners to the new 
terminology associated with the decimal system. For instance, the paisa had replaced the anna 
and the meter the tar. In addition to showing spinners that they could materially engage with the 
new units in much the same way they had engaged the old ones, karyakartas also had to ensure 
that spinners had at least a working knowledge of the basic properties of the new. Partly as a 
result, Lele prepared a series of directive statements spinners could memorize and apply to their 
work instead of mastering the relatively complicated formulae used to determine yarn count and 
wages. While these statements had the primary effect of reducing the mathematical labor 
                                                 
72 Krishnadas Gandhi, Katai Ganit, Bhag 2: Sut ka Ank, 3rd ed. (Maganwadi: Akhil Bharat Sarv Seva Sangh, 1954), 
front cover. 
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spinners had to perform, they also reminded spinners of the decimal and non-decimal terms for 
the same object. For example, one statement read: “If the weight of one meter (that is, one tar) of 
yarn is equal to one gram, then the yarn count is also one.” Here, the reader learns that the 
decimal unit meter is roughly equivalent to that of the non-decimal unit tar. Or, alternatively, 
another statement proclaims that a decameter is approximately the same size as a pati. And, 
whether intentionally or not, Lele crafted these statements in such a way that they repeated many 
of the same phrases, thus establishing a rhyming pattern. Readers will not need to know Hindi in 
order to recognize the repetition embedded in the following statements: 
    Ek meter yani ek tar ka vazan 
 Yadi ek gram hai, to sut ka ank ek. 
 
    Ek decameter yani ek pati ka vazan  
 Yadi ek decagram hai, to sut ka ank ek. 
 
    Ek hectometer yani ek lati ka vazan 
 Yadi ek hectogram hai, to sut ka ank ek. 
 
    Ek kilometer yani ek gundi ka vazan 
         Yadi ek kilogram hai, to sut ka ank ek.73 
 
It seems reasonable to infer that such a high degree of repetition might well have served as a 
memory aid and thus of great practical use to largely illiterate spinners struggling to learn a new 
mathematical language. 
Although karyakartas did not “invent” the decimal system or initiate decimalization, they 
nevertheless played a crucial role in determining the shape decimalization would assume in post-
colonial India. This is because they, along with others who interacted with the masses on a daily 
basis, bore a disproportionate amount of responsibility for introducing the basic properties of the 
decimal system and modeling their use. But notably, karyakartas almost certainly took their 
                                                 
73 Ibid, 15-6. 
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pedagogical role more seriously than the small-time merchants and factory owners who also 
served as leading intermediaries between “ordinary” Indians and decimalization. As a result, the 
former set themselves the task of generating practical strategies to make the decimal system 
comprehensible, often drawing upon tactics they had previously employed for non-decimal 
denominations. In the process, then, they helped to build the decimal system from the ground-up, 
not impose it from the top-down. This was an important achievement since by the mid-twentieth 
century, the decimal system, and its concomitant the metric system, had achieved the status of a 
global behemoth with international treaties and organizations dedicated to regulating its use. But 
significantly, the decimal and metric systems did not take such a shape in the khadi economy but 
instead emerged as almost logical outgrowths of already existing metrological and pecuniary 
systems. That they could do so is a testament to the pioneering conceptual work executed by 
karyakartas. 
 
Khadi Textbooks 
If khadi mathematics represented one of the major innovations to emerge out of khadi 
sahitya in the late 1930s and early 1940s, khadi textbooks represented another. Referred to 
variously as pathya-pustakein and praveshikaen, the textbooks attempted to explain the khadi 
economy to two discrete audiences: schoolchildren and schoolteachers, on the one hand, and 
khadi karyakartas, on the other. While khadi sahityakars distinguished between the two 
audiences and produced slightly different textbooks for each, we can identify commonalities 
across textbooks, in particular, a commitment to the spread of knowledge of the khadi economy 
to a wider audience. After all, up to this point, most khadi sahitya had taken khadi officials, 
along with a relatively small group of spinners and weavers, as its chief addressees. 
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Nevertheless, khadi institutions began to assemble a formal educational infrastructure for the 
khadi project from the mid to late 1930s, one composed of training institutes for karyakartas and 
primary and secondary schools for children. Textbooks occupied a crucial position within that 
infrastructure as one of the primary media for educating Indians about the khadi economy. 
Although formally similar to some of the textbooks employed at technical and non-technical 
schools, khadi textbooks departed from standard practice in their insistence that students access 
macroeconomic thought through microeconomic activity. That is, they viewed engagement with 
productive technologies as the best avenue for generating conceptual knowledge about the 
economy. Moreover, they encouraged students to produce this knowledge for themselves, all the 
while cautioning them that the micro should never be completely absorbed into the macro.   
This section examines the content and structure of the textbooks produced by khadi 
sahityakars with an eye toward interrogating the relationship they presupposed between the 
microeconomic and the macroeconomic. As discussed in Chapter One, AISA committed itself in 
1940 to establishing at least one khadi vidyalay, or school, in each of the provinces.74 These 
schools would provide incoming karyakartas with the training they required to perform their 
work while also offering refresher courses to already serving karyakartas. AISA’s education 
committee developed six different courses for incoming karyakartas along with a syllabus and 
exam to go along with them. It also prepared a curriculum for traveling residential camps that 
would provide refresher courses of one to two months for karyakartas located at a great distance 
from khadi vidyalays.75 As AISA developed new iterations of its training programs throughout 
the 1940s and 1950s, it commissioned additional textbooks while continuing to utilize the old 
ones. Moreover, it sporadically instructed its officials to prepare textbooks for schoolchildren 
                                                 
74 Akhil Bharat Charkha Sangh, Varshik Vivaran: 1940 (Wardha: Akhil Bharat Charkha Sangh, 1941), 8. 
75 Akhil Bharat Charkha Sangh, Varshik Vivaran: 1941-42 (Wardha: Akhil Bharat Charkha Sangh, 1942), 14-7. 
 121 
 
studying at national and municipal schools, textbooks that bore a striking resemblance to those 
prepared for karyakartas. Both sets of textbooks provide a unique perspective on what khadi 
sahityakars determined to be the most significant features of the khadi economy. This section 
investigates one of those features: the privileged position assigned to the microeconomic as a 
route to the macroeconomic. 
Maganlal Gandhi and Richard Gregg’s Takli Shikshak makes an ideal starting point for 
this discussion insofar as it exhibits many of the features common to khadi textbooks.76 
Published in 1926, a full decade before the start of the period under consideration, Takli Shikshak 
nonetheless served as a model of sorts for many of the textbooks that followed. In particular, it 
introduced an organizational strategy that subsequent textbooks would imitate: it placed 
productive technologies and processes (and not the history or organization of the khadi program) 
at its center. That is, with few exceptions, Takli Shikshak and other khadi textbooks did not 
explicitly discuss the origins and development of the khadi program. They did not discuss the 
principles presumed to animate that program either. They did not even discuss the myriad 
activities undertaken by khadi institutions. Instead, they focused almost exclusively on detailing 
the appearance, construction, operation, and repair of productive technologies such as the takli 
and the ambar charkha. This strategy had enormous implications for readers’ understanding of 
the khadi economy. 
Allow me to elaborate.  Gandhi and Gregg intended their textbook for the use of students 
studying at primary and secondary schools, some of them operated by municipal governments.77 
Although jointly addressed to schoolchildren and schoolteachers, Takli Shikshak would have 
been more useful to the latter in that it offered them advice on how to instruct children in the use 
                                                 
76 Maganlal K. Gandhi and Richard B. Gregg, Takli Shikshak (Sabarmati: Shikshan Vibhag, Charkha Sangh, 1926). 
77 Maganlal K. Gandhi and Gregg 1926, 5. 
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of the takli, a small spindle that for centuries had accomplished the work of spinning without the 
need for a full-fledged spinning wheel. As such, it contained chapters on the manufacture of 
taklis, exercises to be performed on the takli, and the concrete benefits to be gained from each 
exercise. The authors explained their decision to write a textbook on the takli as a largely 
practical one born of their conviction that the takli made an excellent pedagogical tool. For 
instance, in contrast to the charkha, which they characterized as large, bulky, and expensive, the 
takli was light, inexpensive, and easily transportable. Moreover, it made little noise, required no 
special repairs, and was so captivating as to hold the attention of even the most unruly 
schoolchild.78 And, as the authors repeatedly noted, the takli could be worked on almost any 
occasion—while walking, while standing, while sitting, while talking with friends, while 
attending public gatherings, while riding in an ox cart or on a train. The sick and elderly could 
even ply the takli while convalescing in a hospital, a point not especially relevant to 
schoolchildren but one the authors found worth highlighting nonetheless.79 In short, the takli 
made an ideal subject for a khadi textbook partly because its advocates perceived it to be an 
unusually simple instrument. 
But more importantly, Gandhi and Gregg argued, regular practice with the takli would 
help students to develop a variety of skills or capacities (gun) and conceptual orientations 
(vichar) that extended far beyond the takli itself. For example, students who worked the takli for 
at least a short time everyday would learn patience and national feeling while acquiring an 
understanding of the importance of cooperation and disciplined use of one’s time. Moreover, 
they would experience the satisfaction that comes from performing manual labor and 
contributing to the wellbeing of the nation. Such lessons, the authors stressed, would be of value 
                                                 
78 Maganlal K. Gandhi and Gregg 1926, 55-6. 
79 Ibid, 4 and 57. 
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to all students regardless of whether they chose to pursue a career as a doctor, painter, engineer, 
or sculptor.80 In other words, the utility of the takli lay not only in its conventional function as an 
instrument for spinning yarn but also in its interconnections with other fields of knowledge. 
Thus, Takli Shikshak and other textbooks like it would educate students in far more than the 
mechanics of spinning. 
Subsequent khadi textbooks made similar arguments about the relationship between the 
productive process or technology that constituted the formal subject of their work and the larger 
set of concerns to which that subject was related. For instance, Vinoba Bhave’s Mul Udyog 
(1938) asserted that instruction in the takli would develop students’ sensory powers; provide 
them with physical exercise; introduce them to basic mathematics; and offer them the 
opportunity to practice various conceptual tasks, such as the sorting and ranking of material 
objects.81 In addition, Kunder Balwant Diwan’s Takli (1955) suggested that regular takli use 
would acquaint students with some of the concepts central to the mechanical sciences, including 
gyration and the law of inertia.82 Finally, B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya’s I Too Have Spun (1946) 
listed the mathematical operations (among them multiplication, division, and square roots) 
individuals would learn through spinning while also characterizing spinning as an activity 
capable of cultivating artistry in its practitioners.83 Therefore, when Bhave, Diwan, Sitaramayya, 
and others placed productive technologies at the center of their textbooks, they did not do so with 
the intention of preparing mere technical manuals. Instead, they viewed those productive 
                                                 
80 Ibid, 53. 
81 Bhave, 4-6; 45-8; and 56.  
82 Kunder Balwant Diwan, Takli (Sevagram: Hindustani Talimi Sangh, 1955), 169-72. 
83 B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, I Too Have Spun: Being a Collection of Notes on Spinning (Bombay: Hind Kitabs 
Limited, 1946), 68-71 and 42-3. 
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technologies as introductions to—even invitations to engage with—a larger field of 
macroeconomic knowledge. 
The textbooks produced by khadi sahityakars had much in common with those produced 
for buniyadi talim, or basic education, schools in the middle decades of the twentieth century. 
Buniyadi talim, or nai talim (new education) as it was sometimes called, referred to an 
educational program introduced by Bhave, M. K. Gandhi, and others in the late 1930s. The 
promulgation of the Government of India Act of 1935, which devolved some powers—including 
charge of the education portfolio—from the central to the provincial governments, inspired 
renewed interest in educational policy among a broad cross-section of Indians. In 1937 when 
popularly elected governments came to power in the provinces, Gandhi wrote several articles 
outlining his vision of what a national education system might look like. At the heart of that 
vision lay a commitment to placing manual or productive labor at the center of the educational 
process. But in contrast to technical schools, which sought to indoctrinate students into a 
particular craft or industry, buniyadi talim schools would not distinguish between technical and 
conceptual knowledge, or rather they would accord equal weight to each.84 That is, while 
buniyadi talim students would spend hours every day learning to spin a charkha or work a 
handloom, they would do so not only in an effort to become proficient spinners or weavers but 
also so that they could gain access to all the other fields of knowledge to which the charkha and 
the handloom were connected.   
Proponents of buniyadi talim did not immediately specify the content of these other fields 
of knowledge but instead busied themselves with establishing an institutional structure for their 
project. At their urging, the INC made buniyadi talim the centerpiece of its national education 
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program in March 1938 and helped to establish the Hindustani Talimi Sangh, the organization 
charged with overseeing the administration of buniyadi talim, one month later. Buniyadi talim 
has received relatively little attention in the historiographical literature, probably because it never 
counted more than a small minority of Indian schoolchildren among its pupils. However, khadi 
institutions maintained a close relationship to buniyadi talim schools, preparing textbooks for 
some of them and housing others on their property. Moreover, AISA encouraged its karyakartas 
to educate their children at buniyadi talim schools, providing monthly educational stipends to 
those who did so.85 Perhaps partly for these reasons, khadi textbooks shared much of the 
buniyadi talim ethos, in particular the conviction that productive labor offered the best inroads 
into more conceptual fields of knowledge.   
Khadi textbooks thus had the effect of encouraging readers to approach the khadi 
economy not primarily through the mediation of formal rules and principles but through 
sustained bodily labor. Such labor, or so they suggested, was both an end and a pathway to 
something more: the larger world of the macroeconomy. By contrast, textbooks produced by 
Dube and other proponents of a popular Hindi-language economics literature took a very 
different approach. Take the 1940 textbook on village economics co-authored by Dube and his 
colleague Shankarsahay Saxena as an example. Intended for the use of high school students, the 
book begins with a discussion of the importance of the study of economics followed by an 
overview of economics’ various subfields. Subsequent chapters seek to explicate key concepts, 
such as wealth, utility, value, and price, while still others investigate the relationship between 
land, labor, and capital, or the operation of the market.86 Like other “popular” economists, Dube 
                                                 
85 This policy was put in place by at least 1944. Budget Samiti meeting, 9-12.12.1947, All India Spinners 
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86 Gramya Arthashastra (Yuktprant ke Highschool aur Intermediate Board ki Highschool Pariksha ke Gramya 
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and Saxena take pains to make their arguments intelligible to students, often through the use of 
“real-life” examples and the provision of study questions. For example, they ask students to 
conduct investigations of the socioeconomic conditions prevailing in their village and to keep 
track of their family’s monthly budget. But crucially, they permit students to complete these 
exercises only after familiarizing them with the conceptual framework that “ought to” determine 
their answers. Such an approach allows students to explore and build upon the conceptual 
knowledge they have been given but not to produce it for themselves. At least it does not do so in 
the fashion of khadi textbooks, which demanded that readers make their own conceptual 
knowledge through their interactions with taklis, charkhas, and other productive instruments. 
And although khadi sahityakars had some expectation of the type of knowledge readers would 
produce, they nevertheless entrusted the latter with a large measure of freedom. 
Still, we would be remiss to assume that khadi textbooks privileged macroeconomic 
understandings of the economy even as they suggested that karyakartas and schoolchildren alike 
could best access the macro through the micro. On the contrary, they repeatedly alert us to the 
importance of micro-level experiences of economic life. Nowhere is this more evident than in 
textbooks’ treatment of pleasure, a term rarely if ever associated with the khadi economy, which 
in the popular imagination at least more often signifies sacrifice, discipline, and tedious, 
repetitive labor. However, in the opinion of some khadi sahityakars, the khadi economy 
constituted an arena in which participants could expect to encounter enjoyment and recreation. 
That is, spinners and other participants in the khadi economy would, ideally speaking, derive not 
only material benefits from their labor but also excitement. Moreover, they would generate 
sensual gratification for themselves alongside new wealth for the nation.   
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We find the clearest expression of this sentiment in Sitaramayya’s 1946 work, which 
doubles as a textbook and an autobiography of one individual’s experiences with the charkha. At 
the beginning of his text, Sitaramayya commends the charkha to his readers as “the panacea for a 
hundred ills, the elixir of life and the philosopher’s stone” before settling in to a slightly more 
sober discussion of the charkha’s construction and operation.87 Nevertheless, he intersperses his 
lessons on the tensile strength of yarn and the ratio of the revolutions of a charkha’s wheels with 
admonitions to approach the charkha as an instrument capable of producing almost 
immeasurable pleasure in its users. For instance, he punctuates a discussion of slivers, the long 
bundle of plant fibers that spinners turn into yarn, with the following declaration: “There is no 
greater pleasure in spinning than working with really good slivers. Spinning then becomes an 
attractive and engrossing pastime, a veritable intoxication. Under favourable conditions, it may 
soon develop into an irresistible mania, like novel reading or cards!”88 In addition, he advises his 
readers to amuse themselves by attempting to shape the yarn they have spun into elaborate 
patterns.89 And, finally, he urges spinners to ply the charkha even in what might initially appear 
unpleasant circumstances. For example, the third-class compartment of a train, though poorly 
maintained and overcrowded, might nevertheless prove a thrilling environment for a spinner: 
What a pleasure spinning can be with a large number of curious people looking on! They 
eagerly make room for you, extend a hundred little courtesies. You, on your part, 
reciprocate by carrying on a friendly conversation. The spectators, caught up by the 
soothing hum of the wheel and the magic of rhythmic production, ask questions; they 
want to know how it is done—and what is more, the whole background of hand-spinning 
and its present revival in India.90 
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In Sitaramayya’s hands, then, spinning becomes an invitation to play, and the khadi economy 
promises a range of delights to those willing to enroll themselves in it. 
Other khadi sahityakars also emphasized the indispensability of pleasure, albeit in more 
measured tones than those employed by Sitaramayya. For example, Bhave’s Mul Udyog 
encourages schoolteachers to provide instruction in the takli rather than the charkha on the 
grounds that the former will afford schoolchildren greater freedom or personal agency 
(kartritva). While schoolchildren require some measure of freedom for purely instrumentalist 
reasons—a teacher cannot attend to all his/her students at once—personal agency matters for 
non-instrumentalist reasons as well. For, as Bhave argues, a student derives little excitement or 
pleasure from spinning if she must appeal repeatedly to the teacher for guidance. Instead, she 
should be encouraged to remain as free as possible to experience all the joy spinning can bring.91 
Here again we encounter pleasure not as incidental to the khadi economy but as central to it. 
Note that the authors of these textbooks do not attempt to justify their invocation of 
pleasure with reference to economic utility. They do not suggest that pleasure inspires greater 
productivity or makes spinners more committed to their work. Nor do they suggest that pleasure 
is necessarily generative of conceptual knowledge. On the contrary, they seem to imply that 
enjoyment, even excitement, is an end in itself, a good to be treated on par with bundles of yarn 
and handfuls of rupees. Thus, from the perspective of khadi sahityakars, at least, spinning is an 
activity that holds the macro and the micro together: even as it provides opportunities for 
spinners to acquire conceptual knowledge of the economy it also, and equally importantly, 
suffuses them with joy. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter examines the relationship between pedagogical writing, labor, and 
knowledge production in the khadi economy. It did so through an investigation of a range of 
projects designed to help the rural poor in overcoming their innumeracy. A lack of familiarity 
with mathematical concepts and methods (and, in some instances, an inability to count beyond a 
certain number), innumeracy negatively impacted villagers’ lives in ways that illiteracy and other 
more familiar problems did not. While standard accounts of Gandhian constructive work portray 
it as primarily disciplining in its thrust, I move away from a focus on pedagogy as a disciplining 
project to a consideration of how pedagogical encounters transpired in practice. In doing so, I 
argue that the main aim of khadi organizations’ pedagogical initiatives was not primarily, as 
some have suggested, to discipline the rural poor, but rather to create the conditions under which 
the rural poor could gain control over their own material and conceptual labor. In doing so, I 
show that the economic actor valorized by khadi organizations was not simply a morally upright 
individual committed to bread labor but also an intellectually curious one who approached 
physical labor as a gateway to other forms of knowledge. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
Spinning Employment 
One morning in March 1920, several self-styled inventors entered the grounds of 
Sabarmati Ashram to present their creations in front of a panel of judges. Founded by M. K. 
Gandhi shortly after his return from South Africa in 1915, Sabarmati Ashram was the site of his 
earliest experiments with khadi and the initial headquarters of the khadi movement. On that 
spring morning, khadi production was still in its infancy. Ashram residents had only just begun 
to spin their own yarn, much of it of such poor quality that weavers struggled to turn it into cloth. 
Although delighted that khadi production was finally underway, Gandhi worried that without a 
technological revolution, the charkha, or spinning wheel, might never find a permanent home 
outside the ashram. That was why he had persuaded his friend Revashankar Jagjivan Jhaveri to 
offer a Rs. 5,000 prize for the invention of a “better” charkha and why he had asked the ashram’s 
manager Maganlal Gandhi to assemble a panel of experts to adjudicate the competition. At a 
time when the average per capita income was only about Rs. 50, Rs. 5,000 constituted a princely 
sum. The judges ruled that none of the contestants had submitted a charkha worthy of such a 
substantial prize, however, and advised the organizers to hold a new competition in six months.1 
That competition also failed to produce a winner, as did the next one and the next one until 
finally, in 1949, khadi organizations awarded the prize to a twenty-nine-year-old technology 
enthusiast from Madras State. M. K. Gandhi was not around to witness the contest’s conclusion, 
                                                 
1 “The Spinning Wheel Competition,” Young India (13 Oct. 1920), 2-3. 
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having been felled by an assassin’s bullet a year earlier. As a result, it fell upon his colleagues to 
introduce the prize-winning charkha to the public and persuade them that, when worked in 
sufficient numbers, it would help revitalize an Indian economy ravaged by two centuries of 
colonial rule.2   
Gandhi and his colleagues were not alone in their assessment that technology had a 
critical role to play in placing the Indian economy on a stronger footing. In the decades leading 
up to independence in 1947, Indian politicians, economists, and scientists of diverse ideological 
persuasions agreed that economic development could not proceed in the absence of an overhaul 
of India’s impoverished technological infrastructure. This consensus broke down over the 
question of what such an overhaul should look like, however, whether it should be grounded in 
the adoption of large-scale, capital-intensive technologies or small-scale, labor-intensive ones. 
While these two approaches were not inherently in conflict with one another (proponents of 
capital-intensive technologies sometimes conceded the need for labor-intensive technologies in 
certain sectors of the Indian economy), the balance of elite opinion tipped firmly in the direction 
of the former. Gandhi and his colleagues, by contrast, favored the development of small-scale, 
labor-intensive technologies that although ill-suited to mass production, might nevertheless 
provide a secure livelihood to the masses. In articulating this opinion and pushing to have it 
incorporated into India’s development agenda, they encountered strong opposition from many of 
their co-nationals, some of whom labeled them arch-traditionalists or even enemies of scientific 
progress. 
This chapter traces the rise and fall of the khadi economy through the framework of 
technological development. The narrative thread is an account of a competition to develop a 
                                                 
2 The term “silent revolutionary” may have been used to refer to the prize-winning charkha for the first time in 
Vijayadev, Ambar Charkha:  The Silent Revolutionary (Khadi and Village Industries Commission, 1957), 44. 
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better spinning wheel that attracted contestants from across India and the world. Initiated by 
Gandhi in 1919, it did not conclude until after his death in 1948. The winner, referred to as the 
ambar charkha, became the focus of efforts to transform khadi work from a part-time to a full-
time occupation and women into industrial producers. These efforts made the ambar charkha 
appealing to an audience that extended beyond rank-and-file Gandhians. Members of the Indian 
planning establishment viewed the ambar charkha as a technology potentially capable of 
providing full-time employment at little cost to the state. By moving away from well-trodden 
debates about whether Gandhi was pro- or anti-technology and toward a consideration of how his 
unique perspective on technology operated in practice, I show how changes in the charkha’s 
material qualities opened new possibilities while foreclosing others. Ultimately, I argue that 
khadi organizations’ greatest triumph—the unveiling of the ambar charkha—was simultaneously 
the occasion for their decline. 
 
The upright charkha 
The story of Gandhi’s search for a spinning wheel has assumed near mythical status, 
thanks in no small part to his narrativization of it in his 1929 autobiography. Gandhi’s account 
begins in London in the late summer or fall of 1909. He had traveled there as the head of a 
delegation of South African Indians come to protest their discriminatory treatment at the hands 
of the South African government. London was home to a large community of diaspora Indians at 
the time and so, in between meetings with government officials and newspaper editors, Gandhi 
sat down with his fellow expatriates to discuss the future of the Indian nation. As he later 
recalled, “We had many long conversations about the condition of India and I saw as in a flash 
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that without the spinning-wheel there was no swaraj. I knew at once that everyone had to spin.”3 
But, as he confessed subsequently, he had never seen a spinning wheel before he had that vision 
and, for a time, believed he had seen a handloom instead.  
Gandhi’s confusion over what distinguished a spinning wheel from a handloom did not 
bode well for his prospects of ever laying eyes on one. Upon returning to India from South 
Africa in 1915, he began to question his visitors about the spinning wheel, asking them to locate 
one and bring it back to him. This approach bore little fruit, however, since the charkha had been 
rendered all but extinct several decades before and very few people were still familiar with its 
use. Finally, in 1917, a Gujarati woman named Gangabehn Majumdar approached Gandhi and 
offered to conduct “an earnest and incessant search” for a charkha on his behalf. Gandhi 
accepted immediately, concluding that the art of spinning “being confined to women and having 
been all but exterminated, if there was some stray spinner still surviving in some obscure corner, 
only a member of that sex was likely to find out her whereabouts.” As luck would have it, 
Majumdar accomplished the seemingly impossible. After months of roaming around rural 
Gujarat, she stumbled upon a long-discarded charkha and returned with it to Gandhi’s home in 
Ahmedabad. Gandhi could barely contain his excitement at her discovery. Although away in 
Bombay at the time convalescing from an illness, he wrote almost daily letters to his friends and 
colleagues requesting updates on their progress with the charkha. Moreover, he asked two of his 
sickroom attendants to learn spinning and credited their practice sessions with helping restore 
him to health. When he finally returned to the ashram, he began plying the charkha himself.4 
                                                 
3 Gandhi, CWMG 37, 288. 
4 M. K. Gandhi, An Autobiography:  Or the Story of My Experiments with Truth, Trans. Mahadev Desai 
(Ahmedabad:  Navajivan Publishing House, 2006), 450-53. 
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Made of wood and dominated by the vertical wheel from which it took its name, the 
upright charkha was the first spinning wheel to be adopted by the khadi movement. It was also 
the immediate impetus for the spinning wheel competition and the most widely recognized 
emblem of the khadi economy. In a chapter in his autobiography titled “Found at Last!,” Gandhi 
described the excitement he felt at laying eyes on the upright charkha for the first time. Once 
ubiquitous in India, it had been almost uniformly discarded by the rural masses in the second half 
of the nineteenth century in the face of competition from millspun yarn.5 Though Gandhi 
recommended the upright charkha to others and began to ply it himself, he simultaneously 
charged the ashram staff with “improving” it, that is, of making it better suited to its primary task 
of supplying much-needed work to the rural unemployed and underemployed.6 AISA’s 
Technical Department, led by the self-taught technologist, Maganlal Gandhi, initially 
spearheaded this effort but increasingly secured the assistance of a vast network of private 
citizens and organizations through the medium of the contest. While Gandhi’s own experiments 
helped him identify some of the upright charkha’s shortcomings, he also sanctioned additional 
charkha censuses, conducted surveys, and ordered khadi-producing institutions to submit yarn 
and cloth samples for inspection in an effort to gather additional information.7 The survey and 
inspection results quickly confirmed his worst fears: khadi would never find a substantial market 
nor the khadi economy a substantial workforce in the absence of a major overhaul of the upright 
charkha.    
                                                 
5 Ibid, 450-2. 
6 Ibid, 456.   
7 For an account of one such census, see A Khadi Tour:  Concerning Some Information Gathered in the First Months 
of 1924 (Information Bureau, All India Khadi Department, 1924).  For a sample survey, see All India Khadi 
Information Bureau, Khadi Bulletins (Sabarmati:  Khadi Information Bureau, 1923), 96-8.  And for the initial order 
instructing all khadi organizations to submit yarn and khadi samples to AISA’s Technical Department, see Board of 
Trustees meeting, December 12, 1926, All India Spinners Association Papers (hereafter cited as AISA Papers), 
Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (hereafter cited as NMML).   
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The upright charkha’s defects made it especially ill-equipped to serve as the centerpiece 
of a household economy. For starters, it produced only small quantities of yarn, often as little as 
one to two hanks (or approximately 1,000-2,000 meters) per eight-hour workday. This was partly 
because it utilized only a single spindle instead of the multiple spindles favored by textile mills 
but also because it contained no mechanism for spinning and winding yarn simultaneously, 
forcing spinners to pause frequently to collect and twist newly spun yarn. To make matters 
worse, handspinning was poorly compensated; in the early 1920s, an individual who spun for 
eight hours a day at the average speed could expect to earn a daily income of only three to four 
paise. At a time when the average daily income was about seven paise, such a sum would prove 
attractive only to those with no other source of work.8 An essay published in 1926 hypothesized 
that handspinners would never earn more than two to three annas per day on the upright charkha; 
by contrast, the government’s average daily famine wage was less than two annas.9 And, finally, 
the very weavers paid to turn yarn into khadi expressed a strong aversion to handspun yarn, 
which, unlike the thread manufactured in textile factories, broke repeatedly upon use.10 Although 
khadi officials did not hold the upright charkha entirely responsible for this state of affairs, 
noting on multiple occasions that prior generations of handspinners had used it to produce 
infinitely superior thread, they nonetheless suggested that it did not do enough to transform 
unskilled spinners into technically adept ones.11 So long as spinners continued producing low-
                                                 
8 Dhirendra Majumdar, Bapu ki Khadi (Sevagram:  Akhil Bharat Charkha Sangh, 1950), 8-9.  There are twelve ? in 
an anna and sixteen annas in a rupee. 
9 S. V. Puntambekar and N. S. Varadachari, Hand-Spinning and Hand-Weaving:  An Essay (Ahmedabad:  All India 
Spinners’ Association, 1926), 129. 
10 Akhil Bharatvarshiya Charkha Sangh, Salana Report, 1925-26 (Ahmedabad:  Akhil Bhartavarshiya Charkha 
Sangh, 1926), 13-5.  Also see, Satis Chandra Das Gupta, Khadi Manual, Vol. I (Parts 1-3) (Calcutta:  Khadi 
Pratisthan, 1924), 32. 
11 This claim is a bit ironic given that M. K. Gandhi and others initially recommended the upright charkha on the 
grounds that it was relatively easy to operate and thus accessible to the elderly, infirm, and “ignorant” alike.  See 
Gandhi’s 1926 Young India article cited in All India Spinners’ Association, Khadi Guide: 1927 (Ahmedabad:  The 
All India Spinners’ Association, 1927), 5. 
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quality thread, khadi institutions would have to pay weavers two-to-three times the market rate, 
leaving little money over for anything else.12   
Khadi officials cited these and other limitations when they publicly acknowledged that 
handspinning could never be anything but a supplementary occupation practiced in the evenings 
and agricultural off-season by those in need of an additional source of income.  Irritated at the 
repeated charge that it aspired to displace the textile industry, AISA began its 1927 annual report 
with the following disclaimer: 
It is necessary at the outset to remove one misapprehension which again and again crops 
up in the arguments used against the Charkha.  Spinning is not put forward as the sole 
occupation for any class of people; it is not intended that it should compete with, or 
displace, any existing type of industry.  There is therefore no meaning in comparing the 
earnings out of spinning [to] other whole-time occupations and declaring them to be too 
meager.  The sole claim urged in its [khadi’s] favour is that it is the only immediately 
practicable supplementary occupation that can be offered to the vast mass of the 
population that is starving or half-fed in consequence of abject poverty and enforced 
idleness for nearly half the year.13 
 
In fact, claimed the authors of an essay awarded a Rs. 1,000 prize in 1926 by a committee 
comprised of M. K. Gandhi, Maganlal Gandhi, Shankarlal Banker, and Ambalal Sarabhai, 
handspinning had always been a part-time occupation and during the “Vedic period” even 
“operated like a kind of poor law.” Kautilya’s Arthashastra, they continued, had instructed 
government officials “to give spinning as work for the absolutely poor and destitute such as 
cripples, poor women who did not stir out of their homes, girls obliged to work for their 
subsistence and the like.”14 The “progressive pauperisation” of the Indian population under the 
British had produced a new class of destitutes: the landless and land-poor agriculturists who 
                                                 
12 Akhil Bharatvarshiya Charkh Sangh, Salana Report, 1925-26 (Ahmedabad:  Akhil Bharatvarshiya Charkha 
Sangh, 1926), 15. 
13 Khadi Guide, 1927, 1.  The Khadi Guide, 1927 estimated that handspinning could augment the average per capita 
income of Rs. 50 by as much as Rs. 24 per year (7). 
14 Puntambekar and Varadachari 1926, 12. 
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struggled to eat even once a day.15 Until such time as more remunerative employment became 
available to them, the upright charkha might at least keep them alive.   
In the short term, then, it made sense to make the upright charkha the centerpiece of the 
khadi program. Besides the fact that it was relatively inexpensive and easy to operate, “charkha 
surveys” carried out between May and August of 1922 suggested that there were a surprising 
number of upright charkhas already in operation. A survey of the eastern Indian state of Bihar, 
for example, counted a total of 220,000 upright charkhas, 200,000 of which were currently in 
use.16 A similar survey of Tamil Nadu turned up only 25,000 working upright charkhas, while a 
survey of the United Provinces (UP) turned up an astounding 300,000.17 While these figures 
seem suspiciously high given what we know about the near total collapse of the spinning 
industry in the late nineteenth century, they nonetheless provided khadi organizations a reason 
for optimism.    
 
The Competition Begins 
The competition to invent a better charkha began with an announcement in the October 5, 
1919 edition of Gandhi’s Gujarati-language newspaper Navajivan. Short and to-the-point, the 
announcement proclaimed that the Gujarati diamond merchant Revashankar Jagjivan Jhaveri had 
offered a Rs. 5,000 prize for the invention of a portable spinning wheel built from indigenous 
components that could turn as many as ten spindles at a time. Interested parties should submit 
their model to Satyagraha Ashram in Ahmedabad by January 1, 1920 for inspection by a panel of 
                                                 
15 Ibid, 133-9. 
16 Khaddar Work in India (Bombay: All-India Congress Khaddar Department, 1922), 70. 
17 Ibid, 92 and 95. 
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expert judges.18 A handful of Indians responded to this announcement, hurriedly preparing a 
draft model and traveling to Ahmedabad at their own expense to present it to the judges. In what 
would become a recurring pattern, the judges rejected each of the entries for failing to meet all 
the competition’s conditions. Jhaveri and the other organizers did not lose faith in the 
competition format, however, scheduling another one for October 1, 1920.19 
The second competition began with a series of introductions. While two of the 
contestants, Mr. Muljibhai Laloobhai and Mr. Raruchandra K. Sirdesai, had participated in the 
previous competition and thus were well-known to the organizers, the other four were submitting 
entries for the first time. Unlike Laloobhai and Sirdesai, who were native Gujaratis, the new 
contestants hailed from all over India. They included: Mr. Nathumal, a drawing teacher from 
Sialkot in northwestern India; Professor D. C. Malik, a university instructor from Calcutta in 
eastern India; Mr. Margod of Gorakhpur in northern India; and Mr. Kale of Dharwar in southern 
India. The judges were Maganlal Gandhi, M. K. Gandhi’s nephew and the manager of 
Satyagraha Ashram; Harilal Dalsukhram, a so-called spinning master; Gokuldas Mangjibhai 
Patel, an engineer from the New Mauekchowk Mills; and Anubhai M. Mehta, the manager of the 
Harivalabh Mueband Mills.20 
A summary of the contest prepared by the ashram’s manager Maganlal Gandhi indicates 
that the judges rejected four of the entries out of hand before pausing to consider the remainder 
in greater detail. One, a three-part spinning wheel submitted by a Mr. Margod of Gorak, 
produced three seers of yarn in three hours, a quantity termed adequate by the judges. However, 
because many of its parts were made of “foreign materials” and it could be transported only with 
                                                 
18 “Notes,” Navajivan Oct. 5, 1919, CWMG Vol. 16, 317-8. A subsequent announcement moved the competition 
date back to March 1, 1920. 
19 “The Spinning Wheel Competition,” Young India (13 Oct. 1920), 2-3.   
20 Ibid. 
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great difficulty, it, too, was rejected. The final charkha, a ten-spindle model invented by a Mr. 
Kale of Dharwar, received more favorable reviews. Though the judges did not award it a prize, 
they decided to retain it for further testing in the hopes that the staff of Satyagraha Ashram could 
improve upon it. Notably, Kale’s charkha produced far less yarn than Margod’s—only 1.5 seers 
in eight hours—suggesting that standard measures of productivity alone do not explain what 
made the former better, or at least more promising, than the latter.21   
Nevertheless, what does emerge clearly from the October 1920 competition is the extent 
to which contestants and judges alike believed that textile mills could serve as a model for the 
development of a better charkha. Perhaps most tellingly, two of the contestants submitted what 
were essentially imitations of technologies already in use in mills.  One, a professor from Hindu 
University, had prepared an imitation jute mill spindle, while the other, a drawing teacher from 
Sialkot, had duplicated a mechanism employed by mills to wind yarn. Though the panel of 
judges rejected both entries, it did so not because of any inherent opposition to mill technologies 
but because the spinning wheels inspired by those technologies were “incomplete” or “left much 
to be improved.” In fact, two of the judges were themselves employed by textile mills, one as a 
manager, the other as an engineer. Perhaps for this reason, they drew upon their knowledge of 
the textile mill and its functioning when evaluating the (hand-powered) spinning wheels placed 
before them. For example, they described Margod’s three-part charkha—presumably three 
discrete pieces of machinery that together performed the work of spinning and two of its 
preparatory processes—as a “miniature mill-machine in a hut.”22 Though in hindsight it might 
seem obvious that a spinning wheel such as Margod’s that employed three pieces of machinery 
to perform three specialized tasks would appear to the judges as similar in important respects to 
                                                 
21 “The Spinning Wheel Competition,” Young India (18 Oct. 1920), 2-3. 
22 “Spinning Wheel Competition,” 2-3. 
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the highly specialized technologies of the textile mill, this was by no means a foregone 
conclusion. The khadi movement, which had created the demand for such competitions in the 
first place, was predicated on the notion that there was a fundamental distinction between hand- 
and machine-powered technologies, a distinction that carried over to the products of those 
technologies as well. Indeed, on a very real level, the mills constituted the foil against which the 
khadi movement and its handspinners were juxtaposed. On another level, however, the mills 
functioned as something else:  a source of ideas about what a better charkha could look like as 
well as a vocabulary with which to describe what better meant. When the ambar charkha 
emerged almost three decades later, it, too, assumed a tripartite shape, a shape described with no 
small measure of approval as like that of a “miniature spinning mill.”23    
The second competition also failed to produce a winner, as did the next one and the next 
one for many years running. Jauhari raised the prize amount to Rs. 1 lakh (Rs. 100,000) in 1929, 
after which entries began to pour in not only from all over India but from many foreign countries 
as well. The panel of judges rejected entries from Turkey, Japan, Spain, and Germany, some of 
them submitted by engineers with previous experience in textile mills.24 Another contestant was 
Maurice Freydman, a Polish engineer previously in the employ of Mysore State who moved to 
M. K. Gandhi’s Sevagram Ashram at some point in the 1930s. After Maganlal Gandhi’s death in 
1928, Freydman, who also used the name Bharatanand, served as one of the khadi economy’s 
chief technicians and contest organizers.25  His crowning invention, the dhanush takua, never 
won the competition, probably because, although it performed the function of spinning, it was 
not, strictly speaking, a spinning wheel. It nevertheless earned a strong endorsement from M. K. 
                                                 
23 Sevak, 15-7. 
24 Vijayadev, Ambar Charkha:  The Silent Revolutionary (Khadi and Village Industries Commission, 1957), 17. 
25 Krishnadas Gandhi, “Dhanush Takli,” Maharashtra Khadi Patrika (Aug. 1940) in Keshav Deodhar, Dhanush 
Takua (Sevagram:  Khadi Vidyalay, 1944), 4-5. 
 141 
 
Gandhi, who in 1942, called upon khadi organizations to cease manufacturing new charkhas and 
to pour all their capital into manufacturing dhanush takuas instead.26 
Gandhi’s call does not seem to have carried very much weight, however, and the contest 
continued until, finally, in 1949, khadi organizations declared the ambar charkha the victor. The 
ambar charkha’s inventor and namesake, Ekambarnath, acknowledged his own debt to the mills 
in a brief account of his life published in a Tamil-language newspaper in 1956. Born in a village 
in Tirunelveli district in southern Madras state in January 1920, Ekambarnath belonged to an 
agricultural family of some means. As a child, he demonstrated a strong interest in what he 
termed “technical objects” and recalls making many of his own toys, among them a small 
motorcar and bicycle. He also spun occasionally on the kisan charkha, a modified version of the 
yerwada charkha Gandhi constructed in Yerwada Jail. Ekambarnath set the charkha aside after 
his wedding in 1939 but returned to it shortly after his wife’s death in 1942. Overcome by grief 
and unable to concentrate on any other task, he spent all his waking hours spinning. But, he 
writes, the kisan charkha provided only limited relief. So meager was its output that he soon 
developed a strong “hatred” for it and dedicated himself to the task of improving it. Ekambarnath 
made little progress in this regard until he conferred with a friend employed as a laborer at a 
nearby textile mill. The friend prepared a diagram for him of the spinning equipment used by the 
mill and may even have supplied him with sample machine parts. News of his experiments soon 
spread to adjoining villages, and enthusiastic neighbors stopped by to offer suggestions. One of 
them mentioned the prize Gandhi had promised for the invention of a better charkha, and, 
Ekambarnath reports, he became aware of the charkha’s true importance for the first time. As a 
result, he asked his father to release him from agricultural duties so that he could pursue his 
                                                 
26 M. K. Gandhi, “Dhanush Takua,” Khadi Jagat (Jan. 1942) in Keshav Deodhar, Dhanush Takua (Sevagram:  
Khadi Vidyalay, 1944), 1. 
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experiments fulltime. The father consented and, what’s more, gave his son Rs. 1,000 to construct 
a small workshop on their property and to hire a skilled carpenter to assist him in his labors. By 
1946, Ekambarnath had developed a much-improved charkha but was dissatisfied with the 
quality of punis, or bundles of cotton fibers, he fed into the spinning wheel. Once again, he 
turned to mill workers for advice and prepared an imitation of the machine employed by textile 
mills to transform unruly fibers into neat bundles. Finally, in 1949, he presented his invention to 
a gathering of AISA karyakartas, who applauded his efforts and committed their organization to 
manufacturing the charkha in large numbers.27 
The man assigned the task of conducting further experiments on the ambar charkha was 
Nandlal Patel, former director of AISA’s Research Department. Patel had previously developed a 
modified version of the kisan charkha, for which AISA awarded him a Rs. 125 prize in 1945.28 
In the following years, he had turned his attention to creating a “self-sufficient handloom” 
(swavalambi kargha) that could be operated and stored in even the smallest village hut. Such a 
handloom would replace the old-style pit loom, proper installation of which required that 
weavers dig a large hole in the floor of their hut. Though relatively inexpensive, the pit loom 
posed a considerable burden to non-weaving households unaccustomed to maintaining a pit in 
the middle of their living space. Since by this time AISA had adopted a policy of encouraging 
spinners to take up weaving, it asked Patel and other employees to devise a handloom that could 
be folded up and stowed in a corner at the end of the working day. With Patel’s assistance, khadi 
workers constructed several such handlooms, one of which could even be hung from a peg on the 
                                                 
27 Ekambarnath, “Mainne Ambar Charkha Kaise Banaya?” in Ambar Charkha, Tarunbhai, ed. (Varanasi:  Sarvoday-
Sahitya-Prakashan, 1958), 32-5.  Ekambarnath is occasionally referred to as Ekambar Nair.  For example, see K. G. 
Deodhar, Ambar Charkha:  Haath Pustika (Ahmedabad:  Ambar Charkha Kachahari, 1955), 4. 
28 Budget Samiti meeting, March 28, 1945, All India Spinners Association Papers (hereafter cited as AISA Papers), 
Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (hereafter cited as NMML).  Patel was awarded commendations for several 
other inventions in 1951.  See Budget Samiti meeting, November 11, 1951, AISA Papers, NMML. 
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wall when not in use.29 But his most important contribution to the khadi economy took the form 
of his experiments on the ambar charkha, which he conducted from a workshop in Coimbatore 
District, home to India’s largest concentration of spinning mills outside of Ahmedabad and 
Bombay.30   
With Ekambarnath’s assistance, Patel prepared many different versions of the ambar 
charkha. Finally, in early 1954, he settled upon a wooden version that in one analysis resembled 
nothing so much as a “big typewriter.”31 A compact box twenty-one inches long, sixteen inches 
wide, and twenty-one inches high, it weighed twenty-six pounds and employed four spindles to 
the upright charkha’s one.32 Each additional spindle boosted the ambar charkha’s productivity, 
which initial reports suggested was three-to-four times that of the upright charkha. If the upright 
charkha spinner produced between two and three hanks of yarn in an eight-hour workday, the 
ambar charkha spinner would produce between eight and sixteen—the former if she also cleaned 
and carded her cotton during the eight-hour period, the latter if she performed spinning work 
alone.33 This additional productivity would translate into a much-needed increase in spinning 
wages: twelve to sixteen annas per eight-hour workday as opposed to an average of four annas 
on the upright charkha.34 By way of comparison, the government body charged with 
administering khadi work estimated in 1956 that agricultural laborers earned an average of only 
                                                 
29 Akhil Bharat Charkha Sangh, Tisara Saranjam Sammelan, Sevapuri-Banaras:  Tarikh 15 se 17, November 1949 
(Sevagram:  Akhil Bharat Charkha Sangh, 1950), 11-3. 
30 For more on the Coimbatore textile industry, see S. R. B. Leadbeater, The Politics of Textiles:  The Indian Cotton-
Mill Industry and the Legacy of Swadeshi, 1900-1985 (New Delhi:  Sage Publications, 1993), 14-5. 
31 Deodhar 1955, 4. 
32 Vijayadev, Ambar Charkha:  The Silent Revolutionary (Khadi and Village Industries Commission, 1957), 21. 
33 Deodhar 1955, 19; “Ambar Charkha-Parikshan Yojna,” (Ahmedabad:  Ambar Charkha Samiti Prakashan, 1956), 
44-5; and Deodhar, Ambar Charkha Kyon? (Nasik:  Khadi Gramodyog Ayog Ambar Shiksha Vibhag, 1957), 43.  A 
hank is a unit of yarn found in coiled form.  One hank was equal to approximately 1,000 meters.  One leading khadi 
official estimated that the ambar charkha was actually 7-7.5 times more productive than the upright charkha.  See 
Dwarkanath Lele, Ambar Charkha Programme:  Questions and Answers (Bombay:  Khadi and Village Industries 
Commission, 1958), 3-4.   
34 Deodhar, Ambar Charkha Kyon?, 44.  Sixteen annas is equal to one rupee. 
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twelve annas a day for performing rigorous physical labor.35 If family members took turns plying 
the ambar charkha, they could produce significantly more, perhaps as many as 16-26 hanks per 
day. One government publication suggested that the average family could expect to earn Rs. 600-
900 per year plying the ambar charkha, a figure that, if accomplished, might well have tempted 
many rural dwellers to give up agriculture entirely.36   
The ambar charkha’s most striking feature was almost certainly its physical appearance, 
which ensured that it would never be mistaken for the upright charkha. In the understated words 
of one khadi official, “When the common people see it, they say, ‘This is a machine’.” He 
continued, “Of course, the traditional [upright] charkha is also a machine (yantra). But when one 
considers the common meaning of the word ‘machine’, one is forced to acknowledge that…the 
ambar charkha is more machine-like (yantra-may).” The official in question was most impressed 
by the ambar charkha’s interlocking parts, which seemed to move of their own accord. Their 
“self-propelling” (swayam-chalit) nature made the ambar charkha autonomous in ways other 
spinning wheels were not, a position a second khadi official echoed in an introductory pamphlet 
for karyakartas.37 According to that second official, Dwarkanath Lele, the upright charkha 
spinner required “skill of a certain type,” while the ambar charkha spinner required nothing more 
than “training.” This was because ambar charkha spinning was “mainly mechanical,” while the 
“personality, mood, aptitude, and skill” of the upright charkha spinner influenced the quality of 
her work.38 Or as he put it in the Hindi-language version of his text: 
[I]t can be said that while the common charkha [another name for the upright charkha] is 
subjective (vyakti-nishth), the ambar charkha is objective (vastu-nishth). In other words, 
the common charkha is a spinning implement that the spinner plies and, through it, 
                                                 
35 Ambar Charkha-Parikshan Yojna 1956, 45. 
36 Vijayadev, 22. 
37 K. G. Deodhar, Ambar Charkha Yantra (Nasik:  Khadi Gramodyog Ayog Ambar Shiksha Vibhag, 1957), 1.   
38 Dwarkanath Lele, Ambar Charkha Programme:  Questions and Answers (Bombay:  Khadi and Village Industries 
Commission, 1958), 2-3. 
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manifests his skill. The ambar charkha performs the work of spinning by itself; the 
individual we call the “spinner” merely turns it.39  
 
Other officials marveled at the ambar charkha’s distinctive three-part shape—in addition 
to the spinning wheel described above, a complete ambar charkha set consisted of a dhunai 
modhiya, or carding machine, and an ambar belni, or drawing machine (Fig. 4.1). Khadi 
organizations referred to both the spinning wheel and the set by the name ambar charkha, a 
confusing semantic decision that nevertheless reinforced the two’s fundamental inseparability. 
The ambar charkha had acquired a three-part shape in the first place because its spinning wheel 
component would not work properly unless fed a special type of cotton sliver that required 
specialized carding and drawing machinery for its production.40 As a result, would-be ambar 
charkha spinners had to purchase the entire set, which had the additional benefit of encouraging 
them to perform their own cotton processing work.41 Khadi officials encouraged spinners to 
think of the ambar charkha as a “family instrument,” emphasizing that while other charkhas 
could be plied by only one person at a time, the ambar charkha set could be jointly worked by up 
to three family members.42 They further suggested that the ambar charkha’s three-part shape 
made it a home-based instrument in ways other, more portable charkhas were not. Dozens of 
accounts extolled the ease with which spinners could transport these other charkhas with them 
wherever they went—on a train, to visit a friend, even to attend a public meeting.43 By contrast, 
the ambar charkha was too heavy and bulky to be moved very far, and so would have to take up 
                                                 
39 Dwarkanath Lele, Ambar Prashnottari (Bombay:  Khadi aur Gramodyog Commission, 1958), 4.  Translated from 
the Hindi. 
40 Slivers are created by carding or combing cotton fibers, and then drawing them into long strips of parallel fibers. 
41 “Ambar Charkha Samachar,” Ambar Yojna Samiti (Ahmedabad:  Sarva Seva Sangh, 1955), 117.  
42 The term “family instrument” is taken from The Story of a Silent Economic Revolution 1958, 26. 
43 For example, Prabhakar Diwan, Kisan Charkha:  Peti Charkha tatha Dubta Charkha Sahit (Sevagram:  Akhil 
Bharat Charkha Sangh, 1948 [1945]), 86; B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, I Too Have Spun:  Being a Collection of Notes 
on Spinning (Bombay:  Hind Kitabs Limited, 1946), 78-81; and Vinoba, Mul-Udyog:  Katna [Shikshakon ke liye 
Pathyakram ka Spashtikaran] (Sevagram:  Hindustani Talimi Sangh, 1938), 6. 
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permanent residence in the village hut. The village hut itself would be transformed in the process 
as nominally self-propelling machines worked by a rotating cast of family members were 
installed within it.  
 
 
 Fig. 4.1 The ambar charkha in three-part form44  
 
 
Khadi officials’ excitement at this new arrangement, particularly what some termed the 
ambar charkha’s “objectivity,” would seem to mark a departure from their earlier concern that 
                                                 
44 The Silent Revolution, 17. 
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machinery posed a threat to human subjectivity.  While some officials had defined “machine” in 
fairly neutral terms—for instance, a machine is an “arrangement in which transformation of 
direction, speed, force and energy occur[s]”—others distinguished between tools and machines, 
warning that the latter threatened to turn human beings into slaves.45 And, indeed, a small 
number of officials expressed strong reservations about the ambar charkha in the years following 
its invention. Chief among them was the economist J. C. Kumarappa, who, in an August 1956 
letter, informed the President of India and former AISA trustee Rajendra Prasad that the ambar 
charkha was not a “Gandhian” technology.46 Leading architect of the body of thought referred to 
as “Gandhian economics,” Kumarappa had worked closely with M. K. Gandhi since the late 
1920s, publishing regularly in Gandhi’s journal Young India and even assuming its editorship 
when Gandhi was imprisoned in the early 1930s. In 1935, Kumarappa became the Secretary and 
Gandhi the President of the All India Village Industries Association, established by the Indian 
National Congress to develop the rural Indian economy.47 This close partnership continued until 
Gandhi’s death in 1948, after which Kumarappa continued his efforts to install a village-centric 
development model in independent India for several more years. By 1956, Kumarappa had 
largely retired to an ashram outside Madurai, but he continued to pronounce on matters 
pertaining to the rural economy. Unfortunately, Kumarappa’s terse letter offered no explanation 
for his disavowal of the ambar charkha, but others came to a similar conclusion at approximately 
the same time. One of them, the Union Minister for Planning Gulzarilal Nanda, had authored an 
influential book on khadi in 1935, marshaling an array of statistics and technical data to 
                                                 
45 For the first statement, see Bharatananda, Dhanush Takli (Sevagram:  Hindustani Talimi Sangh, 1943), 2.  For the 
second, see J. B. Kripalani’s speech in Akhil Bharat Charkha Sangh, Tisara Saranjam Sammelan, Sevapuri-
Banaras:  Tarikh 15 se 17, November 1949 (Sevagram:  Akhil Bharat Charkha Sangh, 1950), 4. 
46 Letter D-1384 from J.C. Kumarappa to Rajendra Prasad, p. 19 (of file) (8.8.1956), NMML. 
47 For a brief biographical statement on Kumarappa, see Benjamin Zachariah, Developing India:  An Intellectual and 
Social History (New Delhi:  Oxford University Press, 2005), 177-9. 
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demonstrate that it constituted “a sound economic proposition.”48 But he, along with his 
colleague, the Union Minister for Production K. C. Reddi, argued in 1955 or 1956 that cloth 
produced from yarn spun on the ambar charkha should not be considered khadi.49 Meanwhile, 
AISA’s successor organization, the Sarva Seva Sangh, spent months debating the same question 
before finally agreeing to certify the ambar charkha as a “khadi technology.”50 The anxiety 
experienced by these and other senior officials detracted little from the excitement felt by others, 
one of whom proclaimed the new spinning wheel “the charkha of Gandhiji’s dreams” and 
another the reincarnation of the Hindu god Krishna.51 The skepticism with which some greeted 
the ambar charkha’s invention is nonetheless telling, since it raises a seemingly improbable 
question: how could a spinning wheel, the chief icon of Gandhi’s khadi economy, be anathema 
to that economy?    
 
Reception 
Unsurprisingly for an invention awaited for over three decades, initial reports of the 
ambar charkha were nothing if not adulatory. In fact, as early as 1958, the Khadi and Village 
Industries Commission (KVIC), the body charged with overseeing khadi production and 
consumption in independent India, issued a heavily illustrated promotional album celebrating the 
ambar charkha and its accomplishments. In many respects the album doubled as a biography of 
the ambar charkha or perhaps a pedagogic comic book in which the ambar charkha played the 
starring role. While much of the album is devoted to an account of the problems the ambar 
                                                 
48 Gulzarilal Nanda, “Some Aspects of Khadi,” Congress Jubilee Brochure, No. 3 (Allahabad:  All India Congress 
Committee, 1935), 12.  BL P/T 1194. 
49 All India Khadi and Village Industries Board Annual Report, 1955-6, 306-7; 312.   
50 Ibid, 85. 
51 Vijayadev, 19 and Vinoba Bhave, “Ambaravtar” (October 18, 1956), in K. G. Deodhar, Ambar Charkha Kyon? 
(Nasik:  Khadi Gramodyog Ayog Ambar Shiksha Vibhag, 1957), 14. 
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charkha had been deputed to resolve—agriculturalists have no work for six months of the year, 
urban unemployment is high, families and women are idle—the final ten pages contain a series 
of stirring images. In one, a bejeweled, sari-clad woman resembling Mother India sits on a 
globe, an ambar charkha cradled in her lap (Fig. 4.2). In another, an enormous hand gripping an 
ambar charkha between its fingers rises from the earth, sending stones flying in every direction 
(Fig. 4.3). And in the album’s final image, the ambar charkha is seated on a gigantic pedestal, 
framed by an even larger chakra, or wheel (Fig. 4.4). The emblem of the Indian republic is 
attached to the pedestal’s front, only wrapped around the familiar lions are the words “silent 
economic revolution.”52 As we are told in subsequent comic books, both of them published in 
1959, the ambar charkha is the “silent revolutionary” that will foment this “silent revolution.”53 
Indeed, the images are only slightly less dramatic in the latter albums, one of which shows an 
Indian family taking shelter from a threatening cluster of clouds inside an outsized ambar 
charkha.54 Although these comic books clearly performed a propagandistic function, they also 
reflected genuine excitement, excitement that was in many regards quite warranted.   
 
                                                 
52 The Story of a Silent Economic Revolution (Bombay: Indulal H. Shah, 1958), 28, 29, and 35. 
53 Ambar Charkha (1959), 44 and The Silent Revolution (Khadi and Village Industries Commission, 1959), 22. 
54 The Silent Revolution, 19. 
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Fig. 4. Illustration from a KVIC album showing Mother India cradling the ambar 
charkha.55 
                                                 
55 The Story of a Silent Economic Revolution 1958, 28. 
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Fig. 4.3 Illustration from a KVIC album showing giant hand cradling the ambar charkha.56 
                                                 
56 Ibid, 29. 
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Fig. 4.4 Illustration from a KVIC album showing the ambar charkha on a pedestal with a modified 
version of the motto of the Indian republic on the front.57 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
57 Ibid, 30. 
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The material structure of the ambar charkha made it possible for khadi organizations and 
spinners themselves to effect a major shift in the organization of spinning. Because the ambar 
charkha produced far more yarn than the upright charkha—six to eight hanks in an eight-hour 
workday as opposed to the latter’s one to two—spinners could afford to operate it full-time. Each 
of the three comic books made prominent note of this fact, providing readers with two sets of 
projected earnings: one for the individual who spun only in his “idle time” and one for the 
individual who spun eight hours a day, three hundred days a year.58 Furthermore, because the 
ambar charkha came as a set, family members could complete preparatory tasks like carding and 
drawing cotton while the spinner spun. Indeed, the comic books encouraged spinners to adopt the 
ambar charkha as a “family unit” since, by doing so, they could increase their daily production 
by ten to twenty hanks of yarn.59 Next, the ambar charkha, by centralizing several productive 
processes in a single home, made it possible for spinners to enjoy greater control over their own 
labor. One of the comic books depicts an ideal division of labor in which the oldest son 
specializes in carding, the father and mother in drawing, and the son’s wife and widowed sister 
in spinning. Because of this arrangement the family can afford to reduce its labor in the fields, 
pay off its debts, and still have enough yarn left over for clothing, all while working according to 
its own schedule.60 Finally, because the ambar charkha required greater technical expertise to 
operate than the upright charkha, would-be-spinners had to complete a longer training or 
apprenticeship period. In fact, a government appointed committee recommended in 1956 that 
aspiring spinners complete three months of training and acquire a proficiency certificate before 
                                                 
58 The Story, 22-4; Ambar Charkha (1959), 22; The Silent Revolution, 22-4.  The spinner who worked only in his 
“idle time” could expect to earn at least Rs. 120 per year, while the spinner who worked full-time could expect to 
earn at least Rs. 240. 
59 Ambar Charkha (1959), 22 and Silent Revolution, 17.  Such an increase would likely have guaranteed a yearly 
income of at least Rs. 1,000. 
60 Ambar Charkha (1959), 35-8. 
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becoming eligible for a government subsidized ambar charkha.61 While three months might not 
seem like a long time, would-be spinners, many of them poor peasants more accustomed to 
working in the fields than spinning a wheel, had to ply the charkha for eight hours daily, often at 
an official training facility, in order to gain certification. Such requirements constituted a 
considerable entry barrier to the profession, ensuring that only a relatively small cadre of ambar 
charkha spinners would emerge.  
Even the KVIC and its predecessor the All India Khadi and Village Industries Board 
(AIKVIB) recognized that with the invention of the ambar charkha something fundamental about 
spinning had changed. Prior to 1954, at least for the purposes of official record-keeping, a 
charkha was simply a charkha. Although there were many different models of the charkha in 
existence, each with its own name and distinctive appearance, khadi oversight bodies did not 
distinguish between yarn produced using a box charkha and a kisan charkha, a peti charkha and a 
bamboo charkha.62 However, post-1954 and the invention of the ambar charkha, two categories 
of spinning wheel emerged: traditional, a category that continued to contain within it a variety of 
spinning wheels, and ambar, a singular category reserved for the ambar charkha alone. From that 
point on, yarn, cloth, and even spinners themselves were distinguished from one another based 
on their association with the ambar charkha.63 Yarn became traditional and ambar yarn.  Spinners 
became traditional and ambar spinners. Two central government ministers even questioned 
                                                 
61 Ambar Charkha Enquiry Committee, 1-6; 49. 
62 For the pre-1953 model, see Khadi Guide 1927, Khadi Guide 1927, and All India Khadi and Village Industries 
Board (Ministry of Commerce and Industry):  Annual Report, 1953-54 (Bombay:  KVIC, 1955). 
63 This change can be seen as early as The Second Five Year Plan for Khadi & Village Industries (Bombay:  All 
India Khadi and Village Industries Board, 1955), 18-26.  See also Khadi and Village Industries Commission Act, 
1956 (No. 61 of 1956):  An Act to provide for the establishment of a Commission for the development of Khadi and 
Village Industries and for matters connected therewith (Bombay:  Khadi and Village Industries Commission, 1957), 
32; The Third Five Year Plan for Khadi & Village Industries (Bombay:  Khadi and Village Industries Commission, 
1960), 3-4; and Khadi and Village Industries Commission Annual Report, 1961-62 (Bombay:  Khadi and Village 
Industries Commission Directorate of Publicity, 1962), 27-39. 
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whether cloth produced from ambar charkha spun yarn should be considered khadi in the first 
place, arguing that the AIKVIB itself had not made up its mind on the issue.64 Another 
government-affiliated khadi organization, the Sarva Seva Sangh, waited until the end of 
December 1955 to issue a determination that such cloth was, in fact, khadi.65    
The emergence of a distinction between traditional and ambar cannot be understood 
without reference to two other distinctions, both of which predated the former one by almost 
three decades. While the first, which distinguished between cloth produced by hand and cloth 
produced by machine-powered technologies, is relatively well known, the second has attracted 
considerably less attention.66 Known in some circles as the problem of “full” versus “half” khadi, 
it drew a distinction between khadi produced using handspun yarn and khadi produced using 
millspun yarn.67 Although technically speaking, khadi was cloth made of handspun, handwoven 
yarn, the organization charged with overseeing the khadi movement (the All India Spinners 
Association or AISA) sometimes employed a looser definition. The impetus for the half-full 
distinction was partly a financial one: because millspun yarn was cheaper than handspun yarn 
and AISA paid weavers a fixed wage, weavers had incentive to “cheat,” to pass off millspun yarn 
as handspun yarn to make more money. The impetus was also moral, however—Gandhi and 
some of his colleagues believed that the spinning mills had destroyed the livelihoods of many 
poor Indians—and the Khaddar (Protection of Name) Act was passed in 1934 to address both 
problems.68  Unfortunately, AISA and its partner organizations found it difficult to detect half 
                                                 
64 All India Khadi and Village Industries Board Annual Report, 1955-6, 306-7; 312.  The ministers in question were 
K. C. Reddi, Union Minister for Production, and Gulzarilal Nanda, Union Minister for Planning. 
65 All India Khadi and Village Industries Board Annual Report, 1955-6, 85. 
66 Abigail McGowan argues that the distinction is not a natural one in Crafting the Nation.  In her estimation, a 
consensus that crafts were different from industrial goods emerged in India in the second half of the nineteenth 
century and provided one of the frameworks within which the subsequent khadi movement can be placed (11; 189). 
67 The earliest formulation of full vs. half khadi I can find is contained in the Khadi Guide, 1929, 8. 
68 The Act decreed that khaddar or khadi, here defined as “cotton cloth which is spun and woven by hand in India,” 
“shall be deemed to be trade descriptions within the meaning of the Merchandise Marks Act IV of 1889.”  The 
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khadi, which looked and felt almost exactly the same as full khadi. The very materiality of the 
cloth in question made it possible to conceal deceit, to pretend that millspun yarn was handspun 
yarn. 
Similarly, the problem of traditional versus ambar khadi also stemmed from financial and 
moral concerns.  Because the Government of India had already committed itself to subsidizing 
the sale of khadi—consumers received a rebate of three annas on the rupee plus an additional 
subsidy of one anna on the rupee—it would incur considerable expense by adding another 
category of cloth to the khadi family.69 However, on the face of things, there was no reason why 
ambar cloth should not be treated as khadi since it, too, was made of handspun yarn. Economics 
aside, then, the government had another reason for considering the possibility that ambar cloth 
was something else besides khadi. That reason was the social relations of production that gave 
rise to it. While the KVIC’s enthusiasm for the ambar charkha declined significantly in the early 
1960s, in the 1950s it still expected that the ambar charkha could serve as the foundation of a 
new class of professional spinners. Though it did not describe them as such, these spinners 
would be independent artisans with a distinctive moral economy, not the poorly-trained peasants 
who spun part-time for the khadi movement. In fact, the KVIC even attempted to develop a 
genealogy for this new category of spinner through its visual publications, a genealogy that 
extended all the way back to Harappa and Mohenjo Daro. According to the fictional narrator of 
one of the KVIC’s comic books, a khadi worker charged with spreading the gospel of the ambar 
charkha to eager villagers, the history of the ambar charkha can be traced back to the very 
                                                 
Merchandise Marks Act governed the application of false trade descriptions to a whole host of goods.  When 
extended to khadi, it made it illegal for weavers, merchants, and mills to describe as khadi cloth produced from 
handspun yarn.  C. Rajagopalachari prepared a draft bill to this effect as early as March 1929.  See “Khadi in the 
Legislatures,” 28 March 1929, Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi 45 (4 Feb. 1929-11 May 1929), 280-1. 
69 All India Khadi and Village Industries Board Annual Report, 1955-6, 306-7, 312; and Ambar Charkha Enquiry 
Committee, 62-3.  The AIKVIB proposed providing a rebate of four annas on the rupee to purchasers of ambar 
khadi. 
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moment when “civilization” first “blossomed” in India. For example, pointing to an image of the 
ruins of Mohenjodaro, he explains that archaeological excavations uncovered a charkha there. 
Indians also plied the charkha during the “Vedic,” “Buddhist,” “medieval,” and “Mughal” 
periods but were forced to stop in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries when the arrival of the 
East India Company put an end to their industry (Fig. 4.5).70 While the story of the devastation of 
the Indian textiles industry is a familiar one, the KVIC and its fictional khadi worker tell it with a 
notable twist: the spinning wheel becomes the central actor in the story, the crucial link 
connecting one generation of spinners to the next.     
                                                 
70 Ambar Charkha 1959, 2-6. 
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Fig. 4.5 Illustration from a KVIC album tracing the charkha to Mohenjo Daro..71 
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The KVIC’s comic books are, in many respects, insightful accounts of the relationship 
between machines and bodies, and the ways in which changes in one can effect potentially 
transformative changes in the other. Despite the presence of images showing British boots 
crushing Indian bodies beneath them, this is not a one-sided story, however.72 Instead, machines 
are allowed—even encouraged—to participate in the making of modern India, an India in which 
things and humans work together to decrease unemployment and build peaceful, almost utopian 
village communities. Machines can do this work, in part, because they have bodies of their own, 
bodies that change shape and, in doing so, acquire new capacities. Just as changing human 
bodies can be mapped onto genealogical charts and evolutionary grids, changing machine-bodies 
can also be plotted. In fact, the KVIC includes two family trees in the pages of its comic books, 
one of which places a tiny takli, or spindle, in the background and a much larger ambar charkha 
in the foreground. Arranged between them in order of increasing size are a traditional charkha, a 
Punjabi charkha, a box charkha, and another unidentified predecessor to the ambar charkha.73 
Sweeping them all along as if into the future is a swirling white carpet, a reminder that while all 
charkhas are members of the same genus, their species separates them (Fig. 4.6).74 The second, 
and substantially longer, family tree arranges charkhas in order of invention along consecutive 
pages. Unlike the others, the ambar charkha gets an entire page to itself, framed against a light 
blue background with soft white lines radiating around it.75 These family trees do not belong to 
the charkha alone, however, but instead intersect time and again with “larger” trends in Indian 
history. For example, while the periodization outlined above—Mohenjo Daro and Harappa 
                                                 
71 Ibid, 3. 
72 Ibid, 7-9. 
73 Names are not assigned to any of the charkhas in the comic book itself.  I employ the terminology used by the 
National Gandhi Museum. 
74 Silent Revolution, 15.   
75 Ambar Charkha (1959), 3-21 but especially 12-21. 
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followed by the Vedic period, then the Buddhist period, then the medieval period, then the 
Mughal period then the British period—is a standard if not unproblematic one, it gains its 
coherency in this account through the work done by the charkha and its changing forms. The 
Vedic period is not related to the Mughal period by its common location in a space called India 
(although there are undertones of this, of course) but because the charkha effects a relationship 
between them. Because it is an object with a material body it can move between these “periods” 
in ways that even humans cannot. Indeed, its forward movement through time and space is the 
central force joining one period to another and, more importantly in this case, providing the 
ambar charkha spinners of the 1950s with a connection to an Indian past. Such a connection is 
vital since, on both an empirical and analytical level, the existence of such a history has long 
functioned as a crucial resource for artisanal communities.  
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Fig. 4.6 Illustration from a KVIC album tracing a genealogy of the ambar charkha.76 
 
 
Still, the development of an imagined history for ambar charkha spinners was not in itself 
sufficient and so the Khera Committee, appointed by the Government of India in 1955 to 
evaluate the results of a series of tests performed on the ambar charkha, took the unusual step of 
recommending that newly manufactured ambar charkhas go first to weavers and their families.77 
This step was unusual in that for the preceding two centuries at least, Indian weavers had not 
been in the habit of spinning. Instead they secured their yarn from merchant intermediaries or 
                                                 
76 The Silent Revolution, 14. 
77 For a brief summary of the Khera Committee’s mandate, see All India Khadi and Village Industries Board Annual 
Report, 1955-6, 91.  The Khera Committee was also referred to as the Ambar Charkha committee. 
 162 
 
textile mills and, upon weaving it into cloth, sent it elsewhere for washing and dyeing. As a 
result, the Khera Committee’s proposal that “at least 75 percent of the spinners (other than the 
present spinners of traditional khadi yarn) should be from weavers’ families, until nearly all such 
families have been provided with at least one, preferably two, Ambar charkha sets” threatened 
not only to create an entirely new breed of spinner but to overhaul the weaving industry as 
well.78 Thus, the committee’s recommendations and the KVIC’s subsequent attempts to act upon 
them can be read as an effort to embed the new ambar charkha spinner within a preexisting 
artisanal community of weavers. Such a strategy had the advantage of enacting two 
improvements simultaneously: ambar charkha spinners would become artisans and weavers, up 
to this point the archetypal Indian artisan, would become better ones.   
Interestingly, the material apparatus of the new Indian artisan, the spinner plus weaver, 
would look much like that of the factory with the crucial caveat that centralization, not 
specialization, would be its defining feature. If, as Sevak and others have already informed us, 
the ambar charkha was a “miniature spinning mill decentralized and worked by the villager in his 
hut,” the insertion of the weaver and his handloom into the picture made it more like one of the 
dual spinning-weaving factories that had opened in Kanpur and other industrial centers at the 
beginning of the twentieth century.79 Though these factories sold some of their yarn on the open 
market, they consumed the vast majority of it themselves, thus concentrating virtually the entire 
cloth production process within the space of the factory floor. Similarly, the ambar-charkha-
spinner-plus-weaver-would centralize cloth production within a single home, in the process 
sharply reducing the influence of merchant intermediaries. In addition, by encouraging weavers 
                                                 
78 Ambar Charkha Enquiry Committee, 9 and 50-1. 
79 Sevak, 15. 
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to spin their own yarn, one of the primary threats to the long-term viability of khadi—the 
problem of bad thread, or millspun yarn passed off as handspun yarn—would be eliminated.   
 
Women as Industrial Producers 
The village home had never before been the factory floor. It had, however, been a place 
of work, especially for women, who performed a wide variety of domestic tasks within its four 
walls. If one strand of feminist scholarship has characterized the home as a site of value 
production on the basis of women’s oftentimes invisible labor within it, another has investigated 
how the production of a boundary between home and work meant different things to different 
groups of women, some of whom were largely confined to the home and others of whom labored 
in the factory or the fields. Though members of this latter group enjoyed some freedom of 
mobility, they rarely enjoyed equality of status with their male co-workers, receiving lower 
wages (when indeed they were compensated) and performing more menial tasks. Meanwhile, 
they assumed primary responsibility for a growing number of agricultural operations in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as men increasingly migrated to urban areas to seek out 
factory employment.80 Growing landlessness and the progressive “de-feminization” of the 
industrial workforce in the 1920s and 1930s further increased the ranks of female agricultural 
labor.81 Some women supplemented their agricultural income through cottage industries work 
                                                 
80 Sen 1999, 71-2. 
81 The term “de-feminization” comes from Roy 2005, 134.  Women made up a progressively smaller percentage of 
the industrial workforce in many large centers.  For instance, the percentage of women employed in Bengal’s jute 
industry declined from 20% in 1901 to under 13% in 1941 (Sen 1999, 4).  In Bombay, women’s participation in the 
cotton textiles industry declined from about 25% in the 1890s to 20% by the 1920s to no more than 15% by the late 
1930s (Chandavarkar 1994, 94).  In the Kanpur textiles industry, women’s participation declined from 5% in 1906 
to 2% in 1921 to 1% by 1944 (Joshi 2005, 84-5).  Rajnarayan Chandavarkar attributes de-feminization to several 
factors, especially government legislation that restricted women’s working hours and made employers responsible 
for maternity benefits.  He adds that families generally benefited from a division of labor making women 
responsible for maintaining rural landholdings while assigning to men the role of seeking out wage labor in urban 
areas.  As a result, those women who entered the urban labor market tended to be widowed or to have an 
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but found that many of the tasks they had previously performed (among them, rice pounding, 
grain husking, and flour grinding) were being taken over by small-size mechanized units.82 And, 
to make matters worse, new “ideologies of domesticity” “valorised women as mothers and 
homemakers rather than as workers,” thus divesting even income-producing domestic labor of 
much of its economic content.83 
Meanwhile, Indian politicians and bureaucrats drew increasingly explicit connections 
between household management and national development in the years immediately following 
independence. Indian nationalists had long posited the existence of such a link, equating 
household management alternately with the management of the community and of the nation.84 
In Partha Chatterjee’s telling, the “nationalist resolution of the women’s question” in the late 
nineteenth century produced a “new woman,” distinct from both her “traditional” and “Western” 
counterparts. This new woman was closely connected to a particular spatial formation:  the inner, 
spiritual domain of the home and family. Significantly, the nation came into being in this inner 
domain, thus remaining separate (and protected) from the outer, material domain in which 
colonialism reigned supreme.85 The association between home, woman, and nation forged under 
colonial rule would be mobilized once again in the post-independence era in the face of chronic 
food shortages. State officials saddled women, in particular, with the task of monitoring family 
                                                 
unemployed or underemployed husband.  See Chandavarkar, The Origins of Industrial Capitalism:  Business 
Strategies and the Working Classes in Bombay, 1900-1940 (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 1994), 94-9.   
82 Sen 1999, 78-80. 
83 These ideologies gained force in different parts of India at different times.  Samita Sen argues that such an 
ideology emerged among the Bengali elite in the late nineteenth century.  This ideology dissociated domesticity 
from productivity and the family from the economy.  See Sen 1999, 56-60.  Chitra Joshi, by contrast, suggests that 
these ideologies gathered force among Kanpuri mill managers and colonial officials only from the 1920s and 30s.  
See Joshi 2005, 87. 
84 The classic statement on the relationship between household management and the nation is Partha Chatterjee, The 
Nation and its Fragments:  Colonial and Postcolonial Histories (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1993), 116-
34. 
85 Chatterjee 1993, 146-51. 
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food consumption, thus making them partly responsible for India’s failure to accomplish food 
sovereignty.86 But as Samita Sen has argued in relation to an earlier period, women’s 
consumption-related tasks had been evacuated of all economic value and were therefore 
understood to be inherently unproductive.87 KVIC’s reconfiguration of the home as a factory and 
home-based industrial labor as a national obligation thus marked a significant reorientation of the 
home-nation dyad, all the more so when it became clear that KVIC meant for women to serve as 
India’s normative industrial producers.       
Consider the promotional albums released by KVIC to publicize its vision for the ambar 
charkha. Three in number, the albums narrated the ambar charkha’s history through a 
combination of statistical accounts of rural poverty, staged dialogues between imaginary 
villagers, and elaborate imagery. One of the albums introduced readers to what it termed “a 
typical Indian rural family” consisting of nine members: Gaurishankar, the father, who works his 
small plot of land for six months a year; Ambabai, the mother, who runs the household; 
Gopinath, the older son, who assists his father in the fields; Gopinath’s wife Saroj, who nurses 
their young child; a nameless daughter and younger son; and the widow and daughter of 
Gaurishankar’s deceased brother. The family, explains the album’s anonymous narrator, is 
“poor, quite poor”; it does not generate enough from agricultural work to supply even its most 
basic needs. One day, a neighbor informs Gopinath that a training center has been opened in the 
village to provide instruction in the ambar charkha. Gopinath greets this news with disdain: 
“What? A new charka?  Ha haa! Tell it to somebody [else]. I’ve no time for your Charkha; what 
                                                 
86 Hayden S. Kantor, “‘A Dead Letter of the Statute Book’:  The Strange Bureaucratic Life of the Bihar Food 
Economy and Guest Control Order, 1950-1954,” South Asian History and Culture (2016), 2-3; Benjamin Siegel, 
“‘Self-Help which Ennobles a Nation’:  Development, Citizenship, and the Obligations of Eating in India’s 
Austerity Years,” Modern Asian Studies (November 2015), 33-5; and Taylor C. Sherman, “From ‘Grow More Food’ 
to ‘Miss a Meal’:  Hunger, Development and the Limits of Post-Colonial Nationalism in India, 1947-1957,” South 
Asia:  Journal of South Asian Studies 36, no. 4 (2013):  571-88. 
87 Sen 1999, 59-60. 
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can it give?” But Gopinath is eventually persuaded to enroll his wife in the first batch of trainees, 
and after three months, she is given a charkha to take home with her.88 The entire family crowds 
around Saroj to examine the charkha and after a few initial missteps, they all learn how to 
operate each of its three components. With the exception of the baby, each family member plies 
the charkha for at least a few hours a day, and their joint efforts generate an additional monthly 
cash income of Rs. 70. The family’s rising fortunes create “a stir in the village.” The daughter 
finds a good husband, the youngest son is sent away to school, and Gopinath pays off a 
longstanding debt. “And above all,” the narrator comments, “Ambar Charkha made it possible 
for the members of the family to join in co-operative effort, establish harmony and thus opened 
the road to prosperity.”89 
The other two albums told much the same story. In one, a peasant family improves its 
fortunes by procuring three ambar charkhas, one each for the grandfather, wife, and young son.90 
In the other, we see three generations of a single family working the ambar charkha, dhunai 
modhiya, and ambar belni side-by-side with a pile of coins and rupee notes stacked between 
them.91 Other images depict village life more generally, emphasizing the changes the ambar 
charkha will bring. The “before” images (before the ambar charkha, that is) show hungry 
villagers clad only in tattered rags, the children playing listlessly and the men sitting idly on the 
ground or smoking a pipe to pass the time. Meanwhile, women tend anxiously to babies or 
gossip with their neighbors. Even the cows do nothing for much of the year, their ribs visible 
through their skin as they lie sleeping in the dirt (Fig. 4.7). The “after” images, by contrast, 
depict a bucolic Eden. Villagers are smiling and well fed, their clothes clean and neatly pressed. 
                                                 
88 Vijayadev, 27-9. 
89 Vijayadev, 33-9. 
90 The Story of a Silent Economic Revolution (Bombay:  Khadi and Village Industries Commission, 1958),  
91 The Silent Revolution (Khadi and Village Industries Commission, 1959), 16. 
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Domestic life is blissful as families sit together, take walks together, plan their futures together. 
Caste and religious prejudices are overcome, and women gain in social status. The cows look 
happier and fatter. And lest we forget who or what to thank for this astonishing transformation, 
we see an ambar charkha whirring busily in every village home (Figs. 4.8 and 4.9).92 
 
 
Fig. 4.7 Illustration from a KVIC album showing village life in the absence of the ambar charkha.93 
 
 
                                                 
92 Vijayadev, especially 27-8 and 43-4; The Silent Revolution 1959, especially 2-6 and 19-20. 
93 The Silent Revolution 1959, 2. 
 168 
 
 
Fig. 4.8 Illustration from a KVIC album showing village life after the ambar charkha.94 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
94 Ibid, 19. 
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Fig. 4.9 Illustration from a KVIC album showing village life after the ambar charkha.95 
 
These fairly generic images of village uplift would not look out of place in the 
promotional materials for other rural reconstruction programs, including the much-vaunted 
Community Development program. However, other images, particularly those that emphasize 
the special role performed by women, mark a point of divergence. In a notable reversal of 
prevailing gender roles, women are portrayed as the primary architects of rural industrialization. 
For instance, it is women who receive initial training on the ambar charkha, then instruct male 
                                                 
95 Ibid, 20. 
 170 
 
relatives in its use. We see this clearly in the case of the aforementioned Saroj, who is first 
depicted meekly assenting to her husband’s command to do well in the training program and 
subsequently as the authority to whom her husband turns when he is confused about how to 
operate the ambar charkha.96 Other husbands behave in a similar fashion, even periodically 
showing up at the training center to offer their wives refreshments.97   
KVIC reports suggest that women may have performed this instructional role even 
outside the pages of a fictional album. For instance, K. G. Deodhar, the head of KVIC’s Ambar 
Education Department, described the process by which an ambar charkha generally entered a 
household:  
A sister (bahan) learns the charkha, takes it home, and teaches her relatives how to use it. 
Her house becomes a school (vidyalay) and that sister becomes a teacher (shikshika). In 
this fashion, in just a short time, the entire house becomes familiar with the ambar 
charkha, and the ambar charkha turns there from dawn till dusk.  
 
To bolster his point, he cited examples from across India, asserting that a similar pattern was in 
effect in Madhya Bharat’s Shivpuri village, Rajasthan’s Bansa Village, Madras’ Mallekund 
Palayam village, and many others.98 Women had even proven themselves capable mechanics, he 
commented, intuitively understanding how to repair broken spinning wheels and communicating 
this knowledge to others.99   
The pedagogical role khadi organizations assigned to women both mirrored and diverged 
from the pedagogical role social reformers had assigned them more than half a century earlier. 
Chatterjee’s new woman had been encouraged to acquire a “modern” education partly so that she 
could serve as a better companion to her husband and partly so that she could better instruct her 
                                                 
96 Vijayadev, 30-4. 
97 Vijayadev, 42. 
98 K. G. Deodhar, Ambar Charkha Yantra (Nasik:  Khadi Gramodyog Ayog Ambar Shiksha Vibhag, 1957), 36-8.  
Translated from the Hindi. 
99 Deodhar, Ambar Charkha Yantra 1957, 33. 
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children.100 By contrast, the ideal woman envisioned by khadi organizations was expected to 
supply her family with an industrial education, then supervise them while they worked. 
Moreover, if the family described by Chatterjee was an upper-caste, Bengali Hindu one, the 
family depicted in KVIC promotional materials was a generic unit—Hindu or Muslim, upper-
caste or lower-caste, joint or nuclear. In this respect, it also differed from the stock family of the 
social reform literature, which was almost always elite and/or urban.101 Still, in their insistence 
that women assume primary responsibility for education within the family, khadi organizations 
were retreading old ground even as they sought to expand the scope of what qualified as the 
proper subject of women’s education. 
It is worth dwelling on this point a little longer, since prior to this time, women had not 
been the primary targets of technical education. On the contrary, colonial officials and Indian 
reformers alike had made the “artisan”—almost always conceptualized as a man—the near 
exclusive focus of their technical schemes. As part of those efforts, they had established 
technical schools throughout India to instruct artisans in design and production techniques.102 
While some government and private institutions also established home economics courses for 
women, these seem to have been regarded as primarily domestic, and not technical, pursuits.103 
Why, then, did khadi organizations identify women as the proper subjects of an industrial 
                                                 
100 Chatterjee 1993, 127-30. 
101 Examples are Gail Minault, Secluded Scholars:  Women’s Education and Muslim Social Reform in Colonial 
India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998); Geraldine Forbes, Women in Modern India (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 1996); and Faisal Devji, “Gender and the Politics of Space:  The Movement for Women’s Reform 
in Muslim India, 1857-1900,” South Asia 14, no. 1 (1991):  141-53. 
102 Abigail McGowan, Crafting the Nation in Colonial India (New York:  Palgrave MacMillan, 2009) and Arindam 
Dutta, The Bureaucracy of Beauty:  Design in the Age of its Global Reproducibility (New York:  Routledge, 2007). 
103 For instance, the Allahabad Agricultural Institute, established by the American missionary Sam Higginbottom in 
the 1910s, began to offer a home economics course in 1936.  Higginbottom’s wife, Ethelind, directed the course.  
See Sam Higginbottom, Sam Higginbottom, Farmer:  An Autobiography (New York:  Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1949), 209-10 and 224-5. 
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education and, by extension, as the most suitable agents for the reindustrialization of the 
countryside? 
Khadi institutions did not offer a straightforward answer to this question, so we are left 
with multiple possibilities. The first of these is that the systematic undervaluation of women’s 
work predisposed families to view female labor as more dispensable than male labor. In order to 
receive an ambar charkha, individuals had to complete a three-month training program—six 
weeks of classroom instruction followed by six weeks of supervised practical work—and pass an 
exam.104 Though some training institutes offered a small stipend to trainees, others did not, 
meaning that families were probably reluctant to send their highest-earning members to the 
training program.105 Since women tended to earn less than men and to perform a higher 
percentage of work assigned little-to-no economic value, they may have seemed the most 
obvious candidates for the course. This explanation is not entirely satisfactory, however, since 
women made up a progressively larger share of the rural workforce as the twentieth century 
advanced. While a growing number of men migrated to urban areas in search of industrial 
employment, women were far more likely to stay put or to migrate relatively short distances to 
work as seasonal agricultural laborers.106 As a result, even as urban industry was increasingly 
masculinized, rural agricultural work was increasingly feminized, making women the de facto 
protagonists of the rural economy.   
The KVIC albums drew a direct link between women’s technical labor and the 
reproduction of the rural household through a series of vignettes, many of which portrayed 
                                                 
104 Tarunbhai, Ambar Charkha (Varanasi:  Sarvoday-Sahitya-Prakashan, 1958), 86 and Government of India, 
Ministry of Production, The Report of the Ambar-Charkha Enquiry Committee, 1956 (Delhi:  Government of India 
Press, 1956), 1-6 and 49. 
105 Haynes 2012, 211 reports that government weaving schools often had difficulty attracting participants precisely 
because weaving families found it prohibitively expensive to release even small children from their weaving duties. 
106 This general pattern is discussed in Chandavarkar 1994, 94-9 and Sen 1999, 25-33. 
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women as their family’s primary breadwinners. For instance, one album narrated the story of a 
“young housewife from Subhashnagar, Dum Dum, Calcutta-28, mother of three children,” who 
“saved her family from starvation with the help of her Ambar Set.” “She has defeated her 
husband in the race for earning more. Her husband working eight hours a day in a nearby 
factory, earns only Rs. 30 a month, while she earned Rs. 65 in the month of July by plying her 
Ambar Charkha.”107 Another album introduced readers to a man who, having lost his job at a 
factory, returns home to his wife. In response to a neighbor’s questions, he declares that he is not 
“panicky” and will make ends meet by assisting his wife on the ambar charkha (Fig. 4.10). Other 
vignettes told the story of households composed entirely of women, as in the case of “a family of 
four in Rajasthan consisting of a widowed mother, two unmarried daughters and a widowed 
daughter” that earns Rs. 100 a month jointly plying the ambar charkha.108   
 
                                                 
107 The Silent Revolution, 19.  
108 Vijayadev, 41-2. 
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Fig. 4.10 Illustration from a KVIC album depicting the ambar charkha as a sort of unemployment 
insurance.109  
 
It is far from clear that we should regard these vignettes as straightforward cases of 
female empowerment, however. After all, khadi organizations had shown only intermittent 
interest in challenging prevailing gender hierarchies and had even reinforced them through their 
hiring decisions. Though they insisted that both men and women ply the charkha, they 
simultaneously staffed their governing bodies almost exclusively with men and even expelled 
women from certain positions.110 For instance, at the height of the ambar charkha program in 
1958, UP’s Shri Gandhi Ashram decreed that women would no longer be hired to inspect and 
repair ambar charkhas, and that those women currently performing such work would be 
                                                 
109 Vijayadev, 42. 
110 National and state executive committees rarely counted more than one woman among their members.   
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retrenched.111 We should keep these examples in mind when evaluating the extent to which 
khadi organizations truly aspired to change women’s social standing through the medium of the 
ambar charkha program. Perhaps efforts to establish a new household economy had to pass 
through women by virtue of their longstanding association with the home. And perhaps, just as 
in the late nineteenth century, some social reformers encouraged women to acquire a “modern” 
education in order to better fulfill their primary roles as wife and mother, khadi officials viewed 
an industrial education as a prerequisite for women’s new role as productive national citizen. 
 Crucially, this new role does not seem to have extended outside the home. On the 
contrary, khadi organizations repeatedly emphasized that women’s primary responsibility was to 
their immediate family and that even neighbors could not always be relied upon to provide help 
in times of need. Consider the case of the fictional Savitri, whose struggle to support her two 
younger brothers after the death of her parents and older brother is the focus of the Hindi-
language play Ek Sahara, or A Support. Published in 1960 by the Gandhian-inspired All India 
Sarva Seva Sangh, the play opens with an invocation: “A true helpmate is one who aids 
humanity in uplifting itself. That helpmate is useless which maims the body, rendering its limbs 
inert.”112 Rather cryptic, this invocation nevertheless alerts the reader to what will prove the 
play’s central theme: self-sufficiency, especially the perils of overreliance on others.   
 The play’s first section narrates Savitri’s efforts to secure clothing and schoolbooks for 
her brothers. She largely fails in this attempt, not for lack of effort, but because of the greed and 
callousness of other members of her community. The local merchant refuses to pay Savitri the 
full value of a gold bracelet she brings to his shop to pawn. The local holyman appeals to God to 
                                                 
111 Prabandhak samiti, 14-17 July 1958, Shri Gandhi Ashram, 226.  SGA did not offer an explanation for this 
decision.  
112 Ramchet Verma, Ek Sahara: Natak (Kashi: Akhil Bharat Sarva-Seva-Sangh-Prakashan, 1960), foreword.  
Translated from Hindi. 
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help her but will not loan her money himself. A local notable refuses to give her work but offers 
to take her on as his mistress. A female neighbor offers a small loan but lacks the means to 
continue doing so.113 Finally, in despair, Savitri informs her brothers that kindness and religion 
have vanished from the world, and leads them out of the village to seek a new life elsewhere. But 
even then, their fortunes continue to decline. An old woman threatens them with a stick when 
they ask for water on the grounds that they might belong to the “wrong caste.”114   
 Relief arrives in the form of a nameless old man, who offers them water and lets them 
rest in his hut. But, he warns, he cannot take care of them forever. Instead, they must learn how 
to provide for themselves. To illustrate this point, he tells Savitri the story of a rabbit who was 
once threatened by a pack of dogs. Although the rabbit counted all the animals of the jungle 
among his friends, one-by-one they refused to aid him for fear the dogs would attack them, too. 
The rabbit grew increasingly desperate until, finally, he remembered his mother’s words from 
long ago—“You will have to learn how to help yourself one day.” And, with that, he leapt high 
into the air, vanishing from the dogs’ sight and gaining his freedom. “Daughter!” announced the 
old man, “In just this fashion, you, too, should not rely on anyone’s help in this world. You 
should place faith only in your own labor.”115 
 He then proceeds to tell Savitri about the ambar charkha, which, he claims, is the only 
support she requires. To reinforce his point, he narrates the story of Ram Pyari, a washerman’s 
daughter from Rajasthan, who has earned Rs. 2,500 in the last two years working exclusively on 
the ambar charkha.116 Savitri agrees to give spinning a try, and after fifteen days, she has made 
substantial progress, producing 16-20 hanks of yarn a day. This covers all her expenses, 
                                                 
113 Ibid, 15-23. 
114 Ibid, 25. 
115 Ibid, 28-9.  Translated from Hindi. 
116 Ibid, 30-1. 
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including the hut she has constructed with the old man’s assistance. Her two brothers assist her 
but still find the time to play for at least two hours every day. She even advises her impoverished 
neighbor to take up the ambar charkha, exclaiming:   
You can see how helpful the ambar is at providing an income of Rs. 1.5-2 per day even as 
you sit in your home. I say, ‘Today, given Bharat’s [India’s] present circumstances, the 
ambar charkha can help so many families to provide for their daily needs, to make 
themselves self-sufficient [swavalamban] and to help the nation [rashtra] move 
forward’.117 
 
She becomes involved in constructive work, too, and is appointed the manager of a cooperative 
store.118 And when she finally returns to her old village, the people who previously shunned her 
gather round to beg her forgiveness.119  
 The “helpmate” of the play’s invocation is the ambar charkha, the use of which enables 
Savitri to accomplish economic self-sufficiency for herself and her brothers. Though she requires 
some initial assistance in the form of an ambar charkha and spinning lessons, she soon assumes 
control over her own fate, a state of affairs the author recommends to everyone. Significantly, it 
takes relatively little effort for Savitri to become an autonomous economic agent.  While in the 
early stages of the play she struggles to secure assistance from others, by the middle, she has 
acquired an ambar charkha and, with it, the means to fend for herself.   
 
Conclusion 
The qualities that separated the ambar charkha from the upright charkha made it 
appealing to an audience that extended beyond rank-and-file Gandhians. Members of the Indian 
planning establishment were especially excited since they viewed it as a technology potentially 
                                                 
117 Ibid, 34-7.  Translated from Hindi. 
118 Ibid, 42-3. 
119 Ibid, 46-7. 
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capable of providing full-time employment at little cost to the state. Partly as a result, the KVIC 
developed a plan to manufacture and introduce 2.5 million ambar charkhas to Indian households 
by the end of 1961. This plan failed spectacularly, however, leaving KVIC in considerable 
debt.120  As if this was not enough, a committee appointed by the central government in 1959 to 
evaluate the ambar charkha had been extremely critical of its potential to become a household 
item. According to its survey, the upright and ambar charkhas together supplied an average 
annual employment of 119 days or less with the upright charkha accounting for sixty percent of 
those. In its judgment, the ambar charkha would be of little help in producing full 
employment.121 
                                                 
120 This plan is discussed in many publications, including “Ambar Charkha-Parikshan Yojna,” (Ahmedabad:  Ambar 
Charkha Samiti Prakashan, 1956), 58. 
121 Prasad 2001, 167. 
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CONCLUSION 
In November 2014, Indian news organizations reported that the Government of India 
(GoI) was preparing to challenge a German company’s registration of “khadi” as an international 
trademark.1 Although government officials publicly complained that the German company’s 
actions amounted to theft of India’s intellectual heritage, their submission to the trademark office 
made a different, more technical argument: that the GoI alone possessed the legal authority to 
certify cloth as “khadi” in both the domestic and the international market. The GoI’s case rested 
on the argument that only the Khadi and Village Industries Commission (KVIC) enjoyed the 
legal authority to certify cloth as “khadi.” KVIC had inherited this authority from its predecessor 
organization, the All India Spinners Association (AISA), the GoI explained in its brief. AISA, in 
turn, had inherited its authority directly from Gandhi, the putative inventor of “the khadi brand.” 
In support of this argument, the GoI submitted historical documents signed by Gandhi and others 
purporting to show that KVIC (and before it AISA) enjoyed the exclusive right to regulate khadi 
production and thus to determine what counted as “khadi” in both the domestic and the 
international market. While the GoI’s legal case attracted an outpouring of public support, the 
employees of several khadi institutions privately expressed their discomfort to me. “Gandhiji 
would not like this,” one of them said. “He did not even take out a copyright on his own books. 
                                                 
1 Dilasha Seth, “Government Objects to German Company Khadi Naturprodukte Using Khadi Trademark,” 
Economic Times, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/government-objects-to-german-
company-khadi-naturprodukte-using-khadi-trademark/articleshow/45029004.cms, accessed March 18, 2017. 
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Khadi belongs to everyone. It can be made by everyone. How can you take out a trademark on 
something like that?”2  
Then in February 2017, Indian news organizations reported that KVIC had sent a legal 
notice to several Indian companies ordering them to stop using the brand name “khadi” to sell 
their products. KVIC, citing khadi’s historical importance, has claimed exclusive ownership over 
the khadi brand since at least 2013.3 In practice, this means that it reserves the right to determine 
which companies can market their goods as “khadi.” Companies interested in using the khadi 
brand must first demonstrate that they have complied with all relevant regulations and submit 
samples of their products for inspection. The head of the government agency charged with 
overseeing compliance explained that the regulations were put in place to safeguard khadi’s 
purity. “Certain rules have to be followed,” he continued, else there was no way of guaranteeing 
that the khadi marketed by the companies in question was genuine.4 The experts asked to 
comment on the legal case almost uniformly condemned the government’s position. The head of 
a non-governmental organization dedicated to revitalizing traditional handicrafts pointed out that 
khadi was meant to be a decentralized project.5 A major Indian newspaper published an editorial 
suggesting that the khadi brand rules were so onerous as to threaten a return to License Raj, the 
derogatory name assigned to the period prior to economic liberalization when the state assumed a 
more explicitly interventionist role in the economy.6 And the employee of one of India’s oldest 
                                                 
2 Personal conversation, April 2, 2018. Translated from Hindi. “Gandhiji” is an honorific for Gandhi. 
3 It claims ownership under the Khadi Mark Regulations of 2013. 
4 Meha Mathur, “Khadi Spinning Trouble,” India Legal, http://www.indialegallive.com/constitutional/special-
report/khadi-spinning-trouble-20583, accessed March 17, 2017. 
5 Mridula Chari, “Legal Notice to Fabindia Puts Spotlight on 2013 Rule: Firms Selling Khadi Need Official 
Approval,” Scroll, https://scroll.in/article/829370/legal-notice-to-fabindia-puts-spotlight-on-2013-rule-firms-selling-
khadi-need-official-approval, accessed March 17, 2017. 
6 “Who Owns Khadi Trademark? Why KVIC’s Fight with Fabindia Suggests Norms are Quite Stifling,” Finance 
Express, http://www.financialexpress.com/opinion/who-owns-khadi-trademark-why-kvics-fight-with-fabindia-
suggests-norms-are-quite-stifling/556301/, accessed March 17, 2017. 
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khadi institutions complained to me that Gandhi would have frowned upon the very notion of a 
khadi brand.7  
 Implicit in the reaction of these interviewees was the presumption that KVIC had 
overstepped its bounds, thus threatening to take the khadi economy in a new and undesirable 
direction. Khadi workers, in particular, worried that KVIC’s foray into the world of trademark 
law and court proceedings would detract from its original mission, whatever that happened to be. 
And yet from the perspective of KVIC officials, they were just doing what khadi workers had 
always done: adapt to changes in the economic landscape. 
 
The Khadi Economy in Perspective 
 This dissertation has traced the development of the khadi economy across the late 
colonial and early postcolonial periods, showing how a network of institutions long presumed to 
constitute a traditionalizing zone within the Indian economy instead lay at the heart of processes 
of modern economy formation. In doing so, it has argued that the history of the khadi economy 
offers critical insights into some of the major developments in twentieth-century Indian 
economic life, including the changing spatial relationship between industry and agriculture; the 
rise of formal organizations and scientific management; the establishment of standardized 
weights and measures; and the creation of technological development programs. 
 Just what does the khadi economy tell us about the processes that went into the making of 
the modern Indian economy between 1915 and 1965? For starters, it shows us that many 
different parties, including members of the khadi economy, shared a common understanding of 
how to make an economy—that is, they all recognized the power of standardization, 
                                                 
7 Personal conversation, May 18, 2017. Translated from Hindi.  
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bureaucratization, centralization in economic life. Simultaneously, however, it demonstrates that 
many of the tools taken to be constitutive of the modern economy could be deployed to different 
ends. In fact, this was where much of the political potential of the khadi economy lay: in material 
objects and practices modified by khadi workers to meet new ends. Khadi workers modified 
these instruments to better conform to their economic imagination, which prioritized goals at 
odds with that of, first, the colonial state and, later, the postcolonial state’s planning apparatus. 
Though they did not always succeed in their mission, khadi workers nevertheless built an 
enduring economy, one which now derives part of its power from its enmeshment with state 
agencies. 
 
The Future 
 What then is the future of the khadi economy? Its continued relevance in post-
liberalization-era India suggests that it is not going away anytime soon. In fact, KVIC has 
become more aggressive in recent years, with its chairperson announcing in the summer of 2018 
that the central government would soon be taking “Brand Khadi” to a new level.8 In fact, it is 
possible that a new generation of consumers will take an interest in khadi, attracted by its stated 
commitment to a living wage for workers and sustainable development. Regardless of its path, it 
is likely that it will continue to participate in the major developments in Indian economic life and 
thus to serve as one vantage point from which to observe the shifting configurations of the Indian 
economy. 
 
                                                 
8 T. E. Narasimhan, “Reimagining Brand Khadi,” Business Standard (10 July 2018). 
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APPENDIX: UNITS OF MEASUREMENT 
Crore – Ten million 
 
Gaz – A yard 
 
Gundi – A hank  
 
Hank – A measure of length for yarn, varying with the material. In the imperial system, a hank of 
cotton yarn is equal to 840 yards and a hank of wool yarn is equal to 560 yards. 
 
Kali – A unit of length for yarn particular to khadi metrology. A kali of cotton yarn is equal to 21 
⅓ yards. 
 
Lakh – One hundred thousand 
 
Lati – A lea 
 
Lea – A unit of length for yarn, varying with the weight of the fibers in the yarn. In the imperial 
system, a lea of cotton is equal to 120 yards. 
 
Pati – A unit of length for yarn particular to khadi metrology. A pati of cotton yarn is equal to 53 
⅓ yards. 
 
Ratal – A pound 
 
Rupee – Basic unit of Indian currency 
 
Round – A unit of length for yarn derived partly from the circumference of the bobbin around 
which yarn is wound. In the imperial system, a round of cotton yarn is equal to 1 ½ yards. In the 
khadi system, it is equal to 1 ⅓ yards. 
 
Tar – A round   
 
Tola – A unit of mass. In the khadi system, there are 40 tolas in 1 pound. 
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